Editing Chandrakirti (section)

==Philosophy==
Chandrakirti was a philosopher of the [[madhyamaka]] school of [[Nagarjuna]]. This school held that all phenomena (''[[dharmas]]'') were empty of intrinsic nature or self-existence ([[Sanskrit]]: ''[[svabhava|svabhāva]]''). This includes all Buddhist phenomena including the [[Buddhahood|Buddha]], the [[Four Noble Truths|four noble truths]] and [[Nirvana (Buddhism)|nirvana]]. According to Chandrakirti, the apophatic method of madhyamaka is a thoroughgoing negation of all concepts, propositions (''pratijñā'') and [[View (Buddhism)|views (''dṛṣṭi'')]] which affirms neither existence nor non-existence. Due to this radical negation, madhyamaka is seen as a middle way which rejects all extreme views and positions.<ref name=":2" />

For Chandrakirti, even though all phenomena lack svabhāva, sentient beings impute svabhāva in their experience due to their ignorance about the true nature of reality. Ultimately, all phenomena are merely conceptual constructs (''prajñaptimatra'') which do not exist in themselves but are mentally imputed dependent designations (''prajñāptirupādāya'').<ref name=":2" />

[[Thupten Jinpa|Thubten Jinpa]] outlines what has been seen by commentators as the main philosophical ideas put forth by Chandrakirti as follows:<blockquote>(1) rejection of formal inference based on criteria grounded in objects facts of the world, relying instead on consequential reasoning that reveals logical contradictions and absurd consequences entailed by an opponent's positions, (2) rejection of the key tenets of the [[Buddhist logico-epistemology|Buddhist epistemology]] initiated by [[Dignāga|Dignaga]] and developed further by [[Dharmakirti]], (3) a radical understanding of the inaccessibility of ultimate truth through language and thought, (4) an understanding of conventional truth that appeals for its validity to everyday intuitions of the world instead of philosophical grounding, (5) a unique interpretation of Nagarjuna's statement about his having no thesis, and (6) the possible cessation of mind and mental factors in [[buddhahood]].<ref>[[Thupten Jinpa|Jinpa, Thupten]] (translator); [[Je Tsongkhapa|Tsongkhapa]], 2021, p. 6.</ref></blockquote>

=== Two Truths ===
Like all madhyamikas, Chandrakirti defends a [[Two truths doctrine|theory of two truths]] with a strict [[Anti-foundationalism|anti-foundationalist]] character.<ref name=":7">Thakchoe 2017</ref> According to Chandrakirti, all things (''bhāva'') have two natures, the conventional and the ultimate.<ref name=":5">Ruegg 1981, p. 72.</ref><ref name=":7" />

The conventional truth ([[Samvrti|''saṁvṛti'']] ''satya'') is the fact that, provisionally speaking, phenomena have a nature or existence (''bhāva'').<ref name=":2" /> For example, a property of fire is heat and so on. This is the truth of the everyday world (''lokasaṁvṛtisatya'') and the truth of conventional transaction (''vyavahārasatya'').<ref name=":5" /> However, these conventional properties are not intrinsic natures or ''svabhāvas'' (even conventionally speaking), since for Chandra, even conventional truth is empty of intrinsic natures. This view differentiates Chandrakirti from other madhyamikas like [[Bhāviveka]] which affirm the ''conventional existence'' of intrinsic natures.<ref name=":7" /><ref name="ReferenceA">Padmakara Translation Group 2005, p. 28.</ref>

Regarding the ultimate truth (''paramārtha satya''), when fire is analyzed to find its ultimate nature, no independent essence is found that makes fire hot, and thus fire (and all things, including the most basic concepts like time and causality) have no ultimate essence or nature. This is the ultimate truth i.e. [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] (''śūnyatā'') or the lack of self-existence (''niḥsvabhāva'').<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":7" /> It is this very lack of inherent nature in conventional truth that allows it to change and have causal efficacy (''arthakriya'') and thus, to be a dependent arising (''[[pratītyasamutpāda]]'').<ref name=":7" />

