Editing Eisaku Satō (section)

== Premiership (1964–1972) ==
{{seealso|First Satō Cabinet|Second Satō Cabinet|Third Satō Cabinet}}
Satō succeeded Ikeda after the latter resigned due to ill health.{{sfn|Kapur|2018|p=98}} He would go on to serve the longest stint of any prime minister up until that time, and by the late 1960s he appeared to have single-handed control over the entire Japanese government. He was a popular prime minister due to the growing economy; his foreign policy, which was a balancing act between the interests of the United States and China, was more tenuous, and his grip on domestic politics was challenged by growing opposition to his administration's support for the [[Vietnam War|American military operations in Vietnam]].

=== Foreign policy ===
[[File:Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos with Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Satō and his wife.jpg|thumb|Satō and his wife with [[Ferdinand Marcos|Ferdinand]] and [[Imelda Marcos]]]]
==== China and Taiwan ====
Satō is the last Prime minister of Japan to visit [[Republic of China|Taiwan]] during his term. In 1965, Satō approved a US$150 million loan to [[Republic of China|Taiwan]]. He visited [[Taipei]] in September 1967. In 1969, Satō insisted that the defense of Taiwan was necessary for the safety of Japan. Satō followed the United States in most major issues, but Satō opposed the [[Nixon visit to China]].<ref>MacMillan. Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World</ref> Satō also bitterly opposed the entry of the PRC into the [[United Nations]] in 1971.

==== South Korea ====
On 22 June 1965, the Satō government and [[South Korea]] under [[Park Chung Hee]] signed the [[Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea]], which normalized relations between Japan and South Korea for the first time. Relations with Japan had previously not been officially established since Korea's [[National Liberation Day of Korea|decolonization]] and [[Division of Korea|division]] at the end of World War II.

==== Southeast Asia ====
During Satō's term, Japan participated in the creation of the [[Asian Development Bank]] in 1966 and held a ministerial level conference on [[Southeast Asia]]n economic development.<ref name=hoshiro>{{cite web|last=Hoshiro|first=Hiroyuki|title=Postwar Japanese and Southeast Asian History - A New Viewpoint|url=http://ricas.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/asj/eng/html/ess018.html|publisher=Research and Information Center for Asian Studies|access-date=6 January 2013|date=7 May 2007}}</ref> It was the first international conference sponsored by the Japanese government in the postwar period. In 1967, he was also the first Japanese prime minister to visit [[Singapore]]. He was largely supportive of the [[South Vietnam]]ese government throughout the [[Vietnam War]].

=== Okinawan reversion ===
[[File:President Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan at San Clemente - NARA - 194752.jpg|thumb|Satō negotiated with U.S. president [[Richard Nixon]] for the repatriation of [[Okinawa Prefecture|Okinawa]]]]
{{main|1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement}}
Since the end of the [[Second World War]], [[Okinawa Prefecture|Okinawa]] had been occupied by the [[United States]]. While visiting the [[United States]] in January 1965, Satō openly asked President [[Lyndon Johnson]] to return Okinawa to Japan. In August 1965, Satō became the first post-war prime minister of Japan to visit Okinawa.

In 1969, Satō struck a deal with U.S. president [[Richard Nixon]] to repatriate [[Okinawa Prefecture|Okinawa]]: this deal was controversial because it allowed the [[United States Forces Japan|U.S. forces in Japan]] to maintain bases in Okinawa after repatriation.<ref>Ambrose. The Rise to Globalism. Page 235</ref> Okinawa was formally returned to Japan on 15 May 1972, which also included the [[Senkaku Islands]] (also known as the Diaoyu Islands in China and the subject, since 1971, of a Sino-Japanese sovereignty dispute; see [[Senkaku Islands dispute]]).

