Editing People's Liberation Army (section)

== Weapons and equipment ==
According to the [[United States Department of Defense]], China is developing kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered [[microwave|microwave weapon]]s, [[Particle beam#Military|particle-beam weapon]]s, and [[electromagnetic pulse]] weapons with its increase of military fundings.<ref>The Standard, 5 March 2008, Volume 1, No. 134, Major jump in military spending, Alarm raised over cyber, space advance, ''the Pentagon said in a report. … "The PLA is also exploring satellite jammers, kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle-beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons for counterspace application", it said, adding it was not clear if the cyber intrusions were backed by the military.''</ref>

The PLA has said of reports that its modernisation is dependent on sales of advanced technology from American allies, senior leadership have stated "Some have politicized China's normal commercial cooperation with foreign countries, damaging our reputation." These contributions include advanced European diesel engines for Chinese warships, military helicopter designs from Eurocopter, French anti-submarine sonars and helicopters,<ref>{{cite news |url = http://in.reuters.com/article/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219 |title = Chinese military's secret to success: European engineering |last1 = Lague |first1 = David |date = 19 December 2013 |work = Reuters |access-date = 20 December 2013 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131220211323/http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219 |archive-date = 20 December 2013 |url-status = dead }}</ref> Australian technology for the [[Houbei class missile boat]],<ref>Lague, David. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531 "Insight: From a ferry, a Chinese fast-attack boat."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116153056/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531 |date=16 November 2021 }} Reuters, 31 May 2012.</ref> and Israeli supplied American missile, laser and aircraft technology.<ref name="G">{{cite web |title = U.S. up in arms over Sino-Israeli ties |url = http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL21Ak01.html |date = 21 December 2004 |work = [[Asia Times]] |access-date = 11 June 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080516232241/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL21Ak01.html |archive-date = 16 May 2008 |url-status = unfit }}</ref>

According to the [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]'s data, China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms in 2010–14, an increase of 143 percent from the period 2005–2009.<ref>{{cite web |title = The United States leads upward trend in arms exports, Asian and Gulf states arms imports up, says SIPRI |url = http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 |website = sipri.org |date = 16 March 2015 |publisher = [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] (SIPRI) |access-date = 18 March 2015 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160409121211/http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 |archive-date = 9 April 2016 |url-status = live }}</ref> SIPRI also calculated that China surpassed Russia to become the world's second largest arms exporter by 2020.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-data-reveals-scale-chinese-arms-industry|title=New SIPRI data reveals scale of Chinese arms industry|date=27 January 2020|website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]|access-date=27 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200127055352/https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-data-reveals-scale-chinese-arms-industry|archive-date=27 January 2020|url-status=live}}</ref>

China's share of global arms exports hence increased from 3 to 5 percent. China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–14. A significant percentage (just over 68 percent) of Chinese exports went to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China also exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–14 included deals with Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of several unmanned combat aerial vehicles.<ref name="auto"/>

Following rapid advances in its arms industry, China has become less dependent on arms imports, which decreased by 42 percent between 2005–09 and 2010–14. Russia accounted for 61 percent of Chinese arms imports, followed by France with 16 percent and Ukraine with 13 per cent. Helicopters formed a major part of Russian and French deliveries, with the French designs produced under licence in China.<ref name="auto"/>

Over the years, China has struggled to design and produce effective engines for combat and transport vehicles. It continued to import large numbers of engines from Russia and Ukraine in 2010–14 for indigenously designed combat, advanced trainer and transport aircraft, and naval ships. It also produced British-, French- and German-designed engines for combat aircraft, naval ships and armoured vehicles, mostly as part of agreements that have been in place for decades.<ref name="auto">{{cite web |title=Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2014 |url=http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=495 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319023856/http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=495 |archive-date=19 March 2015 |access-date=18 March 2015 |website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |publisher= |ref=SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2015}}</ref>

