Editing Alexander Dubček (section)

==Prague Spring==
{{Main|Prague Spring}}

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The Czechoslovak economy began to plateau in the early 1960s. The one-size-fits-all model of economic planning, better suited to the pre-industrialized Soviet Union of the 1930s, resulted in over-investment in heavy industry at the expense of light industry and consumer goods. Quantity was maximized regardless of costs, leading to poor quality and prices that were twice that of world prices. Along with other economists, [[Ota Šik]] condemned the existing system of management as one that made further development impossible. Though production continued to grow, albeit slowly, in 1964 income began to fall. This forced then-president [[Antonín Novotný]] to begin making limited concessions to liberalize the strictly planned economy. This included allowing greater freedom to companies in setting prices and wages.<ref name=":3" /> Though the source of the immediate crisis was the now-pressing economic effects, Dubček's generation had spent the early 1960s engaged in travel, research, and study heavily supported by academia, the state, and the party. Their body of research and experience convinced the reformers that their self-isolated country had not simply reached a growth impasse but had fallen behind the rest of the world due to a generation of stagnation in all spheres of life.<ref name=":11" />

Reforms only touched some sectors, and reforms were slow, which the regime tried to make up with increased imports. Liberalizing the centralized economy threatened those in the party bureaucracy who administered the old system, resulting in their sabotage and slowing of what reforms were voted. The cultural sphere liberalized the most completely and rapidly, but the economy and national autonomy remained heavily centralized.<ref name=":3" /> Cultural intellectuals were able to achieve more, and gain greater leverage among the reformists because of a combination of a greater ability to connect with the public and a peculiarity of the system. Writers and publishers benefited from the autonomous profitability of the sectors they controlled, giving them fundamentally different interests than those tied to heavy industry or other sectors, who lacked financial independence.<ref name=":16">Perina, Rudolf Vilem. "Intellectuals and Political Change in Czechoslovakia: A History of Literarni Noviny and its Contributors, 1952-1969." Ph.D diss., Columbia University, 1977.</ref>

The technocratic economic reformers, such as [[:cs:Radoslav Selucký|Radoslav Selucký]], who denounced the "cult of the plan", were only slightly less ideologically threatening.<ref name=":16" /> In many ways they were just as dangerous to the interests of conservatives in the party, but they lacked the political leverage of the moral economists who bridged the gap with the writers and intellectuals. Ota Šik relied on an interdisciplinary approach and method.<ref>Hruby, Peter. ''Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia.'' Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1980.</ref> Writers and cultural intellectuals began to see themselves as holding the balance of power between the entrenched apparatus and reformers, which for many explains their enthusiasm for joining the party in disproportionate numbers, where their growing power could be expressed.<ref>Skilling, H. Gordon. ''Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution. Princeton'', Princeton University Press, 1976.</ref>

Regardless, the economic reforms touched on both the nationalities and the political question. Reforming how the economy operated was tied to how the party operated, and thinking evolved to recognize the need for a diversity of interests to be represented.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |title=Free Communism: A Czech Experiment |url=https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/Documents/Detail/free-communism-a-czech-experiment-1969/121516 |journal=Fabian Society |issue=19 | year=1989 |  publisher=London School of Economics}}</ref> Cultural reform touched on economic reform, as the educated groups saw one of the principle resources the economy neglected was talent. Technical advance required abilities that were neither promoted nor respected among the conservatives, such as Novotný, who were mostly poorly educated and often lacked fundamental competency at their jobs. They did not call, however, for capitalism and class difference but democratic compensation for additional time and expense necessary for their education.<ref>Richta, Radovan, et al. ''Civilization at the Crossroads.'' International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969.</ref>

In May 1967, speaking before the Plenum of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Dubček represented this rising conviction among his generation that rejected the dictatorship of a single class of workers or party officials. Instead, he appealed to a universal all-inclusive human principle that had as much in common with sociology as Marxist–Leninism, in origins, practice, and aims, while still embracing both.<ref name=":10" />

In September, 1967, Novotný's conservatives began to impose strict censorship on films and other culture products, institutions, and culture workers. This did not quiet opposition but only further provoked it. What followed was an unprecedented mobilization of solidarity among culture workers in both Czech and Slovak lands.<ref>Golan, Galia. ''Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia; The Dubcek Era 1968-1969.'' Cambridge, University Press, 1973.</ref>

