Editing Ahmad Shah Massoud (section)

==Resistance against communism==

===Resistance against the PDPA (1978)===
{{Main|Saur Revolution}}
The government of [[Mohammed Daoud Khan]] tried to scale back the communist [[People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan]]'s influence, dismissing PDPA members from their government posts, appointing conservatives to replace them, and finally dissolved the PDPA, with the arrests of senior party members.<ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi2">{{cite book |last=Neamatollah Nojumi |title=The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region |publisher=Palgrave, New York |edition=2002 1st}}</ref><ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi (2)2">{{Cite book |last=Neamatollah Nojumi |title=The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region |publisher=Palgrave, New York |edition=2002 1st |page=39}}</ref> On April 27, 1978, the [[People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan|PDPA]] and military units loyal to it killed [[Mohammed Daoud Khan|Daoud Khan]], his immediate family, and bodyguards in a violent coup, and seized control of the capital [[Kabul]] declaring the new [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]] ([[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan|DRA]]).<ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi (3)2">{{Cite book |last=Neamatollah Nojumi |title=The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region |publisher=Palgrave, New York |edition=2002 1st |page=41}}</ref> The new communist government, led by a revolutionary council, did not enjoy the support of the masses.<ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi (4)2">{{Cite book |last=Neamatollah Nojumi |title=The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region |publisher=Palgrave, New York |edition=2002 1st |page=42}}</ref> It implemented a doctrine hostile to political dissent, whether inside or outside the party.<ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi (4)2" /> The [[People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan|PDPA]] started reforms along [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] and Soviet lines. The reforms and the PDPA's affinity to the Soviet Union were met with strong resistance by the population, especially as the government attempted to enforce its Marxist policies by arresting or executing those who resisted. Between 50,000 and 100,000 people were estimated to have been arrested and killed by communist troops in the countryside alone.<ref name="Oliver Roy2">{{Cite book |last=Oliver Roy |title=Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan |publisher=Cambridge University Press |edition=1990 |page=95}}</ref> Due to the repression, large parts of the country, especially the rural areas, organized into open revolt against the PDPA government.<ref name="Oliver Roy (2)2">{{Cite book |last=Oliver Roy |title=Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan |publisher=Cambridge University Press |edition=1990}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=October 2012}} By spring 1979, unrest had reached 24 out of 28 Afghan provinces, including major urban areas. Over half of the Afghan army either deserted or joined the insurrection.{{Citation needed|date=June 2022}}

With religious elders declaring a [[jihad]] against the government, in May 1979 Massoud prepared in [[Peshawar]] to oppose the new communist government in [[Panjshir Province|Panjshir]]. Along with twenty-four of his friends, Massoud took a bus to [[Bajaur District|Bajaur]] and, with arms-smuggling [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] tribesmen, marched on foot into the [[Panjshir Valley]]. Massoud's group seized control over a number of government outposts in the [[Panjshir Valley|Valley]], entered the [[Shomali Plain]] to capture [[Gulbahar, Afghanistan|Gulbahar]], and cut off the [[Salang Tunnel|Salang Highway]], the main supply route between [[Kabul]] and the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] border raising alarm in both [[Kabul]] and [[Moscow]] which brought upon Massoud and his group a government counterattack.<ref name=":02" /><ref name="Akbarzadeh & Yasmeen3"/>

Believing that an uprising against the Soviet-backed communists would be supported by the people, Massoud, on July 6, 1979, started an insurrection in the Panjshir, which initially failed. Massoud decided to avoid conventional confrontation with the larger government forces and to wage a [[Guerrilla warfare|guerrilla war]].<ref name=":02" /><ref>{{cite book |last=Isby |first=David |url=https://archive.org/details/warindistantcoun0000isby/page/107 |title=War in a distant country, Afghanistan: invasion and resistance |publisher=Arms and Armour Press |year=1989 |isbn=0-85368-769-2 |page=[https://archive.org/details/warindistantcoun0000isby/page/107 107]}}</ref> He subsequently took full control of Panjshir, pushing out Afghan communist troops.<ref name=":02" /> Oliver Roy writes that in the following period, Massoud's "personal prestige and the efficiency of his military organization persuaded many local commanders to come and learn from him."<ref name="Oliver Roy (3)2">{{Cite book |last=Oliver Roy |title=Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan |publisher=Cambridge University Press |edition=1990 |page=132}}</ref>

===Resistance against the Soviet Union (1979–1989)===
{{Main|Soviet–Afghan War}}
[[File:Afghanistan insurgency 1985.png|thumb|Major resistance forces against the Soviets 1985; Army-green depicts locations of [[Jamiat-i Islami]]. [[Shura-e Nazar]] (Massoud's alliance) comprised many Jamiat positions but also those of other groups.]]