In August 2021, China tested a nuclear-capable [[Hypersonic flight|hypersonic missile]] that circled the globe before speeding towards its target.<ref>{{cite news |title=Biden airs hypersonic missile fears as probable ambassador labels China 'untrustworthy' |url=https://www.dw.com/en/biden-airs-hypersonic-missile-fears-as-probable-ambassador-labels-china-untrustworthy/a-59568428 |work=Deutsche Welle |date=20 October 2021 |access-date=24 October 2021 |archive-date=28 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211028041828/https://www.dw.com/en/biden-airs-hypersonic-missile-fears-as-probable-ambassador-labels-china-untrustworthy/a-59568428 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ''Financial Times'' reported that "the test showed that China had made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and was far more advanced than U.S. officials realized."<ref>{{cite news |title=China successfully tested hypersonic weapon in August: report |url=https://www.space.com/china-hypersonic-weapon-test-august |work=[[Space.com]] |date=17 October 2021 |access-date=24 October 2021 |archive-date=24 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211024180017/https://www.space.com/china-hypersonic-weapon-test-august |url-status=live }}</ref> During the [[Zapad 2021]] joint strategic exercise, most of the gear comprised novel Chinese arms such as the [[Shaanxi KJ-500|KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft]], [[Chengdu J-20|J-20]] and [[Shenyang J-16|J-16 fighters]], [[Xi'an Y-20|Y-20 transport planes]], and surveillance and combat drones.<ref>[[Bonny Lin]], Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, ''et.al.'' China Power Project. (2023). "How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?". [https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/ Center for Strategic and International Studies website] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230807132132/https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/ |date=7 August 2023 }} Retrieved 7 August 2023.</ref> Another joint forces exercise took place in August 2023 near Alaska.<ref>Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef. (6 Aug 2023). "Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska".  [https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b Wall Street Journal website] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230807132130/https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b |date=7 August 2023 }} Retrieved 7 August 2023.</ref>

On 24 September 2024, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Davidson |first=Helen |date=2024-09-25 |title=China test launches intercontinental ballistic missile for first time in decades |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/25/china-missile-test-icbm-pla-rocket-force |access-date=2024-09-25 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-09-25 |title=China conducts rare public test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/china-icbm-test-ballistic-missile-launch-b2618502.html |access-date=2024-09-25 |website=[[The Independent]] |language=en |archive-date=25 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240925222921/https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/china-icbm-test-ballistic-missile-launch-b2618502.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Cyberwarfare ===
{{Main|Cyberwarfare and China}}

There is a belief in the Western military doctrines that the PLA have already begun engaging countries using cyber-warfare.<ref>{{cite news |last=Gorman |first=Siobhan |date=8 April 2009 |title=Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 |url-status=live |access-date=1 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150108232759/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 |archive-date=8 January 2015}}</ref> There has been a significant increase in the number of presumed Chinese military initiated cyber events from 1999 to the present day.<ref>{{citation |first = Bryan |last = Krekel |title = Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation |publisher = [[Northrop Grumman]] |year = 2009 |url = http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110203052113/http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf |archive-date = 3 February 2011 }}</ref>

Cyberwarfare has gained recognition as a valuable technique because it is an asymmetric technique that is a part of [[Chinese information operations and information warfare|information operations and information warfare]]. As is written by two PLAGF Colonels, [[Qiao Liang (writer)|Qiao Liang]] and [[Wang Xiangsui]] in the book ''[[Unrestricted Warfare]]'', "Methods that are not characterized by the use of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful realization of the war's goals, if not more so.<ref>{{citation |last1=Qiao |first1=Liang |last2=Wang |first2 = Xiangsui |title = Unrestricted Warfare |year=1999 |url = http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf |publisher = PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House via [[Foreign Broadcast Information Service]] |url-status=dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20000815214700/http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf |archive-date = 15 August 2000 }}</ref>

