Editing Army of the Republic of Vietnam (section)

===Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 1955–75===
{{See also|Battle for Saigon|1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt |1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing |Buddhist crisis|Huế Vesak shootings| Xá Lợi Pagoda raids |1963 South Vietnamese coup|Arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm|January 1964 South Vietnamese coup}}

[[Image:M113.jpg|thumb|Early unmodified ARVN M113 during the Vietnam War]]
[[File:Waterboarding a captured North Vietnamese soldier near Da Nang.jpeg|thumb|Two United States soldiers and one [[South Vietnam]]ese soldier [[Waterboarding|waterboard]] a captured North Vietnamese prisoner of war near [[Da Nang]], 1968.]]

On 26 October 1955, the military was reorganized by the President Ngô Đình Diệm who declared the republic in the State of Vietnam. The air force was established as a separate service known as the [[Republic of Vietnam Air Force]] (RVNAF). Early on, the focus of the army was the [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] fighters of the [[Viet Cong]] (VC), formed to oppose the Diệm administration. The United States, under President [[John F. Kennedy]] sent advisors and a great deal of financial support to aid the ARVN in combating the insurgents. A major campaign, developed by [[Ngô Đình Nhu]] and later resurrected under another name was the "[[Strategic Hamlet Program]]" which was regarded as unsuccessful by Western media because it was "inhumane" to move villagers from the countryside to fortified villages. ARVN leaders and Diệm were criticized by the foreign press when the troops were used to crush armed anti-government religious groups like the [[Cao Đài]] and [[Hòa Hảo]] as well as to raid [[Buddhist]] temples, which according to Diệm, were harboring VC guerrillas. The most notorious of these attacks occurred on the night of August 21, 1963, during the [[Xá Lợi Pagoda raids]] conducted by the [[ARVN Special Forces]], which caused a death toll estimated to range into the hundreds.

In 1963, Diệm was killed in a [[1963 South Vietnamese coup|coup d'état carried out by ARVN officers]] and encouraged by American officials such as [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.|Henry Lodge]]. In the confusion that followed, General [[Dương Văn Minh]] took control, but he was only the first in a succession of ARVN generals to assume the presidency of South Vietnam. During these years, the United States began taking more control of the war against the VC and the role of the ARVN became less and less significant. They were also plagued by continuing problems of severe corruption amongst the officer corps. Although the United States was highly critical of the ARVN, it continued to be entirely U.S.-armed and funded.

Although the American news media has often portrayed the Vietnam War as a primarily American and North Vietnamese conflict, the ARVN carried the brunt of the fight before and after large-scale American involvement, and participated in many major operations with American troops. ARVN troops pioneered the use of the [[M113 armored personnel carrier]] as an infantry fighting vehicle by fighting mounted rather than as a "battle taxi" as originally designed, and the [[armored cavalry]] (ACAV) modifications were adopted based on ARVN experience. One notable ARVN unit equipped with M113s, the [[3d Armored Cavalry Squadron (South Vietnam)|3d Armored Cavalry Squadron]], used the new tactic so proficiently and with such extraordinary heroism against hostile forces that they earned the [[Presidential Unit Citation (United States)#Vietnam War 2|United States Presidential Unit Citation]].<ref name="landscaper.net">{{cite web|url=http://www.landscaper.net/namstory.htm |title=Photo: U.S. advisor confers with ARVN 3rd Cav commander in front of a South Vietnamese M113 |access-date=2010-06-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100614071616/http://www.landscaper.net/namstory.htm |archive-date=14 June 2010 }}</ref><ref name="apd.army.mil">{{cite web|url=http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/go7124.pdf |title=3d Armored Cavalry Squadron (ARVN) earned Presidential Unit Citation (United States) for extraordinary heroism |access-date=2010-06-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110716142800/http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/go7124.pdf |archive-date=2011-07-16 }}</ref> The ARVN suffered 254,256 recorded deaths between 1960 and 1974, with the highest number of recorded deaths being in 1972, with 39,587 combat deaths,<ref>Clarke, Jeffrey J. (1988), ''United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973'', Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, p. 275</ref> while approximately 58,000 U.S. troops died during the war.<ref name="Casualties - US vs NVA/VC" />

United States experience with the ARVN generated a catalog of complaints about its performance, with various officials saying 'it did not pull its weight,'<ref>Memorandum from George Carver of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, CIA, to DCI Helms, July 7, 1966, FRUS Vietnam 1964–68, Vol. 4, p. 486, cited in Robert K. Brigham, ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2006, p. x</ref> 'content to let the Americans do the fighting and dying,'<ref>Letter from John Sylvester Jr, Province Senior Advisor, Binh Long Province, to Charles Whitehouse, Deputy for CORDS II FFV/III CTZ, Sept. 19, 1969, The Francis N. Dawson Papers: US Policy Toward Indochina 1940–53, Reports for Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, US Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Penn, cited in Brigham, 2006, p. x</ref> and 'weak in dedication, direction, and discipline.'<ref>Memo from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, March 26, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States Vietnam 1964–68, Vol. 4, Washington DC, Govt. Printing Office, 1994, p. 732, cited in Brigham p. x.</ref>  The President remained prone to issue instructions directly to field units, cutting across the entire chain of command. Major shortcomings identified by U.S. officers included a general lack of motivation, indicated, for example, by officers having an inclination for rear area jobs rather than combat command, and a continuing desertion problem.