Following his presentation of grievances the month before, in October 1967 Dubček and [[Ota Šik]] challenged First Secretary Novotný's leadership style at a Central Committee meeting. Dubček said he acted like a dictator.<ref name=":3" /> Faced with lack of support at the central and local level of the party and large public demonstrations the last day of October that were badly mishandled, provoking further opposition, Novotný secretly invited Soviet leader [[Leonid Brezhnev]] to visit to Prague in December 1967. He had hoped to shore up his own position.<ref name=":21" />

In Prague, Brezhnev was stunned to learn of the extent of the opposition to Novotný. He decided not to interfere.<ref name=":21">D. Viney, "Alexander Dubcek", ''Studies in Comparative Communism'' 1 (1968) p. 26</ref> Brezhnev was generally supportive of Novotny, but said he was not there to solve their problems. He was there to help restore party unity, while the KSC Presidium was deadlocked 5-5. In January, 1968, the questions of leadership and reform were turned over to the Czechoslovak Party Central Committee. They voted no confidence in Novotný by splitting the functions of the president and party leader. He remained president but was replaced by Dubček as First Secretary. Novotný resisted, attempting to mobilize elements of the army to prevent his loss of power. Ironically, investigation into this led to Novotný being completely removed from office a few months later. Investigations by officials and a newly freed media of his chief accomplice, General [[Jan Šejna]], exposed a corruption scandal involving his own and his sons' shady business dealings,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Prague Spring |url=https://spartacus-educational.com/COLDprague.htm |access-date=2023-03-18 |website=Spartacus Educational}}</ref> which was known as the 'Clover Seed Scandal'.<ref name=":18" />

Dubček, with his background and training in Russia, was seen by the USSR as a safe pair of hands. "Our Sasha", as Brezhnev called him.<ref>Brezhnev, quoted in B. Wasserstein, ''Civilisation and Barbarism'' (Oxford 2007) pp. 598, 603</ref> Aside from the immediate personal and professional animosity of Bulgarian leader, [[Todor Zhivkov]], who refused to acknowledge him directly, other Warsaw Pact leaders sent customary congratulations. Zhivkov received a protest for his snub from Soviet diplomats. Zhivkov's behavior was not motivated by opposition to Dubček's program of reforms but his discomfort at the manner in which his predecessor had been removed.<ref name=":1" /> Making no secret where he was headed, in February, with Brezhnev present, Dubček pledged: "We shall have to remove everything that strangles artistic and scientific creativeness."<ref name=":3" />

The period following Novotný's downfall became known as the [[Prague Spring]]. During this time, Dubček and other reformers sought to liberalize the Communist government—creating "socialism with a human face".<ref>B. Wasserstein, ''Civilisation and Barbarism'' (Oxford 2007) p. 600</ref> Dubček and his allies’ aim was not a return to capitalism, nor was it an end to the Communist Party's rule or its leading role in society. It was socialism marked by, "internal democracy, unlimited and unconditioned by the party, the strengthening of the faith of the people and the working class, and its transformation into a revolutionary force and the creative power of the party."<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |date=1974-03-14 |title=A DUBE LETTER REPORTED IN ROME |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1974/03/14/archives/a-dubcek-letter-reported-in-rome-former-czech-chief-said-to-defend.html |access-date=2023-03-18 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> To that end, the Prague Spring sought to liberalize the existing regime. It continued a series of reforms that granted greater freedom of expression to the press and public, rehabilitated victims of Stalinist purges by Klement Gottwald,<ref>{{Cite web |title=1988 - 2000 {{!}} Laureates {{!}} Sakharov Prize {{!}} European Parliament |url=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sakharovprize/en/alexander-dubcek-1989-slovakia/products-details/20200330CAN54164 |access-date=2023-03-18 |website=European Parliament}}</ref> advanced economic decentralization, and supported fundamental human rights reforms that included an independent judiciary.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Historical Dictionary of Socialism|url=https://epdf.pub/historical-dictionary-of-socialism.html |access-date=2023-03-18 |website=epdf.pub}}</ref>