==== The nature of conventional truth ====
The conventional is the "domain of mundane cognitive process, and is readily accessible for ordinary beings" according to Sonam Thakchoe.<ref name=":7" /> The conventional truth can be contrasted with conventional falsehood based on erroneous cognitions.<ref name=":5" /> Correct cognition is differentiated from false cognitions by sense faculties that are not impaired. A related distinction which Chandrakirti makes is that between worldly conventions (''lokasaṃvṛti''), which are epistemically reliable from the point of view of ordinary beings and conventions that do not reflect the world (''alokasaṃvṛti)'' and are thus deceptive even by worldly standards.<ref name=":7" />

"Conventional" ''(saṁvṛti)'' can also mean "covering" according to Chandrakirti and is also associated with delusion or ignorance ([[Avidyā (Buddhism)|''avidyā'']]).<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" /> Furthermore, he also glosses the term as codependent (''paraparasaṃbhavana)'' and as being signified ''(saṁket)'' or worldly convention ''(lokavyavahāra).<ref name=":7" />''

The conventional truth, especially as experienced by ordinary people (who reify reality), is a concealing and deluded kind of truth which may act as an obstacle to understanding the ultimate.<ref name=":4">Hayes 2019</ref>''<ref name=":7" />'' From the ultimate point of view in fact, ''saṁvṛtisatya'' is not really true.<ref name=":5" /> Indeed, Chandrakirti explains that conventional phenomena are illusory and unreal and can be compared to a [[mirage]]. The only difference is that conventional phenomena have some causal efficacy from the mundane point of view (for example, water can help a thirsty person, a mirage cannot)''.<ref name=":7" />''

Furthermore, these conventional phenomena are to be differentiated from conventionally illusory entities, such as intrinsic natures or essences that are imputed on to things (which do not exist at all, even conventionally) and conventionally unreal entities (like the horns of a rabbit, which also do not exist at all)''.<ref name=":7" />'' The main difference between these latter two unreal phenomena is that the conventionally unreal entities are understood to be unreal by ordinary people, whereas intrinsic nature is not understood to be unreal by ordinary persons. Instead, ordinary persons impute intrinsic nature on to conventional phenomena (such as water etc.) and perceive them as being intrinsically real (only noble beings realize that this is illusory). As such, intrinsic nature is a conceptual fiction in the minds of ordinary beings.''<ref name=":7" />''

In spite of the unreality of the conventional, Chandrakirti states that the Buddha taught using language and conventional expressions as a way to guide people to the ultimate truth, which is beyond language and cannot be expressed through words.<ref name=":4" />

For Chandrakirti, the way that ordinary beings experience the conventional is very different from the way that awakened saints or noble beings (''āryas'') experience the conventional. Chandrakirti introduced the concept of ''mere convention'' (Tibetan: ''kun rdzob tsam'') to refer to how noble ones experience conventionality, which is quite different to what is held to be ''conventionally real'' or ''conventional true'' (''kun rdzob bden pa''). Ordinary beings grasp at and misconstrue phenomena as being intrinsically real, thus they experience conventional ''reality.'' Enlightened beings meanwhile, only experience a non-reified kind of appearance, which is perceived as being an unreal construct, like a reflected image.<ref name=":7" />''

==== The nature of the ultimate truth ====
Chandrakirti defines ultimate reality as "the nature of things found by particular exalted cognitive processes (yeshes) of those who perceive reality." He further defines it as follows:<ref name=":7" /><blockquote>“Ultimate is the object, the nature of which is found by ''particular'' exalted cognitive processes of those who perceive reality. But it does not exist by virtue of its ''intrinsic objective reality'' (''svarūpatā'' / ''bdag gi ngo bo nyid'')."</blockquote>As such, the ultimate truth for Chandra is the nature of all conventional things that is found by a particular exalted perception which sees how things really are. However, as indicated by Chandra, this nature is also not truly real.<ref name=":7" />

According to Chandrakirti, the ultimate truth, emptiness, is seen as having two aspects: [[Anattā|selflessness]] of persons (''pudgalanairātmya'') and selflessness of phenomena (''dharmanairātmya''). Chandrakirti provides various arguments to show that persons, phenomena (dharmas) and emptiness itself are all unreal and empty.<ref name=":7" />

