Editing Malware (section)

==="Air gap" isolation or "parallel network"===
As a last resort, computers can be protected from malware, and the risk of infected computers disseminating trusted information can be greatly reduced by imposing an [[air gap (networking)|"air gap"]] (i.e. completely disconnecting them from all other networks) and applying enhanced controls over the entry and exit of software and data from the outside world. However, malware can still cross the air gap in some situations, not least due to the need to introduce software into the air-gapped network and can damage the availability or integrity of assets thereon. [[Stuxnet]] is an example of malware that is introduced to the target environment via a USB drive, causing damage to processes supported on the environment without the need to exfiltrate data.

AirHopper,<ref name="z758">{{cite conference|last1=Guri|first1=Mordechai|last2=Kedma|first2=Gabi|last3=Kachlon|first3=Assaf|last4=Elovici|first4=Yuval|title=2014 9th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software: The Americas (MALWARE)|chapter=AirHopper: Bridging the air-gap between isolated networks and mobile phones using radio frequencies|publisher=IEEE|date=2014|page=|isbn=978-1-4799-7329-3|doi=10.1109/MALWARE.2014.6999418|pages=58–67|arxiv=1411.0237}}</ref> BitWhisper,<ref name="s209">{{cite conference|last1=Guri|first1=Mordechai|last2=Monitz|first2=Matan|last3=Mirski|first3=Yisroel|last4=Elovici|first4=Yuval|title=2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium|chapter=BitWhisper: Covert Signaling Channel between Air-Gapped Computers Using Thermal Manipulations|publisher=IEEE|date=2015|page=|isbn=978-1-4673-7538-2|doi=10.1109/CSF.2015.26|pages=276–289|arxiv=1503.07919}}</ref> GSMem<ref>{{cite conference|last1=Guri|first1=Mordechai|last2=Kachlon|first2=Assaf|last3=Hasson|first3=Ofer|last4=Kedma|first4=Gabi|last5=Mirsky|first5=Yisroel|last6=Elovici|first6=Yuval|title=GSMem: Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Computers over GSM Frequencies|publisher=USENIX Security Symposium|date=2015|isbn=978-1-939133-11-3|url=https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec15-paper-guri-update_v2.pdf|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20240301215837/https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec15-paper-guri-update_v2.pdf|archivedate=2024-03-01|url-status=live}}</ref> and Fansmitter<ref>{{Cite arXiv|eprint=1606.05915|last1=Hanspach|first1=Michael|title=Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speakerless) Air-Gapped Computers|last2=Goetz|first2=Michael|last3=Daidakulov|first3=Andrey|last4=Elovici|first4=Yuval|class=cs.CR|year=2016}}</ref> are four techniques introduced by researchers that can leak data from air-gapped computers using electromagnetic, thermal and acoustic emissions.