Editing Egyptian Armed Forces (section)

===Twentieth century===
[[File:ModernEgypt, Opening of Luxor-Aswan rail line, Album-2-BAL-00000606-0008.jpg|thumb|Egyptian infantry form [[honor guard]], 1926]]
By 1914, the Egyptian military functioned largely as a native home-defence and colonial garrison force. It was organized and equipped under British supervision and staffed primarily with British officers. Its structure included infantry battalions, mounted infantry, camel corps units, support services, and irregular militia components.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wheal |first1=Elizabeth-Anne |last2=Pope |first2=Steven |date=1997 |title=The Macmillan Dictionary of The First World War |publisher=Macmillan |pages=147–148 |isbn=978-0-333-68909-7}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ottoman-uniforms.com/1883-till-1914-army-of-egypt-infantry/ |title=1883 till 1914 Army of Egypt Infantry |last=Flaherty |first=Chris |website=Ottoman Uniforms |access-date=29 October 2018 |archive-date=29 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181029191536/https://www.ottoman-uniforms.com/1883-till-1914-army-of-egypt-infantry/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The 1922 declaration of Egyptian independence formally ended the British protectorate but still left Egypt’s sovereignty constrained, particularly in military affairs. Britain retained control over Egypt’s defense, foreign relations, and Sudan, effectively limiting Egypt’s autonomy and perpetuating British military presence and influence. Although the declaration ended the legal fiction of Ottoman rule and met some nationalist demands, it failed to satisfy broader aspirations for full sovereignty. The resulting frustrations over continued British dominance, especially regarding the military, fueled further nationalist opposition and anti-British sentiment.<ref name="King">{{cite book |last=King |first=Joan Wucher |title=Historical Dictionary of Egypt |series=Books of Lasting Value |year=1989 |orig-year=First published 1984 |publisher=[[AUC Press|American University in Cairo Press]] |isbn=978-977-424-213-7 |pages=259–260}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Elkins |first=Caroline |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3icqEAAAQBAJ |title=Legacy of Violence: A History of the British Empire |date=2022 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday |isbn=978-0-593-32008-2 |pages=147 |language=en}}</ref>

The [[Egyptian Air Force]] was initially established in 1930 as the Egyptian Army Air Force and formally inaugurated in 1932. In 1937, it was separated from army command and reorganized as an independent service under the name Royal Egyptian Air Force, becoming the third branch of the Egyptian military after the army and navy.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.geocities.com/acrawford0/Egypt.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091021080301/http://geocities.com/acrawford0/Egypt.html |archive-date=21 October 2009 |title=Royal Egyptian Air Force Gladiators |website=www.webcitation.org |access-date=19 April 2020}}</ref>

During [[World War I]], Egypt’s strategic importance increased significantly due to the threat posed by Ottoman incursions across the Sinai. Although such offensives were ultimately repulsed, Egyptian forces remained focused primarily on internal security and regional garrison duties, especially in Sudan. By 1917, approximately 15,000 Egyptian volunteers were serving in the regular military, while over 98,000 Egyptians served in logistical capacities through the Egyptian Labour Corps and Egyptian Camel Transport Corps.<ref name="Falls365">{{cite book |last=Falls |first=Cyril |title=Military Operations Egypt and Palestine: From June 1917 to the End of the War |year=1930 |publisher=HM Stationery Office |pages=365}}</ref><ref name="Falls367">{{cite book |last=Falls |first=Cyril |title=Military Operations Egypt and Palestine: From June 1917 to the End of the War |year=1930 |publisher=HM Stationery Office |pages=367}}</ref>

