Editing Clinton Doctrine (section)

==Historiography==
Historians and political scientists evaluated Clinton's immediate predecessors in terms of how well they handled the [[Cold War]]. A dilemma has arisen regarding what criteria to use regarding presidential administrations after the end of the Cold War.<ref>John Davis, "The dilemma: evaluating the first post-Cold War president." ''White House Studies'' 3.2 (2003): 183-200.</ref> Historians have debated, with inconclusive results, on the question of whether there was a consistent overall theme or schema to Clintonian foreign policy, or what scholars would call a "Clinton doctrine".<ref>John Dumbrell, "Was there a Clinton doctrine? President Clinton's foreign policy reconsidered" ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' 13.2 (2002): 43–56.</ref> ''[[The Economist]]'' reported that [[Henry Kissinger]] echoed a frequent complaint when he characterized the Clinton foreign policy as less a grand design than “a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to specific crises.”<ref>See "The world beyond: America needs a design for foreign policy" [https://www.economist.com/unknown/2000/09/28/the-world-beyond ''The Economist'' Sept 30, 2000  ]</ref> John Dumbrell however notes that [[Douglas Brinkley]] and others have identified a Clinton doctrine in terms of systematic efforts to expand democracy in the world.<ref>Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic enlargement: the Clinton doctrine." ''Foreign Policy'' 106 (1997): 111-127 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1149177 online]</ref><ref>Kissinger himself also pointed this out. Henry Kissinger, ''Diplomacy'' (1994), p. 805.</ref> Other experts have pointed to the Clintonian emphasis on humanitarianism, especially when military intervention was called for.<ref>Dumbrell, pp 43-44.</ref> Democracy and humanitarianism represent the idealistic tradition in American foreign policy. Critics of Clintonianism have drawn upon the warnings of [[George F. Kennan]], an exponent of the [[Realism (international relations)|realist]] tradition. Kennan argued that idealism made poor policy, and according to Richard Russell, believed idealism that ignored the realities of power and the national interest would be self-defeating and erode American power.<ref>Richard Russell, "American diplomatic realism: A tradition practised and preached by George F. Kennan." ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' 11.3 (2000): 159–182 at p. 170</ref>

Dumbrell also sees several other possible Clinton doctrines, including perhaps a systematic reluctance to become involved in foreign complications far from the American shore.<ref>Dumbrell, p 44.</ref> Dumbrell's favorite candidate is the explicit Clinton administration policy of warning "rogue" states on their misbehavior, using U.S. military intervention as a threat. He traces the origins of this policy to presidents [[Jimmy Carter]] and [[Ronald Reagan]], arguing that the Clinton administration made it more systematic so it deserves the term "Clinton Doctrine". However, Dumbrell concludes, it did not prove successful in practice.<ref>Dumbrell, pp 53-55.</ref>