While China has long been suspected of [[cyber spying]], on 24 May 2011 the PLA announced the existence of having 'cyber capabilities'.<ref>Beech, Hannah. [https://world.time.com/2011/05/27/meet-chinas-newest-soldiers-an-online-blue-army/ "Meet China's Newest Soldiers: An Online Blue Army."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240927020105/https://world.time.com/2011/05/27/meet-chinas-newest-soldiers-an-online-blue-army/ |date=27 September 2024 }}  ''Time'', 27 May 2011.</ref>

In February 2013, the media named "Comment Crew" as a hacker military faction for China's People's Liberation Army.<ref>{{cite news |url = https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 |newspaper = The New York Times |first = David E. |last = Sanger |title = China's Army Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S |date = 18 February 2013 |access-date = 28 February 2017 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170310124107/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 |archive-date = 10 March 2017 |url-status = live }}</ref> In May 2014, a Federal [[Grand Jury]] in the United States indicted five [[PLA Unit 61398|Unit 61398]] officers on criminal charges related to cyber attacks on private companies based in the United States after alleged investigations by the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] who exposed their identities in collaboration with US intelligence agencies such as the CIA.<ref>[https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor "U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage . . . "] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151203185110/http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor |date=3 December 2015 }}, 19 May 2014, justice.gov</ref><ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html "5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519141057/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html |date=19 May 2017 }}, 19 May 2014, NY Times</ref>

In February 2020, the United States government indicted members of China's People's Liberation Army for the [[2017 Equifax data breach]], which involved hacking into Equifax and plundering sensitive data as part of a massive heist that also included stealing trade secrets, though the CCP denied these claims.<ref name="cbs china deny">{{cite web | url = https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-denies-responsibility-in-equifax-breach-after-doj-charges-four-military-members/ | title = Data from Equifax credit hack could "end up on the black market," expert warns | date = February 11, 2020 | access-date = February 11, 2020 | work = [[CBS News]] | archive-date = 2 July 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200702012248/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-denies-responsibility-in-equifax-breach-after-doj-charges-four-military-members/ | url-status = live }}</ref><ref name="WSJ Indicted">{{cite web | url = https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-members-of-china-s-military-indicted-for-massive-equifax-breach-11581346824 | title = Four Members of China's Military Indicted Over Massive Equifax Breach | date = February 11, 2020 | access-date = April 28, 2020 | work = [[The Wall Street Journal]] | archive-date = 29 May 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200529205316/https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-members-of-china-s-military-indicted-for-massive-equifax-breach-11581346824 | url-status = live }}</ref>

=== Nuclear capabilities ===
{{Main|China and weapons of mass destruction}}

[[File:Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles.png|thumb|upright=1.35|The range of [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|the PLA Rocket Force's]] medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (2006)]]

The first of [[List of nuclear weapons tests of China|China's nuclear weapons tests]] took place in 1964, and its [[Test No. 6|first hydrogen bomb test]] occurred in 1967 at [[Lop Nur]]. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]] (CTBT), but did not ratify it.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Borger |first=Julian |author-link=Julian Borger |date=2020-04-16 |title=China may have conducted low-level nuclear test, US claims |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529174223/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |access-date=2023-05-29 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal remains a state secret.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |last3=Johns |first3=Eliana |last4=Knight |first4=Mackenzie |date=2024-01-02 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=80 |issue=1 |pages=49–72 |doi=10.1080/00963402.2023.2295206 |issn=0096-3402 |doi-access=free|bibcode=2024BuAtS..80a..49K }}</ref> There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The ''[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]'' and [[Federation of American Scientists]] estimated in 2024 that China has a stockpile of approximately 438 nuclear warheads,<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":32">{{Cite web |date=March 31, 2023 |title=Status of World Nuclear Forces |url=https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529182756/https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/ |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |access-date=2023-05-29 |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |language=en-US}}</ref> while the [[United States Department of Defense]] put the estimate at more than 500 operational nuclear warheads,<ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last=Feng |first=Emily |date=October 19, 2023 |title=New Pentagon report claims China now has over 500 operational nuclear warheads |url=https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207156597/new-pentagon-report-claims-china-now-has-over-500-operational-nuclear-warheads |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231020031121/https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207156597/new-pentagon-report-claims-china-now-has-over-500-operational-nuclear-warheads |archive-date=October 20, 2023 |access-date=October 19, 2023 |work=[[NPR]]}}</ref> making it the [[List of countries with nuclear weapons#Estimated worldwide nuclear stockpiles|third-largest]] in the world.

