Editing Dương Văn Minh (section)

==Overthrow of Diệm==
{{Main|1963 South Vietnamese coup|Arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm|Buddhist crisis}}
Minh and [[Trần Văn Đôn]], the ARVN Chief of Staff who had no troops due to Diệm's suspicion of him,<ref>Hammer, p. 147</ref> went to observe the [[Southeast Asia Treaty Organization]] (SEATO)'s military exercises in [[Thailand]],<ref name="j286">Jones, p. 286</ref> where they were informed about the regional disquiet over Diệm's policies toward Buddhists.<ref name="j247">Jones, p. 247</ref>

Minh frequently railed against Diệm in his September meeting with Lodge, decrying the police state that was being created by the [[Cần Lao Party]] of the Ngô family.<ref name="j370">Jones, p. 370.</ref> Harkins reported that Minh "has done nothing but complain to me about the government and the way it is handled since I have been here". Harkins was skeptical about Minh's claims of widespread public disenchantment.<ref name="j371">Jones, p. 371</ref>

During late-September, President Kennedy dispatched the [[McNamara Taylor mission]] to investigate the political and military situation in South Vietnam. This included investigating an ARVN coup. Minh expressed an interest in meeting McNamara and Taylor, so a game of doubles tennis was organized. McNamara watched on as Taylor played with Minh, giving "broad hints of our interest in other subjects which we gave him during breaks in the game".<ref name="j373"/> Minh revealed nothing of his thoughts about a possible coup, leaving his guests bewildered. Minh later messaged Taylor with a complaint about a perceived lack of support from Washington for a coup.<ref name="j373">Jones, p. 373</ref> Diệm became very unpopular during the Buddhist crisis of 1963; the US informed the Vietnamese generals (through the CIA) that it would not object if Diệm were to be overthrown. Minh was the second highest ranking general at the time, and he led the [[1963 South Vietnamese coup|coup to overthrow Diệm]] on 1 November 1963.<ref>Tucker, pp. 288–292</ref>

In the afternoon, Minh ordered his bodyguard, [[Nguyễn Văn Nhung]], to arrest, and later execute, Colonel [[Lê Quang Tung]], one of Diệm's closest and most faithful associates. The generals hated Tung, because, at [[Ngô Đình Nhu]]'s instructions, he had disguised his men in regular army uniforms and framed the army for the [[Xá Lợi Pagoda raids]] several months earlier, in August.<ref name="j414"/><ref>Hammer, p. 290.</ref> At nightfall, Nhung took Tung and Major Lê Quảng Trịeu, his brother and deputy<ref name="ks">Karnow, p. 321.</ref> and drove them to the edge of [[Tan Son Nhut Air Base]]. Forced to kneel over two freshly dug holes, the brothers were shot into their graves and buried.<ref name="j414">Jones, p. 414</ref> In the early morning of 2 November, Diệm agreed to surrender. The ARVN officers had reportedly originally intended merely to exile Diệm and Nhu, having promised them safe passage".<ref>Hammer, p. 297</ref><ref name="j4167">Jones, pp. 416–417</ref>

Minh and Đôn asked Colonel [[Lucien Conein]] to secure an American aircraft to take the brothers out of the country. Assistant Secretary of State [[Roger Hilsman]] recommended that if the generals decide to exile Diệm, he should also be sent outside Southeast Asia.<ref name="h294">Hammer, p. 294</ref> He went on to anticipate what he termed a "[[Götterdämmerung]] in the palace".<ref name="h295">Hammer, p. 295</ref>

Minh then went to Gia Long Palace, and Minh sent an armored personnel carrier to transport Diệm and Nhu, while the others prepared for the ceremonial and televised handover of power to the junta.<ref name="j4167"/> Minh arrived in full military ceremonial uniform to supervise the arrest of the Ngô brothers, only to find that they had escaped and humiliated him, having talked to him from a safe house. Minh was reported to be mortified when he realised that Diệm and Nhu had escaped in the middle of the night leaving the rebels to fight for an empty building.<ref name="j418"/> However, Diệm's hideout was found and surrounded, and Minh sent General [[Mai Hữu Xuân]], his deputy Colonel [[Nguyễn Văn Quan]], his bodyguard Nguyễn Văn Nhung and [[Dương Hiếu Nghĩa]] to arrest both brothers.<ref>Hammer, pp. 297–298</ref>

Nhung and Nghĩa sat with the brothers in the APC as the convoy headed off after the arrest. Before the convoy had departed for the church, Minh was reported to have gestured to Nhung, who was a [[contract killer]] and Minh's bodyguard,<ref name="nyt" /> with two right-hand fingers.<ref name="nyt" /> This was taken to be an order to kill both brothers. During the journey, the brothers were killed in the APC, with Nhung riddling their bodies with many bullets.<ref name="nyt" /> An investigation by Đôn later determined that Nghĩa and Nhung sprayed them with bullets before repeatedly stabbing them.<ref>Karnow, p. 326</ref> When the corpses arrived at military headquarters, the generals were shocked.<ref name="j429">Jones, p. 429.</ref> Đôn ordered another general to tell reporters that the brothers had died in an accident and went to confront Minh in his office.<ref name="j429"/><blockquote>
*Đôn: Why are they dead?
*Minh: And what does it matter that they are dead?<ref name="j429"/></blockquote>