The ultimate truth, the lack of self-nature in all phenomena, also refers to the fact that phenomena do not arise or cease at all. Even though conventional phenomena appear to arise and pass away through dependent arising, this appearance is in fact unreal and illusory.<ref name=":7" /> Thus, for Chandrakirti, the wisdom which realizes the ultimate truth is the realization that phenomena (dharmas) do not arise or come into being from themselves, from another thing, from both themselves and another thing, or without a cause.<ref name=":4" /> Just like Nagarjuna, Chandrakirti refutes all positions regarding the arising of phenomena, summing up his position as follows:<blockquote>Entities do not arise causelessly, and they do not arise through causes like [[God]], for example. Nor do they arise out of themselves, nor from another, nor from both. They arise codependently.<ref name=":7" /></blockquote>In this sense then, all phenomena are intrinsically unreal and like illusions, since they truly are not what they appear to be.<ref name=":7" />

According to Chandrakirti, this very ultimate truth (i.e. emptiness and non-arising), is also empty, in the sense that it is also dependent on the provisional truth of dependent imputation. Another way to state this is that only what lacks inherent nature is dependently originated and causally efficacious.<ref name=":7" />

Chandrakirti explains the emptiness of emptiness as follows:<blockquote>The emptiness of intrinsic reality of things is itself called by the wise as ‘emptiness,’ and this emptiness also is considered to be empty of any intrinsic reality. The emptiness of that which is called ‘emptiness’ is accepted as ‘the emptiness of emptiness’ (''śūnyatāśūnyatā''). It is explained in this way for the purpose of controverting objectification of the emptiness as intrinsically real (''bhāva'').<ref name=":7" /></blockquote>Thus, according to Chandrakirti's doctrine of "the emptiness of emptiness", the ultimate truth is not some [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]] reality, existential [[Paul Tillich#God as the ground of being|ground]] or [[Ontology|ontological]] foundation, but refers to a mere absence of nature, and thus to the illusory and unreal character of things.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":7" />

Because of the unreality of the conventional and the ineffability of the ultimate, Chandrakirti holds that madhyamikas do not formally put forth any elaborate theory of the conventional truth apart from the ordinary worldly experience that is accepted by worldly convention or common consensus.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> According to Chandrakirti, theories which seek to explain the workings of the conventional truth (like the metaphysics of [[samkhya]] or [[Yogachara|yogacara]]) actually obscure and undermine our understanding of conventional truth, since it is at variance with direct experience. These theories also undermine our understanding of the ultimate truth (which is the very nature of our experience) since the ultimate cannot be understood conceptually and can only be accessed through the gateway of one's conventional direct experience.<ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 29-30.</ref>

=== ''Prāsaṅga'' and reasoning ===
Chandrakirti defended [[Buddhapālita]] and his madhyamaka method against the views of [[Bhāviveka]]. According to Chandra, Madhyamikas should not use autonomous or independent inferences (''svatantrānumāna'') when debating an opponent.{{sfn|Buswell|Lopez|2013|loc=Entry for {{IAST|Candrakīrti}}}}<ref name=":3">Dunne, John. "Madhyamaka in India and Tibet"</ref> This method had been developed by the Buddhist epistemologist [[Dignāga]] and had been adopted by madhyamikas like [[Bhāviveka]].<ref>Hayes, Richard, "Madhyamaka", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/madhyamaka/>.</ref><ref name=":1">Vose 2015, p. 3.</ref> Bhāviveka had argued that to be able to accurately and effectively defend the madhyamaka view against its opponents, one needed to positively prove one's thesis by means of independent inferences (''svatantrānumāna'') in formal [[syllogism]]s (''prayoga'') which proved the madhyamika thesis in a self-contained manner independent of the views of non-madhyamika interlocutors.<ref name=":2" /><ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 20-21, 25.</ref> He therefore faulted  [[Buddhapālita]]'s analysis of madhyamaka as inadequate.<ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, p. 25.</ref>