During the Prague Spring, he and other reform-minded Communists enhanced popular support for the Communist government by eliminating its repressive features, allowing greater freedom of expression, and tolerating political and social organizations not under Communist control.<ref>B. Wasserstein, ''Civilisation and Barbarism'' (Oxford 2007) p. 599</ref> "Dubček! [[Ludvík Svoboda|Svoboda]]!"<ref>Lost World of Communism (Czechoslovakia), BBC (Documentary)</ref> became the popular refrain of student demonstrations during this period, while a poll at home gave him 78-percent public support.<ref name="autogenerated601">B. Wasserstein, ''Civilisation and Barbarism'' (Oxford 2007) p. 601</ref>

Dubček declared a 10-year program to implement reforms, but as reforms gained momentum he struggled to both maintain control and move with events. Dubček had been a compromise candidate between more radical reformers and hard-line conservatives. In power, Dubček was caught between a powerful hard-line minority in Czechoslovakia and their allies in other [[Warsaw Pact]] countries who pressured Dubček to rein in the Prague Spring, and on the other hand, more radical reformers who demanded more far-reaching and immediate reforms. While still stressing the leading role of the Party and the centrality of the Warsaw Pact,<ref>D. Viney, 'Alexander Dubcek', ''Studies in Comparative Communism'' 1 (1968) p. 31</ref> Dubček also was open to redefining the duty of party members from obedience to more creative expression. According to a CIA assessment at the time, Dubček was seen as an adept politician who might pull the balancing act off at home,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Trường |first=Minh |title=The CIA and Strategic Warning: The 1968 Soviet-Led Invasion of Czechoslovakia |url=https://www.academia.edu/36759336 |date=1 September 2009}}</ref> which if true made Soviet military intervention all the more urgently needed by the anti-reform faction. The Soviet politburo may not have shared this view of Dubček, but they interpreted events as demonstrating dishonesty as much as lack of ability. In a phone conversation between Dubček and Brezhnev on 13 August, Dubček complained that he was on the verge of quitting in frustration, having difficulty meeting his promises because he was operating in such a fluid situation that planning was difficult and any new promises could just cause Brezhnev greater distrust when those promises couldn't be fulfilled rapidly.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |title=Document No. 81: Transcript of Leonid Brezhnev's telephone conversation with Alexander Dubcek, August 13, 1968 |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/pages/doc_81.pdf}}</ref>

The Soviet leadership tried to rein in events in Czechoslovakia through a series of negotiations. The Soviet Union agreed to bilateral talks with Czechoslovakia in July at [[Čierna nad Tisou railway station]], near the Slovak-Soviet border.<ref name="autogenerated601" /> At the meeting, Dubček defended the reform program but pledged his government's continued commitment to the Warsaw Pact and [[Comecon]]. Dubček promised to curb the media and anti-socialist tendencies and prevent the reconstitution of the [[Czech Social Democratic Party|Social Democratic Party]]. In return, the Soviets promised to withdraw troops that had been stationed in the country since exercises that June,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Czech Republic - Intervention |url=https://countrystudies.us/czech-republic/41.htm |access-date=2023-03-24 |website=countrystudies.us}}</ref> where the Czechs had played the NATO team.<ref name=":19" />

Despite Dubček's continuing efforts to stress these commitments afterward, Brezhnev and other Warsaw Pact leaders told Dubček they remained anxious.<ref name=":7" /> Because so many motives were hidden behind clandestine activities, personal motives, and organizational biases, where even pro-intervention hard-liners had to make appearances so as not to be charged with treason, there was and remains confusion as to Soviet motives for the invasion that ended the Prague Spring.

Some believed that the Soviets saw even a partly free press as threatening an end to one-party rule in Czechoslovakia, and (by extension) elsewhere in Eastern Europe.<ref>B. Wasserstein, ''Civilisation and Barbarism'' (Oxford 2007) p. 605</ref> This is contradicted by many eyewitnesses, such as [[Ken Coates]]. According to Coates, the charge that the party was losing control or that counter-revolutionaries were misusing reforms, including press freedom, to undermine the party position was laughable, saying: "Anyone who was in Prague and lived in Czechoslovakia at that time knew that the Party's authority, the Party's position in the eyes of the nation had improved for the first time." Instead, he said that "The Party discredited itself."<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 1970 |url=https://www.marxists.org/subject/czech/1970/crisis.htm |access-date=2023-03-20 |website=Marxists.org}}</ref>

However, the telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubček on 13 August suggests that media coverage was given high importance. Brezhnev had instructed Dubček to remove key people responsible for the media, specifically, "[[Jiří Pelikán (politician)|Pelikán]], [[Čestmír Císař|Císař]], [[František Kriegel|Kriegel]], and other scoundrels".<ref name=":7" /> Dubček's unwillingness or inability to do so created distrust around certain statements circulated in the media, which may have made the issue more significant than it actually was in itself, as it gave credence to the coup plotters.

