Editing Battle of Leuctra (section)

==Battle==
[[File:Leuctra.svg|thumb|250px|The red blocks show the placement of the elite troops within each [[phalanx formation|phalanx]].<br> Top: Traditional [[hoplite]] [[order of battle]] and advance.<br>  Bottom: [[Epaminondas]]'s strategy at Leuctra. The strong left wing advanced more than the weaker right wing.]]
The battle opened with the Spartans' mercenary [[peltasts]] (slingers, javeliniers, and/or skirmishers) attacking and driving back the Boeotian camp followers and others who were reluctant to fight. According to Xenophon, the Boeotian camp followers were trying to leave the field, as they did not intend to fight; this Spartan action drove them back into the Theban army, inadvertently making the Theban force stronger.<ref name="xen4 8">''Hellenica'' VI 4.8</ref> There followed a cavalry engagement, in which the Thebans drove their enemies off the field.<ref name=EB1911/>  Initially, the Spartan infantry were sent into disarray when their retreating cavalry hopelessly disrupted Cleombrotus's attempt to outflank the Theban left column.  At this point the Theban left hit the Spartan right with the [[Sacred Band of Thebes]], a troop made up of all male lovers, led by [[Pelopidas]],<ref>Cornelius Nepos: Lives of Eminent Commanders, Pelopidas</ref> at its head. The decisive engagement was then fought between the Theban and Spartan infantry.<ref name=EB1911/>

The normal practice of the Spartans (and, indeed, the Greeks in general) was to establish their heavily armed infantry in a solid mass, or [[phalanx formation|phalanx]], some eight to twelve men deep.  This was considered to allow for the best balance between depth (the pushing power it provided) and width (i.e., area of coverage of the phalanx's front battle line). The infantry would advance together so that the attack flowed unbroken against their enemy. In order to combat the [[Phalanx#Shields|phalanx's famous right-hand drift]], Greek commanders traditionally placed their most experienced, highly regarded and, generally, deadliest troops on the right wing, as this was the place of honor.  By contrast, the shakiest and/or least influential troops were often placed on the left wing. In the Spartan battleplan, therefore, the [[hippeis]] (an elite force numbering 300 men) and the king of Sparta would stand on the right wing of the phalanx.

[[File:Battle of Leuctra, 371 BC - Decisive action.svg|thumb|left|250px|This shows the flank attack that Rüstow and Köchly proposed. Delbrück rejected such an interpretation.]]
In a major break with tradition, [[Epaminondas]] massed his [[cavalry]] and a fifty-deep column of Theban [[infantry]] on his left wing,<ref name=EB1911/> and sent forward this body against the Spartan right.  His shallower and weaker center and right wing columns were drawn up so that they were progressively further to the right and rear of the proceeding column, in an [[Echelon formation]]. The Theban center and right were held back, screened by skirmishers and cavalry. The infantry engaged, and the Thebans smashed the Spartan right wing. The Spartans' twelve-deep formation on their right wing could not sustain the heavy impact of their opponents' 50-deep column. The Spartan right was hurled back with a loss of about 1,000 men, of whom 400 were some of Sparta's most experienced soldiers, including King [[Cleombrotus I]].<ref name=EB1911/>

[[Wilhelm Rüstow]] and [[Hermann Köchly]], writing in the 19th century, believed that Pelopidas led the Sacred Band out from the column to attack the Spartans in the flank. [[Hans Delbrück]] considered this to be a mere misreading of [[Plutarch]]. Plutarch does indeed describe Pelopidas leading the Band and catching the Spartans in disorder, but there is nothing in his account that conveys anything other than the Sacred Band being the head of the column, and the Spartans were disordered not because they were taken in the flank but because they were caught in mid-maneuver, extending their line.<ref>The History of the Art of War, Hans Delbrück p. 167</ref>

Seeing their right wing beaten, the rest of the Peloponnesians, who were essentially unwilling participants, retired and left the enemy in possession of the field.<ref name=EB1911/>