Editing Boeing 2707 (section)

===Concorde===
By mid-1962, it was becoming clear that tentative talks earlier that year between the [[British Aircraft Corporation]] and [[Sud Aviation]] (later [[Aérospatiale]]) on a merger of their SST projects were more serious than originally thought. In November 1962, still to the surprise of many, the [[Concorde]] project was announced.<ref>[http://www.nms.ac.uk/our_museums/museum_of_flight/things_to_see_and_do/concorde/history_of_concorde.aspx "The History of Concorde"] {{dead link|date=July 2011}} nms.ac.uk </ref> In spite of marginal economics, nationalistic and political arguments had led to wide support for the project, especially from [[Charles de Gaulle]].{{sfnp|Conway|2005|p=76}} This set off something of a wave of panic in other countries, as it was widely believed that almost all future commercial aircraft would be supersonic,<ref>{{cite book |author=Bill Yenne |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iJ2FqbrRqyYC&pg=PA16 |title=Inside Boeing: Building the 777 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161009170728/https://books.google.ca/books?id=iJ2FqbrRqyYC&pg=PA16 |archive-date=October 9, 2016 |publisher=Zenith Imprint |year=2002 |page=16| isbn=9781610606882 }}</ref> and it looked like the Europeans would start off with a huge lead. As if this were not enough, it soon became known that the Soviets were also working on a similar design.{{sfnp|Edelman|2002|p=99}}

Three days after the Concorde announcement, Halaby wrote a letter to Kennedy suggesting that if they did not immediately start their own SST effort, the US would lose 50,000 jobs, $4 billion in income, and $3 billion in capital as local carriers turned to foreign suppliers.{{sfnp|Conway|2005|p=75}} A report from the Supersonic Transport Advisory Group (STAG) followed, noting that the European team was in the lead in basic development, and suggested competing by developing a more advanced design with better economics. At the time, more advanced generally meant higher speed. The baseline design in the report called for an aircraft with Mach 3 performance with {{convert|2400|mile|km}} range in order to serve the domestic market. They felt that there was no way to build a transatlantic design with that performance in time to catch the Concorde's introduction, abandoning the trans-Atlantic market to the Europeans.{{sfnp|Conway|2005|p=76}}

In spite of vocal opponents, questions about the technical requirements, and extremely negative reports about its economic viability, the SST project gathered strong backing from industry and the FAA. Johnson sent a report to the president asking for $100 million in funding for FY 1964. This might have been delayed, but in May, [[Pan American World Airways|Pan Am]] announced they had placed 6 options on the Concorde. [[Juan Trippe]] leaked the information earlier that month, stating that the airline would not ignore the SST market, and would buy from Europe if need be.{{sfnp|Conway|2005|p=78}} Pan Am's interest in Concorde angered Kennedy, who called his administration to get Pan Am to redirect its potential funding back to the US SST program.<ref name=pao>{{cite web |last1=Foundation |first1=Pan Am Historical |title=PanAm.org. The Concorde. Pan Am, JFK, A Plane Too Soon. |url=https://www.panam.org/audio/78-a-plane-too-soon |website=www.panam.org |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20211208161253/https://www.panam.org/audio/78-a-plane-too-soon |archive-date=8 December 2021 |language=en-gb |url-status=live}}</ref>

Kennedy introduced the National Supersonic Transport program on June 5, 1963, in a speech at the [[US Air Force Academy]].<ref>Lt Col Donald I. Hackney. [https://web.archive.org/web/20131205125200/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510143 "The Supersonic Transport as an Instrument of National Power"], p. 2. US Army War College, April 8, 1966</ref><ref name=pao/>