Following the [[1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan|1979 Soviet invasion]] and occupation of Afghanistan, Massoud devised a strategic plan for expelling the invaders and overthrowing the communist regime. The first task was to establish a popularly based resistance force that had the loyalty of the people. The second phase was "active defense" of the Panjshir stronghold, while carrying out [[asymmetric warfare]]. In the third phase, the "strategic offensive", Massoud's forces would gain control of large parts of Northern Afghanistan. The fourth phase was the "general application" of Massoud's principles to the whole country, and the defeat of the Afghan communist government.{{citation needed|date=September 2022}}

Massoud's [[mujahideen]] attacked the occupying Soviet forces, ambushing Soviet and Afghan communist convoys travelling through the [[Salang Pass]], and causing fuel shortages in Kabul.<ref name="Iyer">{{cite news |first2=Pico |last2=Iyer |last1=van Voorst |first1=Bruce |last3=Aftab |first3=Mohammad
|title=Afghanistan: The bear descends on the lion |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954295,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930061145/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954295,00.html |archive-date=September 30, 2007 |newspaper=Time|location=New York |date=May 7, 1984 |access-date=August 16, 2007}}</ref> The Soviets mounted a [[Panjshir offensives|series of offensives]] against the Panjshir. Between 1980 and 1985, these offensives were conducted twice a year. Despite engaging more men and hardware on each occasion, the Soviets were unable to defeat Massoud's forces. In 1982, the Soviets began deploying major combat units in the Panjshir, numbering up to 30,000 men. Massoud pulled his troops back into subsidiary valleys, where they occupied fortified positions. When the Soviet columns advanced onto these positions, they fell into ambushes. When the Soviets withdrew, Afghan army garrisons took over their positions. Massoud and his mujahideen forces attacked and recaptured them one by one.<ref>Roy, p. 199.</ref>

In 1983, the Soviets offered Massoud a temporary truce, which he accepted in order to rebuild his own forces and give the civilian population a break from Soviet attacks. He put the respite to good use. In this time he created the [[Shura-e Nazar]] (Supervisory Council), which subsequently united 130 commanders from 12 Afghan provinces in their fight against the Soviet army. This council existed outside the Peshawar parties, which were prone to internecine rivalry and bickering, and served to smooth out differences between resistance groups, due to political and ethnic divisions. It was the predecessor of what could have become a unified Islamic Afghan army.<ref>Barry, Michael (2002). ''Massoud, de l'islamisme à la liberté'', p. 216. Paris: Audibert. {{in lang|fr}} {{ISBN|2-84749-002-7}}</ref>

Relations with the party headquarters in [[Peshawar]] were often strained, as Rabbani insisted on giving Massoud no more weapons and supplies than to other Jamiat commanders, even those who did little fighting. To compensate for this deficiency, Massoud relied on revenues drawn from exports of [[emerald]]s<ref>{{cite web |author1=Bowersox, Gary |author2=Snee, Lawrence |author3=Foord, Eugene |author4=Seal, Robert |url=http://www.gems-afghan.com/articles/page26a.jpg |title=''Emeralds of the Panjshir valley, Afghanistan'' |year=1991 |publisher=www.gems-afghan.com |access-date=August 17, 2007 |archive-date=September 28, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928075908/http://www.gems-afghan.com/articles/page26a.jpg }}</ref> and [[lapis lazuli]],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.commission-refugies.fr/IMG/pdf/Afghanistan-les_seigneurs_de_guerre.pdf|title=Le pouvoir des seigneurs de guerre et la situation sécuritaire en Afghanistan|language=fr|publisher= commission-refugies.fr|access-date=August 16, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928075907/http://www.commission-refugies.fr/IMG/pdf/Afghanistan-les_seigneurs_de_guerre.pdf|archive-date=September 28, 2007 |url-status = live}}</ref> that are traditionally exploited in Northern Afghanistan.

