Editing David Ben-Gurion (section)

== References ==
{{Reflist|refs=

<ref name="BG-latrun">{{cite web|title=Ben Gurion proposal to conquer Latrun, the cabinet meeting, 26 sept 1948 (hebrew)|url=https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B4gkA1aknU64cHdtcFd2QmpFWXpibWhqVFYwR1VuamRXS3pF/view|website=Israel state archive blog|publisher=israelidocuments.blogspot.co.il/2015/02/1948.html (Hebrew)}}</ref>

<ref name="Shalom2002p155">{{cite book|author=Zaki Shalom|title=David Ben-Gurion, the State of Israel and the Arab World, 1949–1956|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KMTm5zOzUugC&pg=PA155|year=2002|publisher=Sussex Academic Press|isbn=978-1-902210-21-6|page=155|quote="A great satisfaction with the armistice borders…(Concerning the) area intended to pass into Israeli…(Ben Gurions') statements reveal the ambiguity over this subject"}}</ref>

<ref name="Shalom2002p160">{{cite book|author=Zaki Shalom|title=David Ben-Gurion, the State of Israel and the Arab World, 1949–1956|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KMTm5zOzUugC&pg=PA160|year=2002|publisher=Sussex Academic Press|isbn=978-1-902210-21-6|page=160 |quote="If BG had been fully convinced that the IDF should have fought more aggressively for Jerusalem and the surrounding area, then Sharet's opposition would not have stood in the way of government consent"}}</ref>

<ref name="Tal2004p406">{{cite book|author=David Tal|title=War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Vs2PAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA406|date=24 June 2004|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-135-77513-1|pages=406–407|quote=Nothing of this sort appears in the diary he kept at the time or in the minutes of the Cabinet meeting from which he is ostensibly quoting... Ben Gurion once more raised the idea of conquering Latrun in the cabinet. Ben Gurion was in fact reacting to what he had been told by a delegation from Jerusalem... The "everlasting shame" view is unsubstantiated in both Ben Gurion's diary and in the Cabinet protocol.}}</ref>

<ref name="Bar-Joseph2013p115">{{cite book|author=Uri Bar-Joseph|title=The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=db9mAgAAQBAJ|date=19 December 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-135-17010-3|page=115|quote=the plan place by BG before the government call not for an all-out offensive, but rather for a limited action aimed at the conquest of Latrun…more than 13 years later ..(he) claim that his proposal had been far more comprehensive}}</ref>

<ref name="Shapira2014p173">{{cite book|author=Anita Shapira|title=Ben-Gurion: Father of Modern Israel|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2eEdBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA173|date=25 November 2014|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn=978-0-300-18273-6|pages=173–|quote=(Ben Gurion) He also did not flinch from provoking the United Nations by breaking the truce agreement. But the limit of his fearlessness was a clash with a Western power. Vainly, the right and Mapam accused him of defeatism. He did not flinch from confronting them but chose to maintain good relations with the United States, which he perceived as a potential ally of the new state, and also not to provoke the British lion, even though its fangs had been drawn. At the end of the war, when Yigal Allon, who represented the younger generation of commanders that had grown up in the war, demanded the conquest of the West Bank up to the Jordan River as the natural, defensible border of the state, Ben-Gurion refused. He recognized that the IDF was militarily strong enough to carry out the conquest, but he believed that the young state should not bite off more than it had already chewed. There was a limit to what the world was prepared to accept. Furthermore, the armistice borders—which later became known as the Green Line—were better than those he had dreamed of at the beginning of the war. In Ben-Gurion's opinion, in terms of territory Israel was satisfied. It was time to send the troops home and start work on building the new nation.}}</ref>

<ref name="Morris2009p79">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=One state, two states: resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZztAAAAMAAJ|year=2009|publisher=Yale University Press|page=79|isbn=978-0-300-12281-7|quote=in March 1949, just before the signing of the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement, when IDF general Yigal Allon proposed conquering the West Bank, Ben-Gurion turned him down flat. Like most Israelis, Ben-Gurion had given up the dream}}</ref>

<ref name="Shalom2002p174">{{cite book|author=Zaki Shalom|title=David Ben-Gurion, the State of Israel and the Arab World, 1949–1956|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KMTm5zOzUugC&pg=PA174|year=2002|publisher=Sussex Academic Press|isbn=978-1-902210-21-6|pages=174–|quote="The clearest expression of this 'activist' approach is found in a "personal, top secret" letter sent by Yigal Allon to BG shortly after ... We cannot imagine a border more stable than the Jordan River, which runs the entire length of the country "}}</ref>

<ref name="ShemeshTroen2005p5">{{cite book|author1=Moshe Shemesh|author2=Selwyn Illan Troen|title=The Suez-Sinai Crisis: A Retrospective and Reappraisal|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GNGPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA185|date=5 October 2005|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-135-77863-7|page=5|quote=The aims were to be threefold: to remove the threat, wholly or partially, of the Egyptian rmy in the Sinai, to destroy the framework of the fedaiyyun, and to secure the freedom of navigation through the straits of Tiran.}}</ref>

<ref name="Alteras1993p192">{{cite book|author=Isaac Alteras|title=Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953–1960|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ydRHCPWngioC&pg=PA192|year=1993|publisher=University Press of Florida|isbn=978-0-8130-1205-6|pages=192–|quote=the removal of the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. The blockade closed Israel's sea lane to East Africa and the Far East, hindering the development of Israel's southern port of Eilat and its hinterland, the Nege. Another important objective of the Israeli war plan was the elimination of the terrorist bases in the Gaza Strip, from which daily fedayeen incursions into Israel made life unbearable for its southern population. And last but not least, the concentration of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula, armed with the newly acquired weapons from the Soviet bloc, prepared for an attack on Israel. Here, Ben-Gurion believed, was a time bomb that had to be defused before it was too late.  Reaching the Suez Canal did not figure at all in Israel's war objectives.}}</ref>

<ref name="Dowty2005p102">{{cite book|author=Alan Dowty|title=Israel/Palestine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9iFxq6NPPgEC&pg=PA102|date=20 June 2005|publisher=Polity|isbn=978-0-7456-3202-5|pages=102–|quote=Gamal Abdel Nasser, who declared in one speech that "Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death."...The level of violence against Israelis, soldiers and civilians alike, seemed to be rising inexorably.}}</ref>

<ref name="Caraccilo2011p113">{{cite book|author=Dominic Joseph Caraccilo|title=Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FDA8dQyaQ9MC&pg=PA113|date=January 2011|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-0-313-39149-1|pages=113–|quote=The escalation continued with the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, Nasser made clear his intent:"I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations." Less than two weeks later, on October 25, Egypt signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan placing Nasser in command of all three armies. The continued blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of recent Arab statements, prompted Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, to attack Egypt on October 29, 1956.}}</ref>

<ref name="Bickerton2009p101">{{cite book|author=Ian J. Bickerton|title=The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Yca69_RUhMC&pg=PA101|date=15 September 2009|publisher=Reaktion Books|isbn=978-1-86189-527-1|pages=101 |quote="(p. 101) To them the murderous fedayeen raids and constant harassment were just another form of Arab warfare against Israel...(p. 102) Israel's aims were to capture the Sinai peninsula in order to open the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and to seize the Gaza strip to end fedayeen attacks."}}</ref>

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