Editing Anaximander (section)

=== Apeiron ===

{{main|Apeiron|Matter#Classical antiquity (c. 600 BCE–c. 322 BCE)}}{{See also|Classical element#Hellenistic philosophy}}

The ''Refutation'' attributed to [[Hippolytus of Rome]] (I, 5), and the later 6th century Byzantine philosopher [[Simplicius of Cilicia]], attribute to Anaximander the earliest use of the word ''apeiron'' ({{lang|grc|ἄπειρον}} "infinite" or "limitless") to designate the original principle. He was the first philosopher to employ, in a philosophical context, the term ''[[Arche|archē]]'' ({{lang|grc|ἀρχή}}), which until then had meant beginning or origin.

"That Anaximander called this something by the name of {{lang|grc|Φύσις}} is the natural interpretation of what [[Theophrastus|Theophrastos]] says; the current statement that the term {{lang|grc|ἀρχή}} was introduced by him appears to be due to a misunderstanding."<ref name="Burnet 1930 54">{{Cite book|title=Early Greek Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn|url-access=registration|last=Burnet|first=John|publisher=A. & C. Black, Ltd.|year=1930|location=Great Britain|pages=[https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn/page/54 54]}}</ref>

And "Hippolytos, however, is not an independent authority, and the only question is what Theophrastos wrote."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Early Greek Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn_e8u1|url-access=registration|last=Burnet|first=John|publisher=A. & C. Black, Ltd.|year=1930|location=Great Britain|pages=[https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn_e8u1/page/54 54] footnote 2|isbn=9780713603378}}</ref>

For him, it became no longer a mere point in time, but a source that could perpetually give birth to whatever will be. The indefiniteness is spatial in early usages as in [[Homer]] (indefinite sea) and as in [[Xenophanes]] (6th century BC) who said that the Earth went down indefinitely (to ''apeiron'') i.e. beyond the imagination or concept of men.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Kirk |first1=G. S. |last2=Raven |first2=J. E. |last3=Schofield |first3=M. |title=The Presocratic Philosophers|name-list-style=amp| date=2003| publisher=Cambridge University Press| url= https://books.google.com/books?id=kFpd86J8PLsC| isbn=978-0-521-27455-5| page=110}}</ref>

Burnet (1930) in ''Early Greek Philosophy'' says:

<blockquote>"Nearly all we know of Anaximander's system is derived in the last resort from Theophrastos, who certainly knew his book. He seems once at least to have quoted Anaximander's own words, and he criticised his style. Here are the remains of what he said of him in the First Book:</blockquote>

<blockquote><nowiki/>"Anaximander of Miletos, son of Praxiades, a fellow-citizen and associate of Thales, said that the material cause and first element of things was the Infinite, he being the first to introduce this name of the material cause. He says it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but a substance different from them which is infinite" [apeiron, or {{lang|grc|ἄπειρον}}] "from which arise all the heavens and the worlds within them.—Phys, Op. fr. 2 (Dox. p. 476; R. P. 16)."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Early Greek Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn|url-access=registration|last=Burnet|first=John|publisher=A. & C. Black, Ltd.|year=1930|location=Great Britain|pages=[https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn/page/52 52]}}</ref></blockquote>

Burnet's quote from the "First Book" is his translation of Theophrastos' ''Physic Opinion'' fragment 2 as it appears in p.&nbsp;476 of ''Historia Philosophiae Graecae'' (1898) by Ritter and Preller and section 16 of ''Doxographi Graeci'' (1879) by Diels.

By ascribing the "Infinite" with a "material cause", Theophrastos is following the Aristotelian tradition of "nearly always discussing the facts from the point of view of his own system".<ref>{{Cite book|title=Early Greek Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn_e8u1|url-access=registration|last=Burnet|first=John|publisher=A. & C. Black, Ltd.|year=1930|location=Great Britain|pages=[https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn_e8u1/page/31 31]–32|isbn=9780713603378}}</ref>