In the interwar period, although military service was technically compulsory, the armed forces remained limited in size and scope. By 1939, the total strength was modest, and British oversight remained extensive. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Britain retained the right to station troops in Egypt for the protection of the Suez Canal and continued to exert influence over training and operations.<ref name="Metz1990">{{cite book |editor=Metz, Helen Chapin |title=Egypt: A Country Study |publisher=Library of Congress |year=1990 |page=295}}</ref>
[[File:ModernEgypt, Farouk I in Military Uniform, DHP13655-10-17 01.jpg|thumb|left|[[King Farouk I]] inspecting soldiers in 1942]]
At the onset of the [[World War II]], Egypt's military capacity remained limited. Following the Italian invasion of western Egypt in 1940, Egypt broke relations with the [[Axis powers]] and increasingly aligned itself with British military operations. While Egypt's forces were not the primary combatants, they contributed to British-led operations, including in the [[Western Desert campaign]]. Axis forces under General [[Erwin Rommel]] made temporary advances into Egyptian territory before being repelled at the [[Second Battle of El Alamein]].

By the late 1940s, internal dissatisfaction with military leadership was growing. Many younger officers, particularly those educated in Britain, became disillusioned with the entrenched senior command, which was perceived as corrupt and incompetent, accusations heightened by Egypt's poor performance in the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]]. Although a partial purge of the senior officer corps was carried out in 1950, many of the dismissed officers were later reinstated by royal decree, further fueling discontent within the ranks.<ref>{{cite web|author=Alta F. Fowler|title=No. 997 Memorandum by Alta F. Fowler of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs |work=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2 |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d997 |date=July 28, 1952 |location=Washington DC}}</ref>

In an effort to assert greater independence and reduce British influence, King Farouk dismissed the British Military Mission in 1950 and invited former German [[Wehrmacht]] officers, including Generals [[Wilhelm Fahrmbacher]] and [[Oskar Munzel]], to serve as advisors to the Egyptian military establishment. These advisors remained in the country until 1958.<ref>{{cite book|last=Gerolymatos|first=Andre|title=Castles Made of Sand: A Century of Anglo-American Espionage and Intervention in the Middle East|publisher=Thomas Martin Books/St. Martin's Press|location=New York|date=2010|pages=135, 142}}</ref>

[[File:Free Officers, 1953.jpg|thumb|The [[Free Officers movement (Egypt)|Free Officers]] in 1953, a year after toppling the monarchy]]
The Egyptian military’s failure in the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]] was a catalyst for the formation of the [[Free Officers Movement (Egypt)|Free Officers]] led by [[Muhammad Naguib]] and [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]]. In the [[Egyptian coup d'état of 1952]], they overthrew King Farouk and initiated sweeping reforms within the military and state. 

One of the early achievements of the new regime was the signing of the [[Anglo–Egyptian Agreement of 1954]], which mandated the phased withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone. The agreement allowed for continued British access to the base under specific circumstances and stipulated complete withdrawal by June 1956.<ref>{{cite web |title=Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government regarding the Suez Canal Base |url=https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20210/0210.pdf |website=United Nations Treaty Series |access-date=5 April 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210220000000/https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20210/0210.pdf |archive-date=20 February 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Butler |first=J. R. M. |title=Grand Strategy, Volume II: September 1939 – June 1941 |publisher=Her Majesty's Stationery Office |year=2002 |page=112}}</ref>

In 1956, the Egyptian Armed Forces were thrust into a major international conflict during the [[Suez Crisis]], also known as the Tripartite Aggression.<ref name="Ross2004">{{Cite book |last=Ross |first=Stewart |title=Causes and Consequences of the Arab–Israeli Conflict |url=https://archive.org/details/causesconsequenc0000ross_w6z0/page/76/mode/2up |date=2004 |url-access=registration |publisher=Evans Brothers |isbn=978-0-2375-2585-9 |pages=76ff}}</ref><ref name="Isacoff2006">{{Cite book |last=Isacoff |first=Jonathan B. |title=Writing the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Pragmatism and Historical Inquiry |date=2006 |publisher=Lexington Books |isbn=978-0-7391-1273-1 |pages=79ff}}</ref><ref name="Caplan1983">{{Cite book |last=Caplan |first=Neil |title=Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956 |date=1983 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-7146-4757-9 |pages=15}}</ref> The crisis erupted after President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] revoked the concession of the Anglo-French owned [[Suez Canal Company]] and transferred canal operation to the state-owned [[Suez Canal Authority]], prompting a coordinated military response from [[Israel]], the [[United Kingdom]], and [[France]]. On 29 October, Israeli forces invaded the [[Sinai Peninsula]], followed days later by Anglo-French landings in the Canal Zone. The stated aim was to separate the combatants and secure freedom of navigation through the canal, but the operation was widely perceived as a ploy to topple Nasser and restore Western control over the vital waterway.

