Editing Emergency Broadcast System (section)

==Activation procedure==
Actual activations originated with a primary station known as a Common Program Control Station (CPCS-1), which would transmit the {{Audio|Emergency broadcast system.ogg|Attention Signal}}. The Attention Signal most commonly associated with the system was a combination of the sine waves of 853 and 960 [[Hertz|Hz]]{{mdashb}}suited to attract attention due to its unpleasantness. Decoders at relay stations would sound an alarm, alerting station personnel to the incoming message. Then, each relay station would broadcast the alert tone and rebroadcast the emergency message from the primary station. The Attention Signal was developed in the mid-1960s.

A nationwide activation of the EBS was called an Emergency Action Notification (EAN) and was the only activation that stations were not allowed to ignore; the [[Federal Communications Commission]] made local civil emergencies and weather advisories optional (except for stations that agreed to be the "primary" source of such messages).

To activate the EAN protocol, the [[Associated Press]] and [[United Press International]] [[wire service]]s would notify stations with a special message. It began with a full [[Bell character|line of X's, and a bell]] inside the [[Teletype Corporation|Teletype]] machine would sound ten times. To avoid abuse and mistakes, the message included a confirmation password which changed daily. Stations that subscribed to one of the wire services were not required to activate the EBS if the activation message did not have proper confirmation.{{citation needed|date=March 2015}}

===False alarm of 1971===
A properly authenticated Emergency Action Notification was incorrectly sent to United States broadcast stations at 9:33&nbsp;a.m. [[Eastern Time Zone|Eastern Standard Time]] on February 20, 1971.<ref name=conel>{{cite web|title=Code Word "Hatefulness": The Great EBS Scare of 1971|date=15 September 2010|url=http://conelrad.blogspot.com/2010/09/code-word-hatefulness-great-ebs-scare.html|publisher=CONELRAD Adjacent|access-date=7 October 2013|archive-date=24 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131024090753/http://conelrad.blogspot.com/2010/09/code-word-hatefulness-great-ebs-scare.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
At the usual time a weekly EAN test was performed, teletype operator W.S. Eberhart had three tapes in front of him: a test tape, and two tapes indicating a real emergency, instructing the use of EAN Message #1, and #2, respectively. He inadvertently used the wrong tape, which used an unexpected codeword, "HATEFULNESS". The message ordered stations to cease regular programming immediately and begin an Emergency Action Notification using Message #1.<ref>(Timestamp to WCCO white card script instruction) {{Citation|last=2001scoop, W6LDS|title=1971 False Emergency Broadcast System EAN (Heard On WOWO-AM And WCCO-AM)|date=2012-09-16|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1B1EAeh6H_I&t=384| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130829085455/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1B1EAeh6H_I&gl=US&hl=en| archive-date=2013-08-29 | url-status=dead|access-date=2018-05-22}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://ebstest.stlmedia.net/pix/ebsaccident1.jpg|title=EAN Teletype message (February 20, 1971 09:33 EST)|date=2014-10-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141016190942/http://ebstest.stlmedia.net/pix/ebsaccident1.jpg|archive-date=2014-10-16|url-status=dead|access-date=2018-05-22}}</ref> Message 1 stated that regular programming had been interrupted at the request of the United States government but was not specific about the cause.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=The EBS Authenticator Word List |url=http://www.ae5d.com/ebs.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211024220/http://www.ae5d.com/ebs.html |archive-date=2021-02-11 |access-date=2018-05-22 |website=www.ae5d.com}}</ref> A cancellation message was sent at 9:59&nbsp;a.m. EST, but it used the same codeword as the original message.<ref name="ebstest">{{cite web|url=http://ebstest.stlmedia.net/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130121195955/http://ebstest.stlmedia.net/|url-status=dead|archive-date=21 January 2013|title=The Great Accidental Test Broadcast of 1971|access-date=7 October 2013}}</ref> A cancellation message with the ''correct'' codeword was not sent until 10:13&nbsp;a.m. EST.<ref name="ebstest" /> After 40 minutes and six incorrect or improperly formatted cancellation messages, the accidental activation was officially terminated.