Aristotle writes (''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', I.III 3–4) that the [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|Pre-Socratics]] were searching for the element that constitutes all things. While each pre-Socratic philosopher gave a different answer as to the identity of this element ([[water (classical element)|water]] for Thales and [[air (classical element)|air]] for Anaximenes), Anaximander understood the beginning or first principle to be an endless, unlimited primordial mass (''apeiron''), subject to neither old age nor decay, that perpetually yielded fresh materials from which everything we perceive is derived.<ref>[[Pseudo-Plutarch]], ''The Doctrines of the Philosophers'' (I, 3).</ref> He proposed the theory of the ''apeiron'' in direct response to the earlier theory of his teacher, Thales, who had claimed that the primary substance was water. The notion of temporal infinity was familiar to the Greek mind from remote antiquity in the religious concept of immortality, and Anaximander's description was in terms appropriate to this conception. This ''archē'' is called "eternal and ageless". (Hippolytus (?), ''Refutation'', I,6,I;DK B2)<ref>{{Cite book |last=Guthrie |first=William Keith Chambers |title=A History of Greek Philosophy| date=2000| publisher=Cambridge University Press| url= https://books.google.com/books?id=ogUR3V9wbbIC| isbn=978-0-521-29420-1 |page=83}}</ref>

<blockquote>"''Aristotle puts things in his own way regardless of historical considerations, and it is difficult to see that it is more of an anachronism to call the Boundless " intermediate between the elements " than to say that it is " distinct from the elements." Indeed, if once we introduce the elements at all, the former description is the more adequate of the two. At any rate, if we refuse to understand these passages as referring to Anaximander, we shall have to say that Aristotle paid a great deal of attention to some one whose very name has been lost, and who not only agreed with some of Anaximander's views, but also used some of his most characteristic expressions. We may add that in one or two places Aristotle certainly seems to identify the " intermediate " with the something " distinct from " the elements''."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Early Greek Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn_e8u1|url-access=registration|last=Burnet|first=John|publisher=A. & C. Black, Ltd.|year=1930|location=Great Britain|pages=[https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn_e8u1/page/57 57]|isbn=9780713603378}}</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>"It is certain that he [Anaximander] cannot have said anything about elements, which no one thought of before Empedokles, and no one could think of before Parmenides. The question has only been mentioned because it has given rise to a lengthy controversy, and because it throws light on the historical value of Aristotle's statements. From the point of view of his own system, these may be justified; but we shall have to remember in other cases that, when he seems to attribute an idea to some earlier thinker, we are not bound to take what he says in an historical sense."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Early Greek Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn|url-access=registration|last=Burnet|first=John|publisher=A. & C. Black, Ltd.|year=1930|location=Great Britain|pages=[https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn/page/56 56]–57}}</ref></blockquote>

For Anaximander, the [[Principle (chemistry)|principle]] of things, the constituent of all substances, is nothing determined and not an element such as water in Thales' view. Neither is it something halfway between air and water, or between air and fire, thicker than air and fire, or more subtle than water and earth.<ref>[[Aristotle]], ''[[On Generation and Corruption]]'' (II, 5)</ref> Anaximander argues that water cannot embrace all of the opposites found in nature – for example, water can only be wet, never dry – and therefore cannot be the one primary substance; nor could any of the other candidates. He postulated the ''apeiron'' as a substance that, although not directly perceptible to us, could explain the opposites he saw around him.

<blockquote>"If Thales had been right in saying that water was the fundamental reality, it would not be easy to see how anything else could ever have existed. One side of the opposition, the cold and moist, would have had its way unchecked, and the warm and dry would have been driven from the field long ago. We must, then, have something not itself one of the warring opposites, something more primitive, out of which they arise, and into which they once more pass away."<ref name="Burnet 1930 54"/></blockquote>

Anaximander explains how the [[Classical element|four elements]] of ancient physics ([[air (classical element)|air]], [[earth (classical element)|earth]], [[water (classical element)|water]] and [[fire (classical element)|fire]]) are formed, and how Earth and terrestrial beings are formed through their interactions. Unlike other Pre-Socratics, he never defines this principle precisely, and it has generally been understood (e.g., by Aristotle and by [[Augustine of Hippo|Saint Augustine]]) as a sort of primal [[Chaos (cosmogony)|chaos]]. According to him, the Universe originates in the separation of opposites in the primordial matter. It embraces the opposites of hot and cold, wet and dry, and directs the movement of things; an entire host of shapes and differences then grow that are found in "all the worlds" (for he believed there were many).<ref name="Chisholm1911"/>