In the early 1950s, particularly after the [[1952 Egyptian revolution|revolution of 1952]], politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion.{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=17}} Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer in particular was a purely political appointment, whose approach would lead to large-scale problems during the Suez War. Promotions were often based on loyalty rather than merit, and a rigid divide between officers and enlisted men contributed to widespread dysfunction.{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=17}}{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=18}} Although some Egyptian defensive positions, such as at Abu Agelia and Mitla Pass, were organized and offered resistance, the Israeli forces quickly seized the initiative and routed Egyptian positions across the Sinai.{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=127}} Nasser ordered a general withdrawal from the peninsula, which allowed Israeli troops to advance rapidly toward the Suez Canal.

The invasion was soon halted under intense international pressure. The [[United States]],{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=127}} [[Soviet Union]], and [[United Nations]] condemned the attack, forcing a ceasefire by 7 November. Although Egypt suffered tactical defeats, the crisis ultimately elevated Nasser’s stature in the Arab world and signaled the decline of British and French influence in the Middle East.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Abernathy |first=David |title=The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980 |date=2000 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=9780300093148 |page=CXXXIX}}</ref><ref name="Economist2006">{{cite news |title=An affair to remember |date=27 June 2006 |url=https://www.economist.com/node/7218678 |access-date=3 September 2014 |newspaper=The Economist}}</ref> The Egyptian Armed Forces emerged from the conflict with considerable reputational damage, having revealed deep structural weaknesses, but the political outcome was widely seen as a strategic victory for Egypt. 
[[File:Egyptian army in sanaa 1962.jpg|thumb|left|An Egyptian armored column in Yemen, 1962]]
During the [[North Yemen Civil War]] that began in 1962, the Egyptian Armed Forces undertook one of their most extensive foreign deployments, dispatching tens of thousands of troops in support of republican forces against the royalists backed by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.<ref name=sandler977>Sandler, Stanley. ''Ground Warfare: The International Encyclopedia''. Vol. 1 (2002): p. 977. "Egypt immediately began sending military supplies and troops to assist the Republicans... On the royalist side Jordan and Saudi Arabia were furnishing military aid, and Britain lent diplomatic support. In addition to Egyptian aid, the Soviet Union supplied 24 MiG-19s to the republicans."</ref><ref name="ben1987">{{cite book |last1=Beit-Hallahmi |first1=Benjamin |title=The Israeli connection: who Israel arms and why |date=1987 |publisher=Pantheon Books |location=New York |isbn=978-0394559223 |page=[https://archive.org/details/israeliconnectio00beit/page/17 17] |edition=1st |url=https://archive.org/details/israeliconnectio00beit |url-access=registration |access-date=28 September 2019}}</ref> Authorized by President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]], the campaign involved sustained aerial and ground operations with Soviet support. Within months of the initial deployment in 1962, Nasser recognized that the campaign would demand far more than anticipated and sought a face-saving exit strategy, but the scope of engagement continued to escalate.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/28/how-yemen-was-once-egypts-vietnam/|title=How Yemen was once Egypt's Vietnam|newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref>

