Editing Political status of Taiwan (section)

=== Balance of power ===
The possibility of war, the close geographic proximity of ROC-controlled Taiwan and PRC-controlled mainland China, and the resulting flare-ups that occur every few years, conspire to make this one of the most watched focal points in the Pacific. Both sides have chosen to have a strong naval presence. However, naval strategies between both powers greatly shifted in the 1980s and 1990s, while the ROC assumed a more defensive attitude by building and buying [[frigate]]s and missile [[destroyer]]s, and the PRC a more aggressive posture by developing long-range [[cruise missile]]s and supersonic [[surface-to-surface missile]]s.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

Although the [[People's Liberation Army Air Force]] is considered large, most of its fleet consists of older generation [[Chengdu J-7|J-7]] fighters (localized [[MiG-21]]s and Mig-21BIs),{{When|date=November 2024}} raising doubts over the PLAAF's ability to control Taiwan's airspace in the event of a conflict. Since mid-1990s, PRC has been purchasing, and later localizing, [[SU-27]] based fighters. These Russian fighters, as well as their Chinese [[Shenyang J-11|J11A]] variants, are currently{{when|date=January 2021}} over 170 in number, and have increased the effectiveness of PLAAF's [[Beyond Visual Range missile|Beyond Visual Range]] (BVR) capabilities. The introduction of 60 new-generation [[Chengdu J-10|J10A]] fighters is anticipated to increase the PLAAF's firepower. PRC's acquisition of Russian [[Sukhoi Su-30|Su30MKKs]] further enhanced the PLAAF's [[air-to-ground]] support ability. In October 2017, Chinese media reported that Chinese stealth aircraft [[Chengdu J-20]] began production, which gave the PLAAF a significant advantage in air superiority over the ROC Air Force.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-strategy/ | title=The Dragon's Wing: The People's Liberation Army Air Force's Strategy > Air University (AU) > Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs Article Display | date=August 2022 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/11/08/display-at-zhuhai-airshow-reveals-info-on-chinas-j-20-j-16-inventory/ | title=Zhuhai Airshow display reveals info on China's J-20, J-16 inventory | date=8 November 2022 }}</ref> The [[Republic of China Air Force|ROC's air force]], on the other hand, relies on Taiwan's fourth generation fighters, consisting of 150 US-built [[F-16 Fighting Falcon]]s, approximately 60 French-built [[Dassault-Breguet Mirage 2000|Mirage 2000-5s]], and approximately 130 locally developed [[AIDC Ching-kuo|IDFs]] (Indigenous Defense Fighters). All of these ROC fighter jets are able to conduct [[BVR]] combat missions with BVR missiles, but the level of technology in mainland Chinese fighters is catching up. Also, the United States [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] has reported that few of Taiwan's 400 total fighters are operationally capable.<ref>{{cite web |last=Minnick |first=Wendell |url=http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4508720 |title=U.S. Intel Report on Taiwan Air Power Released |publisher=Defensenews.com |date=22 February 2010 |access-date=6 December 2011 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130121093509/http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4508720 |archive-date=21 January 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Hebert |first=Adam J. |url=http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/May%202010/0510issbf.aspx |title=Behind the Taiwan Arms Sales |publisher=Airforce-magazine.com |access-date=6 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120331195033/http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/May%202010/0510issbf.aspx |archive-date=31 March 2012 |url-status=usurped }}</ref>

In 2003, the ROC purchased four missile destroyers—the former {{sclass|Kidd|destroyer|4}}, and expressed a strong interest in the {{sclass|Arleigh Burke|destroyer|4}}. But with the growth of the PRC [[People's Liberation Army Navy|navy]] and [[PLAAF|air force]], some{{Who|date=April 2025}} doubt that the ROC could withstand a determined invasion attempt from mainland China in the future. These concerns have led to a view in certain quarters that Taiwanese independence, if it is to be implemented, should be attempted as early as possible, while the ROC still has the capacity to defend itself in an all-out military conflict. Over the past three decades, estimates of how long the ROC can withstand a full-scale invasion from across the Strait without any outside help have decreased from three months to only six days.<ref>{{cite news | first=Rich | last=Chang | page=3 | title=War simulations reveal communication problem | date=1 May 2006 | newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] | url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/05/01/2003305538 | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060625183105/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/05/01/2003305538 | archive-date=25 June 2006 | url-status=live }}</ref> Given such estimates, the US Navy has continued practicing "surging" its carrier groups, giving it the experience necessary to respond quickly to an attack on Taiwan.<ref>{{cite web |author= Dunnigan, James |date= 7 July 2004 |title= US Navy Sticks it to China |work= Dirty Little Secrets |publisher= StragtegyPage.com |url= http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200477.asp |access-date= 11 June 2006 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20061115210801/http://strategypage.com/dls/articles/200477.asp |archive-date= 15 November 2006 |url-status= dead }}</ref> The US also collects data on the PRC's military deployments, through the use of [[spy satellite]]s, for example.<ref>{{cite news|last=Yao|first=Chung-yuan|page=6|title=China's new satellite can pose threat to Taiwan|date=10 August 2020|newspaper=[[Taipei Times]]|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/08/10/2003741403|access-date=20 May 2023|archive-date=20 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230520054943/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/08/10/2003741403|url-status=live}}</ref> Early surveillance may effectively identify PRC's massive military movement, which may imply PRC's preparation for a military assault against Taiwan.{{cn|date=October 2024}}

