Editing Epiphenomenalism (section)

== Arguments against ==
The most powerful argument against epiphenomenalism is that it is self-contradictory: if we have knowledge about epiphenomenalism, then our brains know about the existence of the mind, but if epiphenomenalism were correct, then our brains should not have any knowledge about the mind, because the mind does not affect anything physical.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | first=William | last=Robinson | editor=Edward N. Zalta | year=2015 | title=Epiphenomenalism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | volume=1 | issue=4 | pages=539–547 | doi=10.1002/wcs.19 | pmid=26271501 | s2cid=239938469 |edition = Fall 2015 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#SelStu}}</ref>

However, some [[Philosophy|philosophers]] do not accept this as a rigorous refutation. For example, philosopher [[Victor Argonov]] states that epiphenomenalism is a questionable, but experimentally falsifiable theory. He argues that the personal mind is not the only source of knowledge about the existence of mind in the world. A creature (even a [[philosophical zombie]]) could have knowledge about the mind and the mind-body problem by virtue of some innate knowledge.<ref>{{cite journal | first1=Victor |last1=Argonov |title=Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach |journal=Journal of Mind and Behavior |volume=35 |year=2014 |pages=51–70 |url=http://philpapers.org/rec/ARGMAA-2 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161020014221/http://philpapers.org/rec/ARGMAA-2 |archive-date=2016-10-20 }}</ref> The information about the mind (and its problematic properties such as [[qualia]] and the [[hard problem of consciousness]]) could have been, in principle, implicitly "written" in the material world since its creation. Epiphenomenalists can say that God created an immaterial mind and a detailed "program" of material human behavior that makes it possible to speak about the [[mind–body problem]]. That version of epiphenomenalism seems highly exotic, but it cannot be excluded from consideration by pure theory. However, Argonov suggests that experiments could refute epiphenomenalism. In particular, epiphenomenalism could be refuted if neural correlates of consciousness can be found in the human brain, and it is proven that human speech about consciousness is caused by them.

Some philosophers, such as [[Daniel Dennett]], reject both epiphenomenalism and the existence of qualia with the same charge that [[Gilbert Ryle]] leveled against a [[Cartesianism|Cartesian]] "[[ghost in the machine]]", that they too are [[category mistake]]s. A quale or conscious experience would not belong to the category of objects of reference on this account, but rather to the category of ways of doing things.

[[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalists]] assert that mental states are well described by their overall role, their activity in relation to the organism as a whole. "This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a 'calculating machine', but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century."<ref name="sep-functionalism">{{cite encyclopedia |first=Janet |last=Levin |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2010 |title=Functionalism |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Summer 2010 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/functionalism/}}</ref> In so far as it mediates stimulus and response, a mental [[Function (computer science)|function]] is analogous to a program that processes [[input/output]] in [[automata theory]]. In principle, [[multiple realisability]] would guarantee [[Universal Turing machine|platform dependencies]] can be avoided, whether in terms of hardware and operating system or, ''ex hypothesi'', biology and philosophy. Because a [[high-level language]] is a practical requirement for developing the most complex programs, functionalism implies that a [[non-reductive physicalism]] would offer a similar advantage over a strictly eliminative materialism.

[[Eliminative materialism|Eliminative materialists]] believe "[[folk psychology]]" is so [[Scientific method|unscientific]] that, ultimately, it will be better to eliminate primitive concepts such as ''mind,'' ''desire'' and ''belief,'' in favor of a future neuroscientific account. A more moderate position such as [[J. L. Mackie]]'s ''error theory'' suggests that false beliefs should be stripped away from a mental concept without eliminating the concept itself, the legitimate core meaning being left intact.

[[Benjamin Libet]]'s results are quoted<ref>[[Daniel Wegner|Wegner D.]], 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.</ref> in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a "conscious veto", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action. In ''[[Freedom Evolves]]'', Daniel Dennett argues that a no-free-will conclusion is based on dubious assumptions about the location of consciousness, as well as questioning the accuracy and interpretation of Libet's results.<ref>Dennett, Daniel. (2003) ''Freedom evolves''.</ref> Similar criticism of Libet-style research has been made by neuroscientist [[Adina Roskies]] and cognitive theorists Tim Bayne and [[Alfred Mele]].