Fewer than 5,000 troops were initially deployed in October 1962, rising to 15,000 by December, 36,000 by late 1963, and 50,000 by late 1964. The peak came in late 1965, with approximately 55,000 personnel divided across 13 infantry regiments, an artillery division, a tank division from the [[Egyptian Armoured Corps]], and multiple Special Forces and airborne regiments. Egyptian field commanders reported logistical constraints, notably the absence of reliable topographical maps during the early phase of operations.<ref>{{Cite news | issue = Jan–Feb, 2004 | last = Aboul-Enein | first = Youssef | title = The Egyptian–Yemen War: Egyptian Perspectives on Guerrilla Warfare | work = Infantry Magazine | access-date = 5 August 2016 | date = 2004-01-01 | url = https://www.idmarch.org/document/Gamal+Abdel+Nasser/1aFl0-show/The+Egyptian-Yemen+War%29%3A+Egyptian+Perspectives+on+Guerrilla+Warfare+By+Lt.+Cdr.+Youssef+Aboul-Enein+Lt.+Cdr.+Youssef+Aboul-Enein+is+currently+serving+in+the+U.S.+Navy+as+the+country+director+for+North+Africa+and }}</ref> The prolonged and resource-intensive conflict strained Egypt’s military capabilities and readiness, contributing to its strategic vulnerability ahead of Israel's [[Six-Day War|invasion in 1967 ]].<ref name=sandler977/><ref name="ben1987"/>

In the period leading up to the [[Six-Day War]] in 1967, the Egyptian Armed Forces were organized into four regional military commands, Suez, Sinai, the Nile Delta, and the Nile Valley up to the border with [[Sudan]], while the remaining 75 percent of Egypt’s territory fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Frontier Corps.<ref>John Keegan, ''World Armies'', Second Edition, MacMillan, 1983, p. 165 {{ISBN|978-0-333-34079-0}}</ref> Tensions escalated in May 1967 when President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] announced the closure of the [[Straits of Tiran]] to Israeli shipping, an action Israel interpreted as a [[casus belli]] and responded to by mobilizing its forces.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|p=228}}

In response, Egypt deployed three battalions of commandos to [[Amman]] in coordination with [[Jordan]] on 3 June. According to historian [[Trevor N. Dupuy]], drawing on the memoirs of King [[Hussein of Jordan]], Nasser’s intent was not to initiate a war but to achieve political and rhetorical leverage.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|pp=229–230}} Nevertheless, Israel proceeded with military action on 5 June.

At the time, the Egyptian Army had seven divisions positioned in the Sinai, two armored and five infantry, under the newly established Sinai Front Command, led by General Abdel Mohsin Murtagi, who had recently returned from Yemen.{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=191}}<ref>Dupuy (1978) lists the 2nd, 3rd, 7th Infantry Division, 6th Mechanised, 20th Palestinian, and 4th Armoured, plus an armoured task force. Dupuy, 239–240.</ref> In the weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, Field Marshal [[Abdel Hakim Amer]] implemented wide-ranging changes to the command structure, replacing both the commanders and chiefs of staff in six of the seven divisions. Scholars such as [[Kenneth Pollack]] argue that these changes aimed to enhance operational effectiveness by placing veterans of the Yemeni conflict in key leadership roles.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=60}}

