Editing Alfred von Schlieffen (section)

==The German Army==
For Schlieffen, the smaller rate of conscription into the German army (55 per cent, compared to France's rate of 80 per cent), created a numerical imbalance, which was worsened by the [[Franco-Russian Alliance]] of 1896. German tactical and operational abilities could not compensate for this quantitative inferiority. Schlieffen had wanted to institute universal conscription and raise as many combat units from trained reservists as possible.{{sfn|Zuber|2002|pp=138–139}} Conscription policy was controlled by the [[Prussian Ministry of War]], which answered to the {{lang|de|[[Reichstag (German Empire)|Reichstag]]}}. Schlieffen planned to create masses of new units when war came, when he would assume command of the army. Upon mobilisation, large numbers of reservists would be assigned to replacement battalions ({{lang|de|Ersatzbataillone}}), while waiting to join the field army.{{sfn|Zuber|2002|p=139}}

From June 1891, Schlieffen proposed to form {{lang|de|Ersatzbataillone}} into brigades in the field army but the units were not effective forces. Replacement units as field units would also not be able to replace field army casualties. The War Ministry rejected Schlieffen's proposals, and nothing was done until 1911, six years after Schlieffen's retirement, when six {{lang|de|Ersatz}} divisions were formed by General [[Erich Ludendorff]]. Schlieffen continued to believe in the mass use of {{lang|de|Ersatzbataillone}}, making them fundamental to the {{lang|de|[[wikt:Denkschrift|Denkschrift]]}} (memorandum or think piece) which became known as the Schlieffen Plan (January 1906). The {{lang|de|Denkschrift}} was not a campaign plan, as Schlieffen had retired on 31 December 1905 and the 96 divisions needed to carry out this one-front war plan did not exist (in 1914 the German army had 79, of which 68 were deployed in the west). Rather, it was a demonstration of what Germany might accomplish if universal conscription was introduced.{{sfn|Zuber|2002|p=139}}

Schlieffen thought that even this hypothetical 96-division German army would probably not be able to defeat France,

{{quote|These preparations [encircling Paris] can be made any way that you like: it will soon become clear that we will be too weak to continue the operation in this direction. We will have the same experience as that of all previous conquerors, that offensive warfare both requires and uses up very strong forces, that these forces become weaker even as those of the defender become stronger, and this is especially true in a land that bristles with fortresses.{{sfn|Zuber|2004|p=195}}}}

Without twelve {{lang|de|Ersatz}} divisions on the right flank (in 1914 the German army had six which operated in Lorraine), outflanking Paris was impossible. Schlieffen admitted in the {{lang|de|Denkschrift}} that {{lang|de|Ersatz}} units could not catch the right wing by foot-marching, nor would the rail system suffice to move twelve {{lang|de|Ersatz}} divisions to Paris. If they could not be sent to the right wing, they could be deployed practically anywhere else on the German front, either between [[Verdun]] and [[Mézières, Ardennes|Mézières]], at [[Metz]] or on the right bank of the [[Moselle]].{{sfn|Zuber|2002|p=46}} There is no evidence that Schlieffen conducted an exercise to test a scheme of manoeuvre similar to the one in the {{lang|de|Denkschrift}}, an envelopment of [[Paris]] by the right flank, which would be surprising if this represented the pinnacle of Schlieffen's strategic thought. None of Schlieffen's surviving deployment plans ({{lang|de|Aufmarsch}}), General staff rides ({{lang|de|Generalstabsreisen}}) or war games ({{lang|de|Kriegsspiele}}) bear any resemblance to the manoeuvre of the Schlieffen Plan; the plans are consistent with Schlieffen's counter-attack doctrine.{{sfn|Zuber|2002|p=212}} On 11 December 1893 Schlieffen wrote a {{lang|de|Denkschrift}} that represented the completion of his idea of mass warfare. When war came, the German government ought to declare full mobilisation in [[East Prussia]], owing to its vulnerability to [[Russia]]n cavalry raids. The East Prussian militia would use prepared equipment; behind this militia screen the German field army would deploy and then throw back the Russians.{{sfn|Zuber|2002|p=140}}