=== Nuclear affairs ===
In his early years as prime minister, Sato had argued that Japan needed to develop nuclear weapons of its own to match those of China, but the United States government was staunchly opposed to this, and the Johnson administration pressured Japan to sign the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/imagine-japan-builds-nuclear-weapons-59512|title=Imagine This: Japan Builds Nuclear Weapons|date=25 May 2019}}</ref>

Accordingly, Satō introduced the [[Three Non-Nuclear Principles]] on 11 December 1967, promising the non-production, non-possession, and non-introduction of [[nuclear weapon]]s inside Japan. Thereafter, Satō shepherded Japan's entry into the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]] and the Diet passed a resolution formally adopting the Non-Nuclear Principles in 1971. For these actions, Satō would receive the [[Nobel Peace Prize]] as a co-recipient in 1974.

However, recent inquiries show that behind the scenes, Satō was more accommodating towards US plans of stationing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. In December 2008, the Japanese government declassified a document showing that during a visit to the US in January 1965, he was discussing with US officials the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the [[People's Republic of China]].<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article.php?story=20081226170930777_en |title=Editorial: The U.S. nuclear umbrella, past and future |access-date=9 January 2011 |archive-date=19 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119122112/http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article.php?story=20081226170930777_en |url-status=dead}}</ref> In December 2009, his son reported that his father agreed in a November 1969 conversation with US President Nixon to allow the stationing of nuclear warheads in [[Okinawa Prefecture|Okinawa]] even after it was restored to Japanese sovereignty.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article.php?story=20091224152025789_en |title=Document on secret Japan-U.S. nuclear pact kept by ex-PM Sato's family |access-date=9 January 2011 |archive-date=17 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181017163100/http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article.php?story=20091224152025789_en |url-status=dead }}</ref>

=== 1968–1969 University crisis ===

{{Main|1968–1969 Japanese university protests|Anpo protests}}

Overcrowded universities, increasing student radicalization, hopes for an abrogation of the [[US-Japan Security Treaty]] after its initial 10-year term ended in 1970, and growing opposition to Japan's material and ideological support for [[Vietnam War|America's war in Vietnam]] helped precipitate large scale protests at hundreds of Japanese schools and universities in 1968–1969, part of a [[Protests of 1968|worldwide protest cycle in 1968]]. After more than a year of conflict, Satō's administration responded by calling in riot police to forcibly clear the university campuses. Thereafter, Satō allowed the Security Treaty to automatically renew in 1970, dashing the hopes of activist groups who staged [[Anpo protests|large street protests]] in an attempt to eliminate it.

=== Nixon shocks and resignation===

The successful resolution of the university crisis, continued robust economic growth, and above all, the 1969 announcement of the United States' commitment to return Okinawa to Japan, made Satō broadly popular with the Japanese public and allowed him to win a then unprecedented third consecutive term as prime minister. However, Satō's popularity soon nosedived, in the aftermath of so-called "[[Nixon Shock]]s" of 1971.{{sfn|Kapur|2018|p=66-67}} In July 1971, the Japanese government was stunned by Nixon's dramatic announcement of his forthcoming [[1972 Nixon visit to China|visit to the People's Republic of China]].{{sfn|Kapur|2018|p=66}} Many Japanese were chagrined by the failure of the United States to consult in advance with Japan before making such a fundamental change in foreign policy, and the sudden change in America's stance made Satō's staunch adherence to non-relations with China look like he had been played for a fool.{{sfn|Kapur|2018|p=67}}

The following month, the government was again surprised to learn that, without prior consultation, Nixon was imposing a 10 percent surcharge on imports, a decision explicitly aimed at hindering Japan's exports to the United States, and was unilaterally suspending the convertibility of dollars into gold, which would eventually lead to the collapse of the [[Bretton Woods system]] of fixed currency exchange rates.{{sfn|Kapur|2018|p=66-67}} The resulting decoupling of the yen and the dollar led the yen to soar in value, significantly damaging Japan's international trade and economic outlook.

With his approval ratings plummeting, Satō abandoned plans to run for a fourth term, and resigned from office in 1972. His heir apparent, [[Takeo Fukuda]], won the Sato faction's support in the subsequent LDP presidential election, but the more popular [[Ministry of International Trade and Industry|MITI]] minister, [[Kakuei Tanaka]], won the vote, ending the Satō faction's longstanding dominance in Diet politics.