Editing Civil war (section)

=== Greed ===
Scholars investigating the cause of civil war are attracted by two opposing theories, [[greed versus grievance]]. Roughly stated: are conflicts caused by differences of ethnicity, religion or other [[social affiliation]], or do conflicts begin because it is in the economic best interests of individuals and groups to start them? Scholarly analysis supports the conclusion that economic and structural factors are more important than those of identity in predicting occurrences of civil war.<ref>See, for example, {{harvnb|Hironaka|2005|pp=9–10}}, and [[Paul Collier|Collier, Paul]], Anke Hoeffler and Nicholas Sambanis, "The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design," in Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 13</ref>

A comprehensive study of civil war was carried out by a team from the [[World Bank]] in the early 21st century. The study framework, which came to be called the Collier–Hoeffler Model, examined 78 five-year increments when civil war occurred from 1960 to 1999, as well as 1,167 five-year increments of "no civil war" for comparison, and subjected the data set to [[regression analysis]] to see the effect of various factors. The factors that were shown to have a statistically significant effect on the chance that a civil war would occur in any given five-year period were:<ref name=cs17>Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 17</ref>

A high proportion of primary [[commodity|commodities]] in national exports significantly increases the risk of a conflict. A country at "peak danger", with commodities comprising 32% of [[gross domestic product]], has a 22% risk of falling into civil war in a given five-year period, while a country with no primary commodity exports has a 1% risk. When disaggregated, only [[petroleum]] and non-petroleum groupings showed different results: a country with relatively low levels of dependence on petroleum exports is at slightly less risk, while a high level of dependence on oil as an export results in slightly more risk of a civil war than national dependence on another primary commodity. The authors of the study interpreted this as being the result of the ease by which primary commodities may be extorted or captured compared to other forms of wealth; for example, it is easy to capture and control the output of a gold mine or oil field compared to a sector of garment manufacturing or hospitality services.<ref name=cs16>Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 16</ref>

A second source of finance is national [[diaspora]]s, which can fund rebellions and insurgencies from abroad. The study found that statistically switching the size of a country's diaspora from the smallest found in the study to the largest resulted in a sixfold increase in the chance of a civil war.<ref name=cs16/>

Higher male secondary school enrollment, [[per capita income]] and economic growth rate all had significant effects on reducing the chance of civil war. Specifically, a male secondary school enrollment 10% above the average reduced the chance of a conflict by about 3%, while a growth rate 1% higher than the study average resulted in a decline in the chance of a civil war of about 1%. The study interpreted these three factors as proxies for earnings forgone by rebellion, and therefore that lower forgone earnings encourage rebellion.<ref name=cs16/> Phrased another way: young males (who make up the vast majority of combatants in civil wars) are less likely to join a rebellion if they are getting an education or have a comfortable salary, and can reasonably assume that they will prosper in the future.<ref>Henrik Urdal – [https://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/expertpapers/Urdal_Expert%20Paper.pdf A CLASH OF GENERATIONS? YOUTH BULGES AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170703213240/http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/expertpapers/Urdal_Expert%20Paper.pdf |date=2017-07-03 }} – ''un.org.'' Retrieved 28 December 2012.</ref>

Low per capita income has also been proposed as a cause for grievance, prompting armed rebellion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=MacCulloch |first=Robert |date=2005 |title=Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426881 |journal=The Journal of Law & Economics |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=93–123 |doi=10.1086/426881 |jstor=10.1086/426881 |issn=0022-2186}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bartusevičius |first=Henrikas |date=2014 |title=The inequality–conflict nexus re-examined: Income, education and popular rebellions |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343313503179 |journal=[[Journal of Peace Research]] |language=en |volume=51 |issue=1 |pages=35–50 |doi=10.1177/0022343313503179 |issn=0022-3433}}</ref> However, for this to be true, one would expect [[economic inequality]] to also be a significant factor in rebellions, which it is not. The study therefore concluded that the economic model of [[opportunity cost]] better explained the findings.<ref name=cs17/>