Regarding infighting among different mujahideen factions, following a Soviet truce, Massoud said in an interview:{{blockquote|text=[[Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin|Hezb-i Islami]] men are like cancer, that is why one has to treat the cancer first.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Causes of the Failure of Government of Afghanistan Under Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani|url=http://prr.hec.gov.pk/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1322/1/799S.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210426094908/http://prr.hec.gov.pk/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1322/1/799S.pdf|archive-date=2021-04-26|website=gov.pk}}</ref>}}

Britain's [[MI6]] having activated long-established networks of contacts in Pakistan were able to support Massoud, and soon [[United Kingdom in the Soviet-Afghan War|became their key ally]]. MI6 sent an annual mission of two of their officers as well as military instructors to Massoud and his fighters. They also gave supplies to Massoud which included sniper rifles with silencers and mortars. As well as training Massoud's junior commanders, MI6 team's most important contribution was help with organisation and communication via radio equipment which was highly useful for Massoud to coordinate his forces and be warned of any impending Soviet attacks.<ref name="Dorril752">{{cite book |last1=Dorril |first1=Stephen |title=MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service |date=2002 |publisher=Simon & Schuster |isbn=978-0743217781 |page=[https://archive.org/details/mi6insidecovertw00dorr/page/752 752]}}</ref> The United States provided him with comparatively less support than other factions.<ref name="phillips" /> Part of the reason was that it permitted its funding and arms distribution to be administered by Pakistan, which favored the rival mujahideen leader [[Gulbuddin Hekmatyar]]. In an interview, Massoud said, "We thought the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] knew everything. But they didn't. They supported some bad people [meaning Hekmatyar]."{{Citation needed|date=August 2011}} Primary advocates for supporting Massoud were the US [[State Department]]'s [[Edmund McWilliams]] and [[Peter Tomsen]], who were on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Others included two [[The Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]] foreign policy analysts, [[Michael Johns (policy analyst)|Michael Johns]] and James A. Phillips, both of whom championed Massoud as the Afghan resistance leader most worthy of U.S. support under the [[Reagan Doctrine]].<ref name="phillips">Phillips, James A. (May 18, 1992). {{unfit|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20150616160328/http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1992/05/winning-the-endgame-in-afghanistan "Winning the Endgame in Afghanistan"]}}, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #181.</ref><ref>Johns, Michael (January 19, 2008). [http://michaeljohnsonfreedomandprosperity.blogspot.com/2008/01/charlie-wilsons-war-was-really-americas.html "Charlie Wilson's War Was Really America's War"].</ref> Thousands of foreign Islamic volunteers entered Afghanistan to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviet troops.

To organize support for the mujahideen, Massoud established an administrative system that enforced law and order (''nazm'') in areas under his control. The Panjshir was divided into 22 bases (''qarargah'') governed by a military commander and a civilian administrator, and each had a judge, a prosecutor and a [[public defender]].<ref>Davies, L. Will; Shariat, Abdullah (2004). ''Fighting Masoud's War'', Melbourne: Lothian, p. 200. {{ISBN|0-7344-0590-1}}</ref> Massoud's policies were implemented by different committees: an economic committee was charged with funding the war effort. The health committee provided health services, assisted by volunteers from foreign [[Humanitarian aid|humanitarian]] [[non-governmental organization]]s, such as [[Aide médicale internationale]]. An education committee was charged with the training of the military and administrative [[En cadre|cadre]]. A culture committee and a judiciary committee were also created.<ref>Barry, p. 194.</ref>

This expansion prompted [[Babrak Karmal]] to demand that the Red Army resume their offensives, in order to crush the Panjshir groups. Massoud received warning of the attack through Britain's [[GCHQ]] intelligence and he evacuated all 130,000 inhabitants from the valley into the Hindukush mountains, leaving the Soviet bombings to fall on empty ground and the Soviet battalions to face the mountains.<ref>Roy, p. 201.</ref>