Chandrakirti critiqued Bhāviveka on this point and argued that madhyamaka thinkers should instead only rely on ''prāsaṅga'' arguments (literally "consequence"), which mainly refers to [[Reductio ad absurdum|reductio arguments]] that seek to show how an opponent's views lead to absurd or unwanted consequences.{{sfn|Buswell|Lopez|2013|loc=Entry for {{IAST|Candrakīrti}}}}<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /> Furthermore, these reductio arguments only refute the opponents position on the opponent's own terms. They do not put forth a counter-position in return nor do they commit the madhyamika to the principles and conclusions used in the course of the argument.<ref name=":10">Padmakara Translation Group 2005, p. 23.</ref> In this sense, the madhyamikas merely point out the absurdity of their opponents views without stating a position of their own, and merely indicate the truth indirectly.<ref name=":10" />

Chandrakirti states:<blockquote>Whoever speaks in terms of independently valid logical arguments (inferences) reaps some fault. We do not rely on them, because the only fruit of our arguments is the annulment of someone else's thesis.<ref name=":8">Dreyfus & McClintock 2015, p. 82.</ref> </blockquote>Chandrakirti argues that the idea that one ''must'' use the syllogistic arguments commits one to the acceptance of inherent natures or some other form of [[foundationalism]] or [[essentialism]].<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /> He also points out that Nagarjuna did not make use of such arguments and relied on ''prāsaṅga''. Chandrakirti sees figures like Bhāviveka as not really being madhyamikas, instead he sees them as logicians which "may take the side of the madhyamaka school out of a desire to parade the extent of his own dialectical skill." According to Chandrakirti, the philosophical practices of these logicians, motivated as they are by a desire for certainty and logic, becomes "an enormous reservoir where faults pile up one after another."<ref name=":8" /> Thus, Chandrakirti does not see Bhāviveka as being a madhyamika (unlike later Tibetan doxographers), but sees him as being a logician (''tārkika''), like other Buddhist thinkers such as Dignaga.<ref>Dreyfus & McClintock 2015, pp. 82-83.</ref>

Another problem which Chandrakirti sees with the idea that a madhyamika must use independent syllogisms is that a madhyamika interlocutor and any essentialist or realist opponent do not share a basic set of premises required for syllogistic reasoning. This is because they do not have the same idea of what it means for something to "exist" and therefore they cannot even agree on a set of basic premises on which to develop an independent syllogism.<ref>Newland 2009, p. 80.</ref><ref name=":3" /> The validity of any independent syllogism depends on the fact that the terminology it uses has the same meaning for both parties in the debate. However, this is impossible in a debate between a madhyamika and a realist according to Chandrakirti, since the very subject of debate is the nature of how the very objects of discussion are said to exist. Thus, a true madhyamika cannot put forth an independent syllogism which is not defective. Furthermore, if both parties use the same terminology but interpret them differently, they also lack a common understanding on which to ground a debate.<ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 26-27.</ref>

''Prāsaṅga'' arguments meanwhile, are mainly negative, and thus do not require the affirmation of any positive thesis or view, but merely deconstructs the arguments of one's opponent. As such, Chandrakirti thinks ''prāsaṅga'' arguments are more suited to the [[Apophasis|apophatic]] method of madhyamaka philosophy.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":4" /> Indeed, according to Chandrakirti, madhyamaka presents no positive view at all and he cites Nagarjuna's ''Vigrahavyāvartanī'' in which he states "I have no thesis" in this regard.<ref name=":3" />

Chandrakirti  also critiques the view of the non-madhyamika epistemologists like Dignāga for having failed to provide a sufficiently indisputable foundation for their premises and for having failed to respond to Nagarjuna's criticism of the foundations of pramana in the ''Vigrahavyāvartanī.<ref name=":4" />''

There is a further problem with the view of the logicians and this is that, for Chandrakirti, all cognitions involve ignorance from an ultimate point of view and thus no cognition is fully reliable. Because of this, meditation on emptiness does not rely on an object at all (even the idea or view of emptiness) and ultimate truth is thus said to be beyond the ordinary mind.<ref name=":3" /><ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, p. 24.</ref> However, there is a role for reasoning in Chandrakirti's thought. Reasoning is only useful for negating all views regarding existence and non-existence. Furthermore, reasoning must also negate itself, because it also relies on conceptual proliferation ([[Conceptual proliferation|''prapañca'']]), which is based on ignorance.<ref name=":3" /> Thus, for Chandrakirti, reasoning and conceptual thought cannot know the ultimate truth, because the ultimate is beyond all concepts and discursive proliferation (''prapañca'').<ref>Ruegg 1981, p. 75.</ref> However, reasoning ''can'' be used to understand the very limitations of reason and thought in explaining the ultimate and how any attempt at conceptually understanding the ultimate leads to contradictions. Reason can thus indirectly point to the ineffable ultimate truth (which can only be realized by another means, i.e. through wisdom, [[Jnana|''jñana'']]) by revealing what it is not.<ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 24-27.</ref>

