Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

==Post-war controversy==
Blitzkrieg had been called a [[Revolution in Military Affairs]] (RMA), but many writers and historians have concluded that the Germans did not invent a new form of warfare but applied new technologies to traditional ideas of ''Bewegungskrieg'' (maneuver warfare) to achieve decisive victory.{{sfn|Citino|2005|p=311}}

===Strategy===
In 1965, [[Captain (land)|Captain]] [[Robert O'Neill (historian)|Robert O'Neill]], Professor of the History of War at the [[University of Oxford]] produced an example of the popular view. In ''Doctrine and Training in the German Army 1919–1939'', O'Neill wrote:

{{blockquote|What makes this story worth telling is the development of one idea: the blitzkrieg. The German Army had a greater grasp of the effects of technology on the battlefield, and went on to develop a new form of warfare by which its rivals when it came to the test were hopelessly outclassed.}}

Other historians wrote that blitzkrieg was an operational doctrine of the German armed forces and a strategic concept on which the leadership of Nazi Germany based its strategic and economic planning. Military planners and bureaucrats in the war economy appear rarely, if ever, to have employed the term ''blitzkrieg'' in official documents. That the German army had a "blitzkrieg doctrine" was rejected in the late 1970s by Matthew Cooper. The concept of a blitzkrieg ''[[Luftwaffe]]'' was challenged by [[Richard Overy]] in the late 1970s and by Williamson Murray in the mid-1980s. That Nazi Germany went to war on the basis of "blitzkrieg economics" was criticized by Richard Overy in the 1980s, and George Raudzens described the contradictory senses in which historians have used the word. The notion of a German blitzkrieg concept or doctrine survives in popular history and many historians still support the thesis.{{sfn|Harris|1995|pp=333–348}}

Frieser wrote that after the failure of the [[Schlieffen Plan]] in 1914, the German army concluded that decisive battles were no longer possible in the changed conditions of the twentieth century. Frieser wrote that the [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht]] (OKW), which was created in 1938 had intended to avoid the decisive battle concepts of its predecessors and planned for a long war of exhaustion (''Ermattungskrieg''). It was only after the improvised plan for the Battle of France in 1940 was unexpectedly successful that the German General Staff came to believe that ''Vernichtungskrieg'' was still feasible. German thinking reverted to the possibility of a quick and decisive war for the [[Balkans campaign (World War II)|Balkan campaign]] and Operation Barbarossa.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|pp=349–350}}

===Doctrine===
Most academic historians regard the notion of blitzkrieg as military doctrine to be a myth. Shimon Naveh wrote, "The striking feature of the blitzkrieg concept is the complete absence of a coherent theory which should have served as the general cognitive basis for the actual conduct of operations". Naveh described it as an "ad hoc solution" to operational dangers, thrown together at the last moment.{{sfn|Naveh|1997|pp=128–129}} Overy disagreed with the idea that Hitler and the Nazi regime ever intended a blitzkrieg war because the once-popular belief that the Nazi state organized its economy to carry out its grand strategy in short campaigns was false. Hitler had intended for a rapid unlimited war to occur much later than 1939, but Germany's aggressive [[foreign policy]] forced the state into war before it was ready. The planning of Hitler and the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' in the 1930s did not reflect a blitzkrieg method but the opposite.{{sfn|Overy|1995|pp=233–235}} J. P. Harris wrote that the Wehrmacht never used the word, and it did not appear in German army or air force field manuals. The word was coined in September 1939 by a ''Times'' newspaper reporter. Harris also found no evidence that German military thinking developed a blitzkrieg mentality.{{sfn|Harris|1995|pp=333–336}} [[Karl-Heinz Frieser]] and [[Adam Tooze]] reached similar conclusions to Overy and Naveh that the notions of blitzkrieg economy and strategy are myths.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|pp=25–27}}{{sfn|Tooze|2006|pp=371–373}} Frieser wrote that surviving German economists and General Staff officers denied that Germany went to war with a blitzkrieg strategy.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|p=}} [[Robert M. Citino]] argues:

{{blockquote|
''Blitzkrieg'' was not a doctrine, or an operational scheme, or even a tactical system. In fact, it simply doesn't exist, at least not in the way we usually think it does. The Germans never used the term ''Blitzkrieg'' in any precise sense, and almost never used it outside of quotations. It simply meant a rapid and decisive victory (lightning war)... The Germans didn't invent anything new in the interwar period, but rather used new technologies like tanks and air and radio-controlled command to restore an old way of war that they still found to be valid, ''Bewegungskrieg.''{{sfn|Yerxa|2011|p=11}}
}}