With the defeat of the Soviet-Afghan attacks, Massoud carried out the next phase of his strategic plan, expanding the resistance movement and liberating the northern provinces of Afghanistan. In August 1986, he captured [[Farkhar District|Farkhar]] in [[Takhar Province]]. In November 1986, his forces overran the headquarters of the government's 20th division at Nahrin in [[Baghlan Province]], scoring an important victory for the resistance.<ref>Roy, p. 213.</ref> This expansion was also carried out through diplomatic means, as more mujahideen commanders were persuaded to adopt the Panjshir military system.

Despite almost constant attacks by the Red Army and the Afghan army, Massoud increased his military strength. Starting in 1980 with a force of less than 1,000 ill-equipped guerrillas, the Panjshir valley mujahideen grew to a 5,000-strong force by 1984.<ref name="Iyer" /> After expanding his influence outside the valley, Massoud increased his resistance forces to 13,000 fighters by 1989.<ref>Isby, p. 98.</ref> The junior commanders were trained by Britain's [[Special Air Service|SAS]] as well as private military contractors, some being sent as far as [[Oman]] and even SAS training grounds in the [[Scottish Highlands]]. These forces were divided into different types of units: the locals (mahalli) were tasked with static defense of villages and fortified positions. The best of the mahalli were formed into units called grup-i zarbati (shock troops), semi-mobile groups that acted as [[Military reserve|reserve]] forces for the defense of several strongholds. A different type of unit was the mobile group (grup-i-mutaharek), a lightly equipped [[commando]]-like formation numbering 33 men, whose mission was to carry out [[Hit-and-run tactics|hit-and-run]] attacks outside the Panjshir, sometimes as far as 100&nbsp;km from their base. These men were professional soldiers, well-paid and trained, and, from 1983 on, they provided an effective strike force against government outposts. Uniquely among the mujahideen, these groups wore uniforms, and their use of the ''[[pakul]]'' made this headwear emblematic of the Afghan resistance.{{citation needed|date=September 2022}}

Massoud's military organization was an effective compromise between the traditional Afghan method of warfare and the modern principles of guerrilla warfare which he had learned from the works of [[Mao Zedong]] and [[Che Guevara]]. His forces were considered the most effective of all the various Afghan resistance movements.<ref>Roy, p. 202.</ref>

The Soviet army and the Afghan communist army were mainly defeated by Massoud and his mujahideen in numerous small engagements between 1984 and 1988{{citation needed|date=August 2021}}. After describing the Soviet Union's military engagement in Afghanistan as "a bleeding wound" in 1986,<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Schmemann|first1=Serge|last2=Times|first2=Special To the New York|date=February 26, 1986|title=Gorbachev Says U.S. Arms Note Is Not Adequate |language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/26/world/gorbachev-says-us-arms-note-is-not-adequate.html|access-date=August 19, 2021|issn=0362-4331|quote=Mr. Gorbachev described Afghanistan as a ''bleeding wound,'' and he said the Soviet Union would like to withdraw its troops ''in the nearest future''.}}</ref> Soviet General Secretary [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] began a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the nation in May 1988. On February 15, 1989, in what was depicted as an improbable victory for the mujahideen, the last Soviet soldier left the nation.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Keller|first1=Bill|last2=Times|first2=Special To the New York|date=February 16, 1989|title=Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan After 9 Years, 15,000 Dead and Great Cost|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/16/world/last-soviet-soldiers-leave-afghanistan-after-9-years-15000-dead-and-great-cost.html|access-date=August 19, 2021|issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

===Fall of the Afghan communist regime (1992)===
{{Main|Civil war in Afghanistan (1989–1992)}}