This false alarm demonstrated major flaws in the practical implementation of an EAN.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=https://www.newspapers.com/image/38855312|title=Small Piece Of Tape Stirs U.S. Emotions|agency=AP|date=1971-02-21|work=The Lawton Constitution and Morning Press|access-date=2018-05-22|page=12A|language=en|via=Newspapers.com|archive-date=2018-05-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180522181517/http://www.newspapers.com/image/38855312/|url-status=live}}</ref> Many stations didn't receive the alert but more importantly, those that did either ignored it (convinced it was false because it came at the time of a scheduled test), canceled the EAN prematurely with or without any coded indication that the alert was erroneous,<ref name=":0" /> or didn't have EAN procedure documents readily accessible to them, so they had no indication of what to do.<ref name="ebstest" /> It is estimated that only 20% of the stations that received the activation followed the procedures completely.<ref name="conel" /> Several stations went off the air, as they were instructed to do. Recordings from stations that did not (and are not supposed to, according to EAN procedures) include one from [[WOWO (AM)|WOWO]] in [[Fort Wayne, Indiana]], for which a recording of the EAN activation exists.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Sievers |first=Bob |date=1971-02-20 |title=Airchecks |url=http://historyofwowo.com/airchecks.html |access-date=2022-09-15 |website=The History of WOWO |quote=The most harrowing moment in Bob Sievers' career: a mistake by an Air Force employee triggers a nationwide activation of the Emergency Broadcast System. Bob was the consummate professional, but he had good reason to believe the United States might be under nuclear attack. In 1998, Bob shared his memories of the incident with the News-Sentinel. Conelrad expert Bill Geerhart has written an excellent summary of the nationwide impact of the incident. Aircheck courtesy of Jim Cassell.}}</ref>

This false alarm was sufficiently disruptive to move the FCC to temporarily suspend the use and testing of Emergency Action Notifications (EANs) by codeword effective February 25, 1971. In the meantime, a national EBS activation (actual or test) would be routed through news service broadcast desks, then authenticated with the White House communications center, introducing a delay of approximately one minute.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.newspapers.com/image/277872316|title=Automatic Takeover of News Services Suspended by FCC|agency=AP|date=1971-02-26|work=The News-Item|access-date=2018-05-22|page=8|language=en|via=Newspapers.com|archive-date=2018-05-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180523010934/http://www.newspapers.com/image/277872316/|url-status=live}}</ref> Numerous investigations were launched and several changes were made to the EBS. Among them, EAN Message #2, which contains specific language indicating an imminent attack,<ref name=":1" /> was eliminated. Another change was moving the tapes for genuine alerts away from the broadcasting machines to prevent them from being mistaken for the weekly test tapes. After numerous safeguards were put in place, the FCC voted to resume automatic national activation of the EBS using EANs in mid-December 1972, almost 20 months after they were suspended.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.newspapers.com/image/385761176|title=The Nation|date=1972-12-15|work=Los Angeles Times|access-date=2018-05-22|page=2|language=en|via=Newspapers.com|archive-date=2018-05-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180522183222/http://www.newspapers.com/image/385761176/|url-status=live}}</ref>

A United States Emergency Broadcast System prerecorded announcement for presidential EBS activation without attack warning did exist, and it could have been distributed from national activation points (such as Federal Preparedness Agency) to radio and TV stations. No such distribution occurred in the 1971 incident, underscoring its falsity.<ref name=":5" />

Following the 1971 incident, FCC publications ultimately removed Message 2 attack warning functions from EBS. FEMA nevertheless confidentially retained EBS attack warning<ref name=":3" /> capabilities into the Reagan presidency. Adding somewhat to the confusion, the confidential plan called for distributing prerecorded warning messages through Priority Four channels; in other words, not via any of the published FCC plans cited elsewhere here.<ref name=":4" />

Citations to this confidential plan presently remain limited to a 1981 Reagan White House memo<ref name=":4" /> and the actual recorded<ref name=":3" /> attack warning announcement itself.