On the morning of 5 June, Israel launched a coordinated military offensive, targeting Egyptian airbases and achieving a substantial degradation of Egypt’s air power early in the conflict. Ground forces soon advanced into the [[Sinai Peninsula]], where Egyptian units faced mounting pressure across several fronts. Amid the deteriorating situation, Field Marshal Amer issued an order for a general withdrawal to the Suez Canal.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|pp=267–269}} The execution of this withdrawal, conducted under fire and without coherent coordination, contributed to considerable disruption among Egyptian forces, who sustained further losses during the retreat.{{cn|date=April 2025}}
[[File:Egyptianbridge.jpg|thumb|left|Egyptian military vehicles crossing the [[Suez Canal]] over one of the bridgeheads during [[Operation Badr (1973)|Operation Badr]].]]
In July 1972, President [[Anwar Sadat]] expelled [[Soviet Armed Forces]] advisors from Egypt.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Colonel E.V. Badolato|title=A Clash of Cultures: The Expulsion of Soviet Military Advisors from Egypt|journal=Naval War College Review|volume=37|issue=2|date=March–April 1984|pages=69–81|jstor=44642308}}</ref> On 6 October 1973, during the [[Yom Kippur]] holiday, which coincided with the 10th day of [[Ramadan]], [[Egypt]] and [[Syria]] launched a surprise offensive to recover occupied territory, initiating the [[October War]].{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} In the Sinai, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal as part of [[Operation Badr (1973)|Operation Badr]] and established positions on the eastern bank, which it held throughout the conflict.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=467}} On 14 October, Egyptian forces advanced deeper into the peninsula to relieve pressure on the Syrian front; however, the Israelis halted this offensive after three days. Seizing the initiative, Israeli forces crossed the canal through a single crossing point at [[Abu Sultan Air Base|Deversoir]],{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=393}} cleared during the [[Battle of the Chinese Farm]], and proceeded to advance north toward [[Ismailia]] and [[Port Said]] to isolate the Egyptian Second Army, south toward Suez to isolate the Third Army, and westward towards [[Cairo]] but were held at Nefalia.{{sfnmp|Herzog|1975|1pp=236–237|Pollack|2002|2p=122}} They encountered fierce resistance on all fronts and Israel suffered a major setback northwards at the [[Battle of Ismailia]].<ref>[https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200126235235/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf|date=2020-01-26}} "The experience represents one of the most humiliating failures in Israeli modern history .. Analysis reveals there were three main factors that led to this stunning defeat."</ref> A UN-brokered ceasefire took effect on 22 October, only to collapse soon after amid mutual accusations of violations. When hostilities resumed, Israel managed to achieve a breakthrough southward, effectively threatening the Third Army’s supply lines, but was ultimately unable to capture [[Battle of Suez|Suez]] despite multiple attempts.<ref>{{Cite web | last1 = Spencer | first1 = John |last2=Geroux |first2= Jayson |date=2022-01-13 |title=Urban Warfare Project Case Study #4: Battle of Suez City. |url=https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-4-battle-of-suez-city/ |access-date=2024-09-28 |website=Modern War Institute |language=en-US}}</ref> A second ceasefire on 25 October ended the fighting.{{sfnmp|Hammad|2002|1pp=237–276|Gawrych|1996|2p=60}}
[[File:An Egyptian ranger battalion stands in formation during Operation Desert Shield 2.JPEG|thumb|right|Egyptian soldiers in the [[Gulf War]]]]
When Sadat and the Israelis concluded the [[Camp David Accords]] in September 1978, part of the ''quid pro quo'' for Egypt’s acceptance of peace was the provision of substantial U.S. military assistance. Today, the U.S. provides an annual assistance package often quoted at a [[Real versus nominal value (economics)|nominal]] $1.3&nbsp;billion to the Egyptian Armed Forces.<ref>Robert Springborg, "Learning from Failure," 2010, 103; {{cite news|title=Scenesetter: President Mubarak's visit to Washington (09CAIRO874)|date=2009-05-19|publisher=US Department of State (cable)}}</ref> This level is second only to that provided to [[Israel]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/nation-locked-in-a-deadly-stalemate/story-fn6ck51p-1225997761161|title=Nation locked in a deadly stalemate|work=The Courier-Mail|author=David Costello|date=February 1, 2011|access-date=2011-02-11}}</ref>

Scholars such as [[Kenneth Pollack]], DeAtkine, and Robert Springborg have proposed multiple explanations for the challenges that Arab (and Egyptian) armies encountered in conflicts with Israel from 1948 through the 1970s and beyond. In particular, they suggest that from 1948 onward, junior officers often exhibited limited willingness to manoeuvre, innovate, or act independently.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=146}} Ground forces units reportedly struggled with manipulation of information and insufficient attention to intelligence gathering and unbiased analysis. Observers note that elements from two Egyptian divisions sent to [[Saudi Arabia]] in 1990–91, accompanied by U.S. personnel during the 1991 Gulf War, frequently reported intense combat despite facing minimal or no resistance, whether or not U.S. military personnel or journalists were present.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=144}} Later studies, such as those by Springborg, indicate that these patterns continued within the Egyptian Armed Forces into the twenty-first century.<ref>Springborg, Robert. "Learning from failure: Egypt." The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations. London: Routledge (2013): 93–109.</ref>