<blockquote>"Anaximander taught, then, that there was an eternal. The indestructible something out of which everything arises, and into which everything returns; a boundless stock from which the waste of existence is continually made good, "elements.". That is only the natural development of the thought we have ascribed to Thales, and there can be no doubt that Anaximander at least formulated it distinctly. Indeed, we can still follow to some extent the reasoning which led him to do so. Thales had regarded water as the most likely thing to be that of which all others are forms; Anaximander appears to have asked how the primary substance could be one of these particular things. His argument seems to be preserved by Aristotle, who has the following passage in his discussion of the Infinite: ''"Further, there cannot be a single, simple body which is infinite, either, as some hold, one distinct from the elements, which they then derive from it, or without this qualification. For there are some who make this. (i.e. a body distinct from the elements). the infinite, and not air or water, in order that the other things may not be destroyed by their infinity. They are in opposition one to another. air is cold, water moist, and fire hot. and therefore, if any one of them were infinite, the rest would have ceased to be by this time. Accordingly they say that what is infinite is something other than the elements, and from it the elements arise.'⁠—Aristotle Physics. F, 5 204 b 22 (Ritter and Preller (1898) Historia Philosophiae Graecae, section 16 b)."''<ref>{{Cite book |title=Early Greek Philosophy |url=https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn |url-access=registration |last=Burnet |first=John |publisher=A. & C. Black |year=1930 |location=Great Britain |pages=[https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn/page/53 53]}}</ref></blockquote>

Anaximander maintains that all dying things are returning to the element from which they came (''apeiron''). The one surviving fragment of Anaximander's writing deals with this matter. Simplicius transmitted it as a quotation, which describes the balanced and mutual changes of the elements:<ref>[[Simplicius of Cilicia|Simplicius]], ''Comments on Aristotle's Physics'' (24, 13):

: "{{lang|grc|Ἀναξίμανδρος [...] λέγει δ' αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους· ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τὴν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων οὗτος θεασάμενος οὐκ ἠξίωσεν ἕν τι τούτων ὑποκείμενον ποιῆσαι, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα· οὗτος δὲ οὐκ ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ στοιχείου τὴν γένεσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τῆς αἰδίου κινήσεως.}}"

In [[Ancient Greek]] quotes usually blend with surrounding text. Consequently, it is uncertain how much is Anaximander's text and what is by Simplicius.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Curd |first=Patricia |title=A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia |publisher=[[Hackett Publishing]] |year=1996 |page=12}}</ref>

<blockquote>
Whence things have their origin,<br/>
Thence also their destruction happens,<br/>
According to necessity;<br/>
For they give to each other justice and recompense<br/>
For their injustice<br/>
In conformity with the ordinance of Time.
</blockquote>

Simplicius mentions that Anaximander said all these "in poetic terms", meaning that he used the old mythical language. The goddess Justice ([[Dike (mythology)|Dike]]) keeps the cosmic order. This concept of returning to the element of origin was often revisited afterwards, notably by Aristotle,<ref>Aristotle, ''Metaphysics'', I, 3, 983 ''b'' 8–11; ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'', III, 5, 204 ''b'' 33–34</ref> and by the Greek [[Tragedy|tragedian]] [[Euripides]]: "what comes from earth must return to earth."<ref>Euripides''[[The Suppliants (Euripides)|Supplices]]'', v. 532</ref> [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], in his ''[[Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks]]'', stated that Anaximander viewed "... all coming-to-be as though it were an illegitimate emancipation from eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only penance."<ref>[[Friedrich Nietzsche]], ''[[Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks]]'' (1873) § 4.</ref> Physicist [[Max Born]], in commenting upon [[Werner Heisenberg]]'s arriving at the idea that the elementary particles of [[quantum mechanics]] are to be seen as different manifestations, different quantum states, of one and the same "primordial substance,"' proposed that this primordial substance be called ''apeiron''.<ref>{{cite book |chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=Bmcpsgp-Ml4C&pg=PA546 | page= 546 |title=A Cultural History of Physics |last=Károly |first= Simonyi |author-link= Simonyi Károly |date= April 7, 2012 |chapter= 5.5.10 Back to the Apeiron? |publisher= CRC Press |isbn=9781568813295 <!-- print source, but for the fans: |access-date=July 9, 2013 -->}}</ref>