Editing Suez Crisis (section)

== Forces ==

=== British ===
[[File:1956-08-06 Suez Crisis.ogv|thumb|upright=1.15|thumbtime=0:34|Universal Newsreel from 6 August about the departure of British and French ships for Egypt]]

British troops were well-trained, experienced, and had good morale, but suffered from the economic and technological limitations imposed by post-war austerity.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 15">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=15}}</ref> The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group, which was intended to be the main British strike force against Egypt, was heavily involved in the [[Cyprus Emergency]], which led to a neglect of paratroop training in favour of [[Counterinsurgency|counter-insurgency operations]].<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 15"/> The [[Royal Navy]] could project formidable power through the guns of its warships and aircraft flown from its carriers, but lacked amphibious capability.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 16">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=16}}</ref>

The [[Royal Navy]] had just undergone a major and innovative carrier modernisation program. The [[Royal Air Force]] (RAF) had just introduced two [[long-range bomber]]s, the [[Vickers Valiant]] and the [[English Electric Canberra]], but owing to their recent entry into service the RAF had not yet established proper bombing techniques for these aircraft.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 16"/> Despite this, General [[Charles Keightley]], the commander of the invasion force, believed that [[Airpower|air power]] alone was sufficient to defeat Egypt.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 16"/> By contrast, General [[Hugh Stockwell]], the Task Force's ground commander, believed that methodical and systematic armoured operations centred on the [[Centurion tank|Centurion]] battle tank would be the key to victory.<ref>{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|pp=16–17}}</ref>

=== French ===
French troops were experienced and well-trained but suffered from cutbacks imposed by post-war politics of economic austerity.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=17}}</ref> In 1956, the [[French Armed Forces]] was heavily involved in the Algerian war, which made operations against Egypt a major distraction.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17"/> French paratroopers of the elite ''[[2nd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment|Regiment de Parachutistes Coloniaux]]'' (RPC) were extremely experienced, battle-hardened, and very tough soldiers, who had greatly distinguished themselves in the fighting in Indochina and in Algeria.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17"/> The men of the RPC followed a "shoot first, ask questions later" policy towards civilians, first adopted in Vietnam, which was to lead to the killing of a number of Egyptian civilians.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17"/> The rest of the French troops were described by the American military historian Derek Varble as "competent, but not outstanding".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17"/>

The main French (and Israeli) tank, the [[AMX-13]], was designed for mobile, flanking operations, which led to a tank that was lightly armoured but agile.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17"/> General [[André Beaufre]], who served as Stockwell's subordinate, favoured a swift campaign of movement in which the main objective was to encircle the enemy.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17"/> Throughout the operation, Beaufre proved himself to be more aggressive than his British counterparts, always urging that some bold step be taken at once.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17"/> The [[French Navy]] had a powerful carrier force which was excellent for projecting power inland, but, like its British counterpart, suffered from a lack of landing craft.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 17"/>

=== Israeli ===
[[File:AMX-13 at Latrun4.JPG|thumb|An Israeli [[AMX-13]], shown here from the rear and side]]

American military historian Derek Varble called the [[Israel Defense Forces]] (IDF) the "best" military force in the Middle East while at the same time suffering from "deficiencies" such as "immature doctrine, faulty logistics, and technical inadequacies".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 18">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=18}}</ref> The IDF's Chief of Staff, Major General [[Moshe Dayan]], encouraged aggression, initiative, and ingenuity among the Israeli officer corps while ignoring logistics and armoured operations.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 18"/> Dayan, a firm infantry man, preferred that arm of the service at the expense of armour, which Dayan saw as clumsy, pricey, and suffering from frequent breakdowns.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 18"/>

At the same time, the IDF had a rather disorganised logistics arm, which was put under severe strain when the IDF invaded the Sinai.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 18"/> Most of the IDF weapons in 1956 came from France.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 18"/> The main IDF tank was the AMX-13 and the main aircraft were the Dassault [[Dassault Mystère IV|Mystère IVA]] and the [[Dassault Ouragan|Ouragan]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|pp=18–19}}</ref> Superior pilot training was to give the Israeli Air Force an unbeatable edge over their Egyptian opponents.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 18"/> The [[Israeli Navy]] consisted of two destroyers, seven frigates, eight minesweepers, several landing craft, and fourteen torpedo boats.

=== Egyptian ===
In the [[Egyptian Armed Forces]], politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 19">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=19}}</ref> The Egyptian commander, Field Marshal [[Abdel Hakim Amer]], was a purely political appointee who owed his position to his close friendship with Nasser. A heavy drinker, he would prove himself grossly incompetent as a general during the Crisis.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 19"/> In 1956, the Egyptian military was well equipped with weapons from the Soviet Union such as [[T-34]] and [[IS tank family#IS-3|IS-3]] tanks, [[MiG-15]] fighters, [[Ilyushin Il-28]] bombers, [[SU-100]] self-propelled guns and assault rifles.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 19"/>

Rigid lines between officers and men in the Egyptian Army led to a mutual "mistrust and contempt" between officers and the men who served under them.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 20">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=20}}</ref> Egyptian troops were excellent in defensive operations, but had little capacity for offensive operations, owing to the lack of "rapport and effective small-unit leadership".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 20"/>