Editing Battle of Zama (section)

==Roman preparations==

In 206 BC Scipio left Iberia and returned to Italy.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=285}} There he was elected to the senior position of [[Roman consul|consul]] in early 205 BC, despite being aged 31 when the minimum age for the office was 42.{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=99}} Scipio was already anticipating an invasion of North Africa and while still in Iberia had been negotiating with the Numidian leaders Masinissa and [[Syphax]]. He failed to win over the latter, but made an ally of the former.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=285–286}}

Opinion was divided in Roman political circles as to whether an invasion of North Africa was an excessive risk. Hannibal was still on Italian soil; there was the possibility of further Carthaginian invasions,{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=286}} shortly to be realised when Hannibal's youngest brother [[Mago Barca]] landed in [[Liguria]] with an army from Iberia;{{sfn|Miles|2011|p=306}} the practical difficulties of an amphibious invasion and its logistical follow up were considerable; and when the Romans had invaded North Africa in 256 BC during the First Punic War they had been driven out with heavy losses, which had re-energised the Carthaginians.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=286–287}} Eventually a compromise was agreed: Scipio was given Sicily as his consular province,{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=194}} which was the best location for the Romans to launch an invasion of the Carthaginian homeland from and then logistically support it, and permission to cross to Africa on his own judgement.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=286}} However, Roman commitment was less than wholehearted; Scipio could not [[Conscription|conscript troops]] for his consular army, as was usual, but only call for volunteers.{{sfn|Miles|2011|p=306}}{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=195}} 

In 216 BC the survivors of the Roman defeat at Cannae had been formed into two legions and sent to Sicily.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=218}} They formed the core of the Roman expeditionary force.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=287}}{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=316}} Modern historians estimate a combat strength of 25,000–30,000, of whom more than 90 per cent were infantry.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=287}}{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=100}} With up to half of the complement of his legions being fresh volunteers, and with no fighting having taken place on Sicily for the past five years, Scipio instigated a rigorous training regime. This extended from drills by individual [[Centuria|centuries]]{{snd}}the basic Roman army manoeuvre unit of 80 men{{snd}}to exercises by the full army. This lasted for approximately a year. At the same time Scipio assembled a vast quantity of food and [[materiel]], [[merchant ship]]s to transport it and his troops, and warships to escort the transports.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=287–288}}

Also during 205 BC, 30 Roman ships under Scipio's second-in-command, the [[legatus|legate]] [[Gaius Laelius]], raided North Africa around [[Hippo Regius]], gathering large quantities of loot and many captives.{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=100}}{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=288}} The Carthaginians initially believed this was the anticipated invasion by Scipio and his full invasion force; they hastily strengthened fortifications and raised troops. Reinforcements were sent to Mago in an attempt to distract the Romans in Italy.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|pp=194–195}} Meanwhile a succession war had broken out in Numidia between the Roman-supporting Masinissa and the Carthaginian-inclined Syphax. Laelius re-established contact with Masinissa during his raid. Masinissa expressed dismay regarding how long it was taking the Romans to complete their preparations and land in Africa.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|pp=198–199}}