Editing Belief (section)

=== Functionalism ===
[[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalism]] contrasts with representationalism in that it defines beliefs not in terms of the internal constitution of the mind but in terms of the function or the causal role played by them.<ref name="Levin">{{cite web |last1=Levin |first1=Janet |title=Functionalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2018 |archive-date=18 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418140903/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Polger">{{cite web |last1=Polger |first1=Thomas W. |title=Functionalism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/functism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=19 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190519120233/https://www.iep.utm.edu/functism/ |url-status=live }}</ref> This view is often combined with the idea that the same belief can be realized in various ways and that it does not matter how it is realized as long as it plays the causal role characteristic to it.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Bickle |first1=John |title=Multiple Realizability |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=16 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210316094454/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ |url-status=live }}</ref> As an analogy, a [[hard drive]] is defined in a functionalist manner: it performs the function of storing and retrieving digital data. This function can be realized in many different ways: being made of plastic or steel, or using magnetism or laser.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> Functionalists hold that something similar is true for beliefs (or mental states in general).<ref name="Levin"/><ref name="Polger"/> Among the roles relevant to beliefs is their relation to perceptions and to actions: perceptions usually cause beliefs and beliefs cause actions.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> For example, seeing that a traffic light has switched to red is usually associated with a belief that the light is red, which in turn causes the driver to bring the car to a halt. Functionalists use such characteristics to define beliefs: whatever is caused by perceptions in a certain way and also causes behavior in a certain way is called a belief. This is not just true for humans but may include animals, hypothetical aliens or even computers.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Levin"/> From this perspective, it would make sense to ascribe the belief that a traffic light is red to a [[self-driving car]] behaving just like a human driver.

Dispositionalism is sometimes seen as a specific form of functionalism.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> It defines beliefs only concerning their role as causes of behavior or as [[dispositions]] to behave in a certain way.<ref name="Quilty-Dunn">{{cite journal |last1=Quilty-Dunn |first1=Jake |last2=Mandelbaum |first2=Eric |title=Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=1 September 2018 |volume=175 |issue=9 |pages=2353–2372 |doi=10.1007/s11098-017-0962-x |language=en |issn=1573-0883 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Audi">{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |chapter=Belief |year=1999 |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=14 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414132344/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, a belief that there is a pie in the pantry is associated with the disposition to affirm this when asked and to go to the pantry when hungry.<ref name="Borchert"/> While it is uncontroversial that beliefs shape our behavior, the thesis that beliefs can be defined exclusively through their role in producing behavior has been contested.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Quilty-Dunn"/> The problem arises because the mechanisms shaping our behavior seem to be too complex to single out the general contribution of one particular belief for any possible situation.<ref name="Borchert"/> For example, one may decide not to affirm that there is a pie in the pantry when asked because one wants to keep it secret. Or one might not eat the pie despite being hungry, because one also believes that it is poisoned.<ref name="Borchert"/> Due to this complexity, we are unable to define even a belief as simple as this one in terms of the behavioral dispositions for which it could be responsible.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>