Naturally, war contingencies are not being planned in a vacuum. In 1979, the [[Congress of the United States|United States Congress]] passed the Taiwan Relations Act, a law generally interpreted as mandating U.S. defense of Taiwan in the event of an attack from the Chinese Mainland (the Act is applied to Taiwan and Penghu, but not to Kinmen or Matsu, which are usually considered to be part of mainland China). The United States maintains the world's largest permanent fleet in the Pacific Region near Taiwan. The [[Seventh Fleet]], operating primarily out of various bases in Japan, is a powerful naval contingent built upon the world's only permanently forward-deployed [[aircraft carrier]] {{USS|George Washington|CVN-73|6}}. Although the stated purpose of the fleet is not Taiwanese defense, it can be safely assumed from past actions that it is one of the reasons why the fleet is stationed in those waters.{{citation needed|date=January 2020}} It is written into the strategy of the United States department of defense within this region that, "First, we are strengthening our military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed. Second, we are working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their capacity to address potential challenges in their waters and across the region. Third, we are leveraging military diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road."<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF |title=The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment. Department of Defense. Page 3, Par. 2, Lines 2–7. |access-date=4 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191216102508/https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF |archive-date=16 December 2019 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Starting in 2000, Japan renewed its defense obligations with the US and embarked on a rearmament program, partly in response to fears that Taiwan might be invaded. Some analysts{{Which|date=April 2025}} believed that the PRC could launch [[preemptive strike]]s on military bases in Japan to deter US and Japanese forces from coming to the ROC's aid. Japanese strategic planners also see an independent Taiwan as vital, not only because the ROC controls valuable shipping routes, but also because its capture by PRC would make Japan more vulnerable. During [[World War II]], the US invaded the [[Philippines]], but another viable target to enable direct attacks on Japan would have been Taiwan (then known as Formosa). However, critics of the preemptive strike theory assert that the PRC would be loath to give Japan and the US such an excuse to intervene.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=4217193543447225711&hl=en&as_sdt=0,33&sciodt=0,33|title=Google Scholar|website=[[Google News]]|access-date=4 December 2019|archive-date=11 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230411110853/https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=4217193543447225711&hl=en&as_sdt=0,33&sciodt=0,33|url-status=live}}</ref>

The [[United States Department of Defense]] in a 2011 report stated that the primary mission of the PRC military is a possible military conflict with Taiwan, including also possible US military assistance. Although the risk of a crisis in the short-term is low, in the absence of new political developments, Taiwan will likely dominate future military modernization and planning. However, also other priorities are becoming increasingly prominent and possible due to increasing military resources. A number of mainland China's most advanced military systems are stationed in areas opposite Taiwan. The rapid military modernization is continually changing the military balance of power towards mainland China.<ref>Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2011, Office of the Secretary of Defense</ref>

A 2008 report by the [[RAND Corporation]] analyzing a theoretical 2020 attack by mainland China on Taiwan suggested that the US would likely not be able to defend Taiwan. [[Cruise missile]] developments may enable China to partially or completely destroy or make inoperative US [[aircraft carrier]]s and bases in the Western Pacific. New Chinese radars will likely be able to detect US [[stealth aircraft]] and China is acquiring stealthy and more effective aircraft. The reliability of US [[beyond-visual-range missile]]s as a mean to achieve air superiority is questionable and largely unproven.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3774348|title='Rand Study Suggests U.S. Loses War With China', Wendell Minnick, 2008, RAND}}{{Dead link|date=June 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

In 2021, Admiral [[Philip S. Davidson|Phillip Davidson]] said in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that China could take military action on Taiwan some time in the next 6 years.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-03-10|title=China could invade Taiwan in next six years, top US admiral warns|url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns|access-date=2021-03-11|website=[[The Guardian]]|language=en|archive-date=11 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210311083644/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=China could invade Taiwan in the next 6 years, warns U.S. admiral|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-could-invade-taiwan-next-6-years-assume-global-leadership-n1260386|access-date=2021-03-11|website=[[NBC News]]|date=10 March 2021 |language=en|archive-date=10 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210310234951/https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-could-invade-taiwan-next-6-years-assume-global-leadership-n1260386|url-status=live}}</ref> A spokesperson for China's foreign ministry later responded stating that Davidson was trying to "hype up China's military threat."<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bowden|first=John|date=2021-03-10|title=China: US admiral trying to 'hype up' threat to Taiwan|url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/china/542537-china-us-admiral-trying-to-hype-up-taiwan-invasion-threat|access-date=2021-03-11|website=[[The Hill (newspaper)|The Hill]]|language=en|archive-date=11 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210311114457/https://thehill.com/policy/international/china/542537-china-us-admiral-trying-to-hype-up-taiwan-invasion-threat|url-status=live}}</ref>

In the wake of [[US House Speaker]] [[Nancy Pelosi]]'s [[2022 visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan|2022 visit to Taiwan]], China increased its air and naval crossings of the [[Taiwan Strait#Median line|Taiwan Strait median line]], an unofficial understanding between the two sides when relations are good. In 2024 China moved [[Airway (aviation)|civil aviation routes]] closer to the line, which is expected to further “squeeze” the airspace controlled by Taiwan within 12 nautical miles of its coast.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/what-is-the-median-line-between-china-and-taiwan/5637905.html | title=What is the Median Line Between China and Taiwan? | date=28 October 2020 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3250431/beijings-changes-civil-flight-path-near-taiwan-strait-median-line-likely-squeeze-islands-air-defence | title=Beijing's changes to cross-strait flight path will 'squeeze' Taiwan air defence | date=31 January 2024 }}</ref>