Editing Battle of Nanking (section)

===China's decision to defend Nanjing===
On November 15, near the end of the Battle of Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek convened a meeting of the [[Military Affairs Commission]]'s Supreme National Defense Council to undertake strategic planning, including a decision on what to do in case of a Japanese attack on Nanjing.<ref name="decision22">{{Cite book |last=Tokushi Kasahara |publisher=Iwanami Shoten |year=1997 |location=Tokyo |pages=109–111 |language=ja |script-title=ja:南京事件}}</ref> Here Chiang insisted fervently on mounting a sustained defense of Nanjing. Chiang argued, just as he had during the Battle of Shanghai, that China would be more likely to receive aid from the great powers, possibly at the ongoing [[Nine Power Treaty Conference]], if it could prove on the battlefield its will and capacity to resist the Japanese.<ref name="decision22" /> He also noted that holding onto Nanjing would strengthen China's hand in peace talks which he wanted the German ambassador [[Trautmann mediation|Oskar Trautmann]] to mediate.<ref name="decision22" />

Chiang ran into stiff opposition from his officers, including the powerful Chief of Staff of the Military Affairs Commission [[He Yingqin]], the Deputy Chief of Staff [[Bai Chongxi]], the head of the Fifth War Zone [[Li Zongren]], and his German advisor [[Alexander von Falkenhausen]].<ref name="decision22" /><ref name="yamamoto22">Masahiro Yamamoto, ''Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity'' (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000), 44–46, 72. For this information Yamamoto cites a wide variety of primary sources including the memoirs of Li Zongren and Tang Shengzhi.</ref><ref name="jay22">Jay Taylor, ''The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China'' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2009), 150–152. Most of the sources Taylor cites here come ultimately from Chiang's diaries, but he also utilizes the scholarship of historian Yang Tienshi and the journalist Iris Chang.</ref> They argued that the Chinese Army needed more time to recover from its losses at Shanghai, and pointed out that Nanjing was highly indefensible topographically.<ref name="decision22" /> The mostly gently sloping terrain in front of Nanjing would make it easy for the attackers to advance on the city, while the [[Yangtze River]] behind Nanjing would cut off the defenders' retreat.<ref name="yamamoto22" />
[[File:Tang_Shengzhi.jpg|thumb|Chinese General [[Tang Shengzhi]]]]
Chiang, however, had become increasingly agitated over the course of the Battle of Shanghai, even angrily declaring that he would stay behind in Nanjing alone and command its defense personally.<ref name="yamamoto22" /> But just when Chiang believed himself completely isolated, General Tang Shengzhi, an ambitious senior member of the Military Affairs Commission, spoke out in defense of Chiang's position, although accounts vary on whether Tang vociferously jumped to Chiang's aid or only reluctantly did so.<ref name="decision22" /><ref name="yamamoto22" /> Seizing the opportunity Tang had given him, Chiang responded by organizing the Nanjing Garrison Force on November 20 and officially making Tang its commander on November 25.<ref name="yamamoto22" /> The orders Tang received from Chiang on November 30 were to "defend the established defense lines at any cost and destroy the enemy's besieging force".<ref name="yamamoto22" />

Though both men publicly declared that they would defend Nanjing "to the last man",<ref name=":222">{{Cite web |last=Masato Kajimoto |year=2000 |title=Introduction – From Marco Polo Bridge to Nanking |url=http://thenankingmassacre.org/2015/07/03/from-shanghai-to-nanking |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150715064628/http://thenankingmassacre.org/2015/07/03/from-shanghai-to-nanking/ |archive-date=July 15, 2015 |access-date=July 19, 2015 |publisher=The Nanking Massacre}} Kajimoto cites news reports in the Chicago Daily News and the American military officer Frank Dorn for this information.</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Masato Kajimoto |year=2000 |title=Fall of Nanking – What Foreign Journalists Witnessed |url=http://thenankingmassacre.org/2015/07/04/what-western-journalists-witnessed/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150715174636/http://thenankingmassacre.org/2015/07/04/what-western-journalists-witnessed/ |archive-date=July 15, 2015 |access-date=July 19, 2015 |publisher=The Nanking Massacre}} Kajimoto cites news reports in the Chicago Daily News and the American military officer Frank Dorn for this information.</ref> they were aware of their precarious situation.<ref name="yamamoto22" /> On the same day that the Garrison Force was established Chiang officially moved the capital of China from Nanjing to [[Chongqing]] deep in China's interior.<ref name="jiken22">{{Cite book |last=Tokushi Kasahara |publisher=Iwanami Shoten |year=1997 |location=Tokyo |pages=113–115, 120–121 |language=ja |script-title=ja:南京事件}}</ref> Further, both Chiang and Tang would at times give contradictory instructions to their subordinates on whether their mission was to defend Nanjing to the death or merely delay the Japanese advance.<ref name="yamamoto22" />