China's policy has traditionally been one of [[no first use]] while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force targeted for [[countervalue]] targets.<ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |last3=Reynolds |first3=Eliana |date=2023-03-04 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=79 |issue=2 |pages=108–133 |bibcode=2023BuAtS..79b.108K |doi=10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713 |issn=0096-3402 |doi-access=free}}</ref> According to a 2023 study by the [[National Defense University (Washington, D.C.)|National Defense University]], China's nuclear doctrine has historically leaned toward maintaining a secure [[Second strike|second-strike]] capability.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Logan |first1=David C |last2=Saunders |first2=Philip C. |date=July 26, 2023 |title=Discerning the Drivers of China's Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230930001818/https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/ |archive-date=September 30, 2023 |access-date=2023-09-16 |website=[[National Defense University Press]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

=== Space ===
{{See also|ASAT program of China}}
Having witnessed the crucial role of space to United States military success in the [[Gulf War]], China continues to view space as a critical domain in both conflict and international [[strategic competition]].<ref name="Cheng-2012">{{Cite journal |last=Cheng |first=Dean |date=2012 |title=China's military role in space |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-1/Cheng.pdf |journal=[[Strategic Studies Quarterly]] |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=55–77 |via=[[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]] |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013057/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-1/Cheng.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 2019 |title=China's National Defense in the New Era |url=https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas-national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/ |website=Andrew S. Erickson: China analysis from original sources |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013056/https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas-national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA operates a various satellite constellations performing [[Reconnaissance satellite|reconnaissance]], [[Satellite navigation|navigation]], [[Communications satellite|communication]], and [[Anti-satellite weapon|counterspace]] functions.<ref name="Clark">{{Cite web |last=Clark |first=Stephen |date=29 January 2021 |title=China launches military spy satellite trio into orbit |url=https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/#:~:text=China%20uses%20the%20Yaogan%20name,are%20the%20Yaogan%2031%20satellites. |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023185527/https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/ |archive-date=23 October 2022 |website=Spaceflight Now}}</ref><ref name="op_china">{{cite news |date=27 December 2011 |title=China GPS rival Beidou starts offering navigation data |publisher=BBC |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648 |url-status=live |access-date=20 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120203001904/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648 |archive-date=3 February 2012}}</ref><ref name="Bruce-2021">{{Cite news |last=Bruce |first=Leo |date=26 November 2021 |title=China successfully launches tactical military communications satellite |work=[[NASA]] Spaceflight |url=https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/china-launches-military-satellite/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013109/https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/china-launches-military-satellite/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Dickinson-2021a">{{Cite report |url=https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickinson04.20.2021.pdf |title=United States Space Command Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee U.S. Senate |last=Dickinson |first=General James H. |date=21 April 2021 |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=26 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220826005031/https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickinson04.20.2021.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Planners at PLA's National Defense University project China's space actions as retaliatory or preventative, following conditions like an attack on a Chinese satellite, an attack on China, or the interruption of a PLA amphibious landing.<ref name=":Li">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |pages=266 |chapter=Beijing's Military Power and East Asian-Pacific Hot Spots |jstor=jj.15136086 |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref> According to this approach, PLA planners assume that the country must have the capacity for retaliation and second-strike capability against a powerful opponent.<ref name=":Li" /> PLA planners envision a limited space war and therefore seek to identify weak but critical nodes in other space systems.<ref name=":Li" />