Press freedom began as an opening to reassessment of the Stalinist purges and the nation's historic past, but it grew into an abstract ideal as conservative criticism generalized and mounted.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Prague Spring: Dubček, the Media, and Mass Demoralisation|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-prague-spring-dubcek-the-media-and-mass-demoralisation |access-date=2023-03-19 |website=Wilson Center}}</ref> The question had been one more of truth-telling than of press freedom. The issues were more broad. Confusion was common. At the time of the invasion, events caught much of the world by surprise, despite widespread evidence of troop buildups and continued seeming arbitrary maneuvers on the country's borders. In an emergency meeting of the [[United States National Security Council]] called by President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] on 20 August, Defense Secretary [[Clark Clifford]], along with the cabinet and president could not explain Soviet actions.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Document 109: Minutes of the US National Security Council Meeting on the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 20, 1968 |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/pages/doc_109.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> The invasion also erupted alongside so many destabilizing changes that some have pointed to 'press freedom' serving as a short-cut explanation.

In a letter written in 1974 to the widow of [[Josef Smrkovský]], a close political ally who died in official political disgrace that January, Dubček said he remained unable to explain why the Soviet leadership believed "distorted reports" about the nature and aims of his socialist reforms. He said that these urgent warnings to the Soviet leadership were the result of party leaders and other conservatives who, "saw all that was happening solely from the angle of the loss of their leading role in the party."<ref name=":0" />

Anti-reformist elements were a coalition of hard-liners in the Soviet Union, such as [[Yuri Andropov]], whose false reports of events in Hungary had also helped overcome Khrushchev's opposition to intervention, and Warsaw Pact leaders fearing for their own positions such as East German leader, [[Walter Ulbricht]], and Polish leader, [[Władysław Gomułka]].<ref>"Zapis’ besedy v TsK KPSS s

rukovoditelyami bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii,

Germanii, Pol’shi, 8 maya 1968 goda" (Top Secret),

8 May 1968, in Archiv Komise vlady CSFR pro analyzu

udalosti let 1967-1970</ref> Perhaps most significantly, false high-level reports included letters secretly passed directly to the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet Politburo]] by those within the Czechoslovakian regime who promoted intervention.

One such message was sent to Brezhnev at the time of the Čierna nad Tisou meeting. These letters and reports were sent by a group of anti-reformist hard-liners in the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC), under the leadership of Slovak Communist Party chief, [[Vasiľ Biľak]], working with allies in the StB and Czechoslovak Army. Bil’ak later wrote in his own memoirs that what he and his colleagues feared most, right up until mid-August, was that Dubček would reach an accommodation of compromise with Moscow that would forestall or prevent an invasion.<ref>Pameti Vasila Bil’aka: Unikatni svedectvi ze zakulisi

KSC, 2 vols. (Prague: Agentura Cesty, 1991), 2:86-89.</ref> Bil’ak himself feared his own imminent departure from office with good reason. His hard deadlines were 26 August, the date of the Slovak Party Congress, and 20 August, a gathering of the reformist leadership. Both had been moved up to allow reformers to secure better positions. The warnings of Bil’ak and his supporters stoked deliberately exaggerated fears of violent "anti-socialist counter-revolution" as an "imminent threat". This was not only to prod the Soviets to quick action but to ensure that Dubček would be removed and not even a moderate reformist government would remain to frustrate their personal prerogatives.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Kramer |first=Mark |date=Fall 1993 |title=THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/CWIHPBulletin3.pdf |journal=Cold War International History Bulletin |issue=3 |pages=2–3 |via=Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars}}</ref> Press freedom was only one of many reforms where no compromise at all could be tolerated.