=== Buddhahood ===
Chandrakirti's view of [[Buddhahood]] is related to his apophatic views. For Chandrakirti, a Buddha's knowing of emptiness is not really knowing anything at all. Instead, a Buddha's knowledge of emptiness is a non-knowing in which there is neither an object nor a mind engaged in the act of knowing the object. Because of this, Chandrakirti holds that for a Buddha, all mind and mental factors (''cittacaitta'') have ceased. Even though from the point of view of ordinary people, a Buddha seems to teach and engage in activities, from the point of view of a Buddha, no conscious decisions are being made and no cognition occurs.<ref name=":3" /> Yet, as Dunne notes, Chandrakirti thereby faces serious difficulties in explaining "the improbable state of affairs" by which a Buddha could teach and benefit sentient beings without any cognitive relation to the world.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dunne |first=J. D. |date=1996-01-01 |title=Thoughtless Buddha, Passionate Buddha |url=https://academic.oup.com/jaar/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/jaarel/LXIV.3.525 |journal=Journal of the American Academy of Religion |language=en |volume=LXIV |issue=3 |pages=525–556 |doi=10.1093/jaarel/LXIV.3.525 |issn=0002-7189}}</ref>

=== Critiques of Yogācāra ===
In his ''[[Madhyamakāvatāra]],'' Chandrakirti also offered refutations of a number of Buddhist views such as those of the ''vijñānavāda'' ("consciousness doctrine") or [[yogācāra]] school.<ref>Fenner, Peter G. (1983). "Chandrakīrti's refutation of Buddhist idealism." ''Philosophy East and West'' Volume 33, no.3 (July 1983) University of Hawaii Press. P.251. Source: [http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/fenner1.htm] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091027071225/http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/fenner1.htm|date=2009-10-27}} (accessed: 21 January 2008)</ref> Chandrakirti understood this tradition as positing a kind of subjective [[idealism]].<ref name=":4" /> According to Chandrakirti, the [[Yogachara|yogācāra]] school fails to fully understand the empty nature of consciousness since they ontologically privilege consciousness over its objects. However, according to Chandrakirti, both are equally empty and neither have any ontological primacy or ultimate existence. Thus, for Chandrakirti, yogācāra fails to appreciate how everything, including consciousness, is conditioned and empty.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" />

Chandrakirti also examines and refutes the basic theories of yogācāra, including the theory of [[Yogachara#The Three Natures and Emptiness|the three natures]] and the theory of the [[Yogachara#Ālaya-vijñāna|storehouse consciousness]].<ref name=":5" /> Chandrakirti cites the ''[[Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra]]'' in order to argue that the storehouse consciousness is a provisional teaching of indirect meaning (''neyartha'').<ref name=":6">Ruegg 1981, p. 73.</ref> He also critiques the yogācāra denial of an external object (''bāhyārtha, bahirartha'') of knowledge and the yogācāra theory of ‘self-awareness’ (''svasamvedana, svasamvitti'').<ref name=":6" />

Furthermore, Chandrakirti interprets the various statements in the Mahayana sutras which seem to promote idealism in a different way than the yogācāra school. According to Chandrakirti, sutra teachings which state that "all is mind" and the like were taught by the Buddha as a way to counter the idea that our sufferings are caused by external forces and actors. According to Chandrakirti, to counter this wrong view and to help people understand that suffering mainly arises due to the way we understand our experience, the Buddha taught that all is mind (''citta-matra'') or idea/impressions (''vijñapti-matra''). Chandrakirti argues that it is a mistake to take this literally as an ontological statement and to conclude that only consciousness exists.<ref name=":4" />