Significant components of the PLA's space-based reconnaissance include Jianbing (vanguard) satellites with [[Front organization|cover names]] [[Yaogan]] ({{Zh|c=遥感|l=remote sensing|labels=no}}) and [[Gaofen]] ({{Zh|s=高分|labels=no|l=high resolution}}).<ref name="Clark"/><ref>{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=22 November 2021 |title=China launches new Gaofen-11 high resolution spy satellite to match U.S. capabilities |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/china-launches-new-gaofen-11-high-resolution-spy-satellite-to-match-u-s-capabilities/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032728/https://spacenews.com/china-launches-new-gaofen-11-high-resolution-spy-satellite-to-match-u-s-capabilities/ |url-status=live }}</ref> These satellites collect [[Electro-optical sensor|electro-optical]] (EO) imagery to collect a literal representation of a [[Targeting (warfare)|target]], [[Synthetic-aperture radar|synthetic aperture radar]] (SAR) imagery to penetrate the cloudy climates of [[South China|southern China]],<ref name="Sino Defense-2007">{{Cite web |date=12 November 2007 |title=JianBing 5 (YaoGan WeiXing 1/3) Synthetic Aperture Radar |url=http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/jianbing5.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080421185528/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/jianbing5.asp |archive-date=21 April 2008 |access-date=18 May 2022 |website=Sino Defense}}</ref> and [[electronic intelligence]] (ELINT) to provide targeting intelligence on adversarial ships.<ref>{{Cite web |date=20 September 2016 |title=The Chinese Maritime Surveillance System |url=https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317214541/https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/ |archive-date=17 March 2022 |website=SatelliteObservation.net}}</ref><ref name="Blizzard-2016">{{Cite journal |last=Blizzard |first=Timothy J. |year=2016 |title=The PLA, A2/AD and the ADF: Lessons for Future Maritime Strategy |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465599 |journal=Security Challenges |volume=12 |issue=3 |pages=69–70 |jstor=26465599 |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013105/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465599 |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA also leverages a restricted, high-performance service of the country's BeiDou [[Positioning system|positioning, navigation, and timing]] (PNT) satellites for its forces and [[Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance|intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]] (ISR) platforms.<ref>{{cite web |year=2012 |title=Precise orbit determination of Beidou Satellites with precise positioning |url=http://earth.scichina.com:8080/sciDe/EN/abstract/abstract507876.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130617060128/http://earth.scichina.com:8080/sciDe/EN/abstract/abstract507876.shtml |archive-date=17 June 2013 |access-date=26 June 2013 |work=Science China}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Dotson |first=John |date=15 July 2020 |title=The Beidou Satellite Network and the 'Space Silk Road' in Eurasia |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-beidou-satellite-network-and-the-space-silk-road-in-eurasia/ |access-date=2020-07-16 |newspaper=Jamestown |language=en-US |archive-date=16 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200716094445/http://jamestown.org/program/the-beidou-satellite-network-and-the-space-silk-road-in-eurasia/ |url-status=live }}</ref> For secure communications, the PLA uses the Zhongxing and Fenghuo series of satellites which enable secure data and voice transmission over [[C band (IEEE)|C-band]], [[Ku band|Ku-band]], and [[Ultra high frequency|UHF]].<ref name="Bruce-2021" /> PLA deployment of anti-satellite and counterspace satellites including those of the [[Shijian]] and [[Shiyan]] series have also brought significant concern from western nations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Smith |first=Marcia |date=19 August 2013 |title=Surprise Chinese Satellite Maneuvers Mystify Western Experts |work=SpacePolicyOnline |url=https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satelllite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=28 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221128213524/https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satelllite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Dickinson-2021a"/><ref name="Jones-2022">{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=27 January 2022 |title=China's Shijian-21 towed dead satellite to a high graveyard orbit |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=3 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230203142431/https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