Đôn later reported that Minh had answered his question in a "haughty" tone.<ref name=j429/> At this time, Xuân walked into Minh's office through the open door, unaware of Đôn's presence. Xuân snapped [[At attention|to attention]] and stated "''Mission accomplie''".<ref name="j429"/>

Minh had his subordinates report that the Ngô brothers had committed suicide. Unclear and contradictory stories abounded on the exact method used by the brothers. Minh said "Due to an inadvertence, there was a gun inside the vehicle. It was with this gun that they committed suicide."<ref name="j425">Jones, p. 425</ref> Conein soon realized that the generals' story was false.<ref name="j430">Jones, p. 430</ref> Soon after, photos of the bloodied corpses of the brothers appeared in the media, discrediting the generals' lies.<ref>Jones, pp. 430–431</ref> Đôn's assertion that the assassinations were unplanned proved sufficient for Lodge, who told the State Department that "I am sure assassination was not at their direction."<ref name="j436">Jones, p. 436</ref> Minh and Đôn reiterated their position in a meeting with Conein and Lodge a few days after the coup.<ref name="j436"/>

===Culpability regarding killings of Diệm and Nhu===
The assassinations caused a split within the junta and repulsed world opinion. The killings damaged the public belief that the new regime would be an improvement over Diệm, throwing the generals into discord. Criticism over the killings caused the officers to battle one another for positions in the new government.<ref name="j436"/> The responsibility for the assassinations has generally been laid at the doorstep of Minh. Conein asserted that ''"I have it on very good authority of very many people, that Big Minh gave the order"'',<ref name="j435"/> as did [[William Colby]], the director of the CIA's Far Eastern division. Đôn, however, was equally emphatic, saying ''"I can state without equivocation that this was done by General Dương Văn Minh and by him alone."''<ref name="j435">Jones, p. 435</ref> Lodge believed Xuân was at least partly culpable, asserting: ''"Diệm and Nhu had been assassinated, if not by Xuan personally, at least at his direction."''<ref name="j436"/> Some months after the event, Minh was reported to have privately told an American official that ''"We had no alternative. They had to be killed. Diệm could not be allowed to live because he was too much respected among simple, gullible people in the countryside, especially the Catholics and the refugees. We had to kill Nhu because he was so widely feared – and he had created organizations that were arms of his personal power."''<ref name="j435"/>

When [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu]] became president, Minh blamed him for the assassinations. In 1971, Minh claimed that Thiệu had caused the deaths by hesitating and delaying the attack by his [[5th Division (South Vietnam)|5th Division]] on Gia Long Palace. Đôn was reported to have pressured Thiệu during the night of the siege, asking him on the phone "Why are you so slow in doing it? Do you need more troops? If you do, ask [[Tôn Thất Đính|Đính]] to send more troops{{snd}}and do it quickly because after taking the palace you will be made a general."<ref>Hammer, p. 299</ref> Thiệu denied responsibility and issued a statement: ''"Dương Văn Minh has to assume entire responsibility for the death of Ngô Đình Diệm."''<ref name="j435"/>

[[Trần Văn Hương]], an opposition politician who was jailed by Diệm, and a future prime minister and president, gave a scathing analysis of the generals' action. He said ''"The top generals who decided to murder Diệm and his brother were scared to death. The generals knew very well that having no talent, no moral virtues, no political support whatsoever, they could not prevent a spectacular comeback of the president and Mr. Nhu if they were alive."''<ref>Jones, pp. 435–436</ref>

Conein asserted that Minh's humiliation by Diệm and Nhu was a major motivation for ordering their executions. Conein reasoned that the brothers were doomed to death once they escaped from the palace, instead of surrendering and accepting the offer of safe exile. Having successfully stormed the palace, Minh had arrived at the presidential residence in full ceremonial military uniform "with a sedan and everything else". Conein described Minh as a "very proud man" who had lost face by turning up at the palace, ready to claim victory, only to find an empty building. He claimed that Diệm and Nhu would not have been killed if they were in the palace, because there were too many people present.<ref name="j435"/>

American policy makers later came to believe that the coup and the murders of Diệm and his brother more deeply entrenched the United States in the war, by increasing its responsibility for what had occurred after the deposing of Diệm's administration.<ref name="nyt" />

In the view of [[Stanley Karnow]]<nowiki>, a former journalist in Saigon for The Saturday Evening Post, ''Minh was not the main mover. But as the senior general, he was the man who crystallized the various factions who were all plotting against Diệm. Everybody and his brother had a plot.''</nowiki><ref name="nyt" />