Others have argued that data such as the [[Bereitschaftspotential]] undermine epiphenomenalism for the same reason, that such experiments rely on a subject reporting the point in time at which a conscious experience and a conscious decision occurs, thus relying on the subject to be able to consciously perform an action. That ability would seem to be at odds with early epiphenomenalism, which according to Huxley is the broad claim that consciousness is "completely without any power… as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".<ref name="Flanagan1992">{{cite book |first=O.J. |last=Flanagan |year=1992 |title=Consciousness Reconsidered |series=Bradford Books |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-56077-1 |lccn=lc92010057 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yFOqQgAACAAJ |page=131}}</ref> [[Mind–body dualism|Mind–body dualists]] reject epiphenomenalism on the same grounds.

Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annaïs Mottaz have also challenged those findings.<ref>{{cite journal | pmc = 3746176 | pmid=23966921 | doi=10.3389/fnhum.2013.00385 | volume=7 | title=Timing and awareness of movement decisions: does consciousness really come too late? | year=2013 | journal=Front Hum Neurosci | pages=385 | last1 = Guggisberg | first1 = AG | last2 = Mottaz | first2 = A| doi-access=free }}</ref>

A study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues published in PNAS<ref>{{cite journal|title=An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement|first1=Aaron|last1=Schurger|first2=Jacobo D.|last2=Sitt|first3=Stanislas|last3=Dehaene|date=16 October 2012|journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences|volume=109|issue=42|pages=16776–16777|doi=10.1073/pnas.1210467109|pmid=22869750|pmc=3479453|doi-access=free}}</ref> challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), thus denying the conclusions drawn from studies such as Libet's<ref name="LGW">{{cite journal |doi=10.1093/brain/106.3.623 |title=Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential) |year=1983 |last1=Libet |first1=Benjamin |last2=Gleason |first2=Curtis A. |last3=Wright |first3=Elwood W. |last4=Pearl |first4=Dennis K. |journal=Brain |volume=106 |issue=3 |pages=623–42 |pmid=6640273}}</ref> and Fried's.<ref name=Fried>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045 |title=Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition |year=2011 |last1=Fried |first1=Itzhak |last2=Mukamel |first2=Roy |last3=Kreiman |first3=Gabriel |journal=Neuron |volume=69 |issue=3 |pages=548–62 |pmid=21315264 |pmc=3052770}}</ref>

In favor of interactionism, [[Celia Green]] (2003) argues that epiphenomenalism does not even provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of interaction posed by substance dualism. Although it does not entail substance dualism, according to Green, epiphenomenalism implies a one-way form of interactionism that is just as hard to conceive of as the two-way form embodied in substance dualism. Green suggests the assumption that it is less of a problem may arise from the unexamined belief that physical events have some sort of primacy over mental ones.

A number of [[scientists]] and philosophers, including [[William James]], [[Karl Popper]], [[John C. Eccles]] and [[Donald Symons]], dismiss epiphenomenalism from an [[evolution]]ary perspective.<ref name="James1879">{{cite journal
 | first = William
 | last = James
 | title = Are we automata?
 | journal = Mind
 | volume = 4
 | issue = 13
 | pages = 1–22
 | year = 1879
 | doi = 10.1093/mind/os-4.13.1
| url = https://zenodo.org/record/1431809
 }}</ref><ref name="Popper1983">{{cite book
 | first1 = Karl Raimund
 | last1 = Popper
 | first2 = John Carew
 | last2 = Eccles
 | title = The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism
 | publisher = Routledge & Kegan Paul
 | location = London
 | year = 1983
 | doi = 10.4324/9780203537480
 | isbn = 9780203537480
 }}</ref><ref name="Symons1979">{{cite book
 | first = Donald
 | last = Symons
 | title = The Evolution of Human Sexuality
 | publisher = Oxford University Press
 | location = Oxford
 | year = 1979
}}</ref><ref name="Georgiev2017">{{cite book
 | last = Georgiev
 | first = Danko D.
 | title = Quantum Information and Consciousness: A Gentle Introduction
 | publisher = CRC Press
 | edition = 1st
 | date = 2017-12-06
 | location = Boca Raton
 | pages = 362
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=OtRBDwAAQBAJ
 | doi = 10.1201/9780203732519
 | oclc = 1003273264
 | isbn =  9781138104488
 | zbl = 1390.81001
 }}</ref><ref name="Georgiev2020">{{cite journal
 | last = Georgiev
 | first = Danko D.
 | title = Inner privacy of conscious experiences and quantum information
 | journal = BioSystems
 | volume = 187
 | pages = 104051
 | year = 2020
 | doi = 10.1016/j.biosystems.2019.104051
 | pmid = 31629783
 | arxiv = 2001.00909
 | s2cid = 204813557
 }}</ref> They point out that the view that mind is an epiphenomenon of brain activity is not consistent with evolutionary theory, because if mind were functionless, it would have disappeared long ago, as it would not have been favoured by evolution.