The PLA also plays a significant role in the [[Chinese space program]].<ref name="Cheng-2012" /> To date, all the participants have been selected from members of the PLA Air Force.<ref name="Cheng-2012" /> China became the third country in the world to have sent a man into space by its own means with the flight of [[Yang Liwei]] aboard the [[Shenzhou 5]] spacecraft on 15 October 2003,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yardley |first=Jim |date=15 October 2003 |title=China Sends a Man Into Orbit, Entering the U.S.–Russian Club |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/china-sends-a-man-into-orbit-entering-the-us-russian-club.html |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013057/https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/china-sends-a-man-into-orbit-entering-the-us-russian-club.html |url-status=live }}</ref> the flight of [[Fei Junlong]] and [[Nie Haisheng]] aboard [[Shenzhou 6]] on 12 October 2005,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mali |first=Tariq |date=18 October 2005 |title=Shenzhou 6 Taikonauts Achieve Firsts for China |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/shenzhou-6-taikonauts-achieve-firsts-china/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032741/https://spacenews.com/shenzhou-6-taikonauts-achieve-firsts-china/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Zhai Zhigang]], [[Liu Boming (taikonaut)|Liu Boming]], and [[Jing Haipeng]] aboard [[Shenzhou 7]] on 25 September 2008.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=7 November 2021 |title=China's Shenzhou 13 crew takes its first spacewalk, the country's 1st by a female astronaut |work=[[Space.com]] |url=https://www.space.com/china-shenzhou-13-first-female-spacewalk |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=7 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211107191224/https://www.space.com/china-shenzhou-13-first-female-spacewalk |url-status=live }}</ref>

The PLA started the development of an anti-ballistic and anti-satellite system in the 1960s, code named Project 640, including ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stokes |first=Mark A. |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=monographs |title=China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States |date=1999 |publisher=Diane Publishing |isbn=978-1-4289-1197-0 |language=en |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112034405/https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=monographs |url-status=live }}</ref> On 11 January 2007, China conducted a successful [[2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test|test]] of an [[anti-satellite missile]], with an SC-19 class KKV.<ref name="channelnewsasia.com">[http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/253580/1/.html China plays down fears after satellite shot down] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110929015038/http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/253580/1/.html |date=29 September 2011 }}, [[Agence France-Presse|AFP]] via [[MediaCorp Channel NewsAsia|Channelnewsasia]], 20 January 2007</ref>

The PLA has tested two types of hypersonic space vehicles, the Shenglong Spaceplane and a new one built by [[Chengdu Aircraft Corporation]]. Only a few pictures have appeared since it was revealed in late 2007. Earlier, images of the High-enthalpy Shock Waves Laboratory [[wind tunnel]] of the [[Chinese Academy of Sciences|CAS]] Key Laboratory of high-temperature gas dynamics (LHD) were published in the Chinese media. Tests with speeds up to Mach 20 were reached around 2001.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://lhd.imech.cas.cn/kyzb/201307/t20130723_116736.html |title=氢氧爆轰驱动激波高焓风洞 |publisher=中国科学院高温气体动力学重点实验室 |date=17 March 2005 |access-date=16 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304002515/http://lhd.imech.cas.cn/kyzb/201307/t20130723_116736.html |archive-date=4 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="strategycenter.net">{{cite web |last=Fisher, Jr. |first=Richard |date=29 June 2011 |title=PLA and U.S. Arms Racing in the Western Pacific |url=http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140131161229/http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp |archive-date=31 January 2014 |access-date=20 June 2012 |website=[[International Assessment and Strategy Center]] |publisher= |quote=It is also possible that during this decade the PLA Navy could deploy initial railgun and laser weapons. It is known that the PLA has invested heavily in both technologies. |df=dmy-all}}</ref>