After the [[Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan|departure of Soviet troops]] in 1989, the [[People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan]] regime, then headed by [[Mohammad Najibullah]], held its own against the mujahideen. Backed by a massive influx of weapons from the Soviet Union, the Afghan armed forces reached a level of performance they had never reached under direct Soviet tutelage. They maintained control over all of Afghanistan's major cities. During late 1990, helped by hundreds of mujahideen forces, Massoud targeted the [[Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR|Tajik Supreme Soviet]], trying to oust communism from the neighboring Tajikistan to further destabilize the dying Soviet Union, which would also impact the Afghan government.<ref>[[Mark Curtis (British author)|Mark Curtis]], ''Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam'', Serpent's Tail (2010), p. 194</ref> At that time, as per [[Asad Durrani]], the director-general of the ISI during this period, Massoud's base camp was in [[Garam Chashma]], in Pakistan.<ref>Asad Durrani, ''Pakistan Adrift: Navigating Troubled Waters'', Hurst (2018), p. 169</ref> By 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Afghan regime eventually began to crumble. Food and fuel shortages undermined the capacities of the government's army, and a resurgence of factionalism split the regime between [[Khalq]] and [[Parcham]] supporters.<ref name="LoC">{{cite web|url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0120)|title=The Fall of Kabul, April 1992|access-date=September 15, 2014}}</ref>

A few days after Najibullah had lost control of the nation, his army commanders and governors arranged to turn over authority to resistance commanders and local warlords throughout the country. Joint councils (''shuras'') were immediately established for local government, in which civil and military officials of the former government were usually included. In many cases, prior arrangements for transferring regional and local authority had been made between foes.<ref name="LoC" />

Collusions between military leaders quickly brought down the Kabul government. In mid-January 1992, within three weeks of the demise of the Soviet Union, Massoud was aware of conflict within the government's northern command. General [[Abdul Momim]], in charge of the [[Hairatan]] border crossing at the northern end of Kabul's supply highway, and other non-[[Pashtun people|Pashtun]] generals based in [[Mazar-i-Sharif]], feared removal by Najibullah and replacement by Pashtun officers. When the generals rebelled, [[Abdul Rashid Dostum]], who held [[General Officer|general rank]] as head of the [[Jowzjan]]i militia, also based in Mazar-i-Sharif, took over.{{citation needed|date=September 2022}}

He and Massoud reached a political agreement, together with another major militia leader, Sayyed Mansour, of the [[Ismaili]] community based in Baghlan Province. These northern allies consolidated their position in Mazar-i-Sharif on March 21. Their coalition covered nine provinces in the north and northeast. As turmoil developed within the government in Kabul, no government force stood between the northern allies and the major [[Bagram Air Base|air force base at Bagram]], some seventy kilometers north of Kabul. By mid-April 1992, the Afghan air force command at Bagram had capitulated to Massoud.<ref name="LoC" /> On March 18, 1992, Najibullah decided to resign. On April 17, as his government fell, he tried to escape but was stopped at [[Kabul Airport]] by Dostum's forces. He took refuge at the United Nations mission, where he remained unharmed until 1996, while Massoud controlled the area surrounding the mission.{{citation needed|date=September 2022}}

Senior communist generals and officials of the Najibullah administration acted as a transitional authority to transfer power to Ahmad Shah Massoud's alliance.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies">{{cite web|url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+af0120%29|title=The Fall of Kabul, April 1992|publisher=[[Library of Congress]]}}</ref><ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies (2)">{{cite web|url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+af0121%29|title=The United Nations Plan for Political Accommodation|publisher=[[Library of Congress]]}}</ref> The Kabul interim authority invited Massoud to enter Kabul as the new Head of State, but he held back.<ref name="Roy Gutman">{{Cite book|last=Roy Gutman|title=How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan|edition=1st ed., 2008 |page=34|publisher=Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC.}}</ref> Massoud ordered his forces, positioned to the north of Kabul, not to enter the capital until a political solution was in place.<ref name="Roy Gutman (2)">{{Cite book|last=Roy Gutman|title=How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan|edition=1st ed., 2008 |publisher=Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC.}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=October 2012}} He called on all the senior Afghan party leaders, many then based in exile in [[Peshawar]], to work out a political settlement acceptable to all sides and parties.<ref name="Amin Saikal">{{Cite book|last=Amin Saikal |author-link=Amin Saikal|title=Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival|date= 2004|edition=2006 1st |page=214|publisher=I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London & New York |isbn=1-85043-437-9}}</ref>