Historian [[Victor Davis Hanson]] states that ''Blitzkrieg'' "played on the myth of German technological superiority and industrial dominance" and adds that German successes, particularly that of its Panzer divisions were "instead predicated on the poor preparation and morale of Germany's enemies".{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=363}} Hanson also reports that at a Munich public address in November 1941, Hitler had "disowned" the concept of ''Blitzkrieg'' by calling it an "idiotic word".{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=260}} Further, successful ''Blitzkrieg'' operations were predicated on superior numbers, air support and were possible for only short periods of time without sufficient supply lines.{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=280}} For all intents and purposes, ''Blitzkrieg'' ended at the Eastern Front once the German forces had given up Stalingrad, after they faced hundreds of new T-34 tanks, when the Luftwaffe became unable to assure air dominance, and after the stalemate at Kursk. To that end, Hanson concludes that German military success was not accompanied by the adequate provisioning of its troops with food and materiel far from the source of supply, which contributed to its ultimate failure.{{sfn|Hanson|2017|pp=280–281}} Despite its later disappointments as German troops extended their lines at too great a distance, the very specter of armored ''Blitzkrieg'' forces initially proved victorious against the Polish, Dutch, Belgian and French Armies early in the war.{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=382}}

===Economics===
In the 1960s, Alan Milward developed a theory of blitzkrieg economics: Germany could not fight a long war and chose to avoid comprehensive rearmament and armed in breadth to win quick victories. Milward described an economy positioned between a full war economy and a peacetime economy.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|p=25}}{{sfn|Harris|1995|p=348}} The purpose of the blitzkrieg economy was to allow the German people to enjoy high living standards in the event of hostilities and avoid the economic hardships of the First World War.{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=260}}

Overy wrote that blitzkrieg as a "coherent military and economic concept has proven a difficult strategy to defend in light of the evidence".{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=207}} Milward's theory was contrary to Hitler's and German planners' intentions. The Germans, aware of the errors of the First World War, rejected the concept of organizing its economy to fight only a short war. Therefore, focus was given to the development of armament in depth for a long war, instead of armament in breadth for a short war. Hitler claimed that relying on surprise alone was "criminal" and that "we have to prepare for a long war along with surprise attack". During the winter of 1939–1940, Hitler demobilized many troops from the army to return as skilled workers to factories because the war would be decided by production, not a quick "Panzer operation".{{sfn|Frieser|2005|p=26}}

In the 1930s, Hitler had ordered rearmament programs that cannot be considered limited. In November 1937, he had indicated that most of the armament projects would be completed by 1943–1945.{{sfn|Overy|1995|pp=192, 195}} The rearmament of the ''[[Kriegsmarine]]'' was to have been completed in 1949 and the ''Luftwaffe'' rearmament program was to have matured in 1942, with a force capable of strategic bombing with [[heavy bomber]]s. The construction and the training of motorized forces and a full mobilization of the rail networks would not begin until 1943 and 1944, respectively.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|p=29}} Hitler needed to avoid war until these projects were complete but his misjudgements in 1939 forced Germany into war before rearmament was complete.{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=195}}

After the war, [[Albert Speer]] claimed that the German economy achieved greater armaments output not because of diversions of capacity from civilian to military industry but by streamlining of the economy. Overy pointed out some 23 percent of German output was military by 1939. Between 1937 and 1939, 70 percent of investment capital went into the rubber, synthetic fuel, aircraft and shipbuilding industries. [[Hermann Göring]] had consistently stated that the task of the [[Four Year Plan]] was to rearm Germany for total war. Hitler's correspondence with his economists also reveals that his intent was to wage war in 1943–1945, when the resources of central Europe had been absorbed into Nazi Germany.{{sfn|Overy|1995|pp=259, 263}}

Living standards were not high in the late 1930s. Consumption of consumer goods had fallen from 71 percent in 1928 to 59 percent in 1938. The demands of the war economy reduced the amount of spending in non-military sectors to satisfy the demand for the armed forces. On 9 September, Göring, as Head of the ''Reich Defense Council'', called for complete "employment" of living and fighting power of the national economy for the duration of the war. Overy presents that as evidence that a "blitzkrieg economy" did not exist.{{sfn|Overy|1995|pp=261, 265}}

Adam Tooze wrote that the German economy was being prepared for a long war. The expenditure for the war was extensive and put the economy under severe strain. The German leadership were concerned less with how to balance the civilian economy and the needs of civilian consumption but to figure out how to best prepare the economy for total war. Once war had begun, Hitler urged his economic experts to abandon caution and expend all available resources on the war effort, but the expansion plans only gradually gained momentum in 1941. Tooze wrote that the huge armament plans in the pre-war period did not indicate any clear-sighted blitzkrieg economy or strategy.{{sfn|Tooze|2006|pp=335, 338, 372}}

===''Heer''===
Frieser wrote that the {{lang|de|[[German Army (Wehrmacht)|Heer]]}} ({{IPA|de|ˈheːɐ̯}}){{efn|name=Heer}} was not ready for blitzkrieg at the start of the war. A blitzkrieg method called for a young, highly skilled mechanized army. In 1939–1940, 45 percent of the army was 40 years old and 50 percent of the soldiers had only a few weeks' training. The German Army, contrary to the blitzkrieg legend, was not fully motorized and had only 120,000 vehicles, compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorized forces. Thus, "the image of the German 'Blitzkrieg' army is a figment of propaganda imagination". During the First World War, the German army used 1.4 million horses for transport and in the Second World War 2.7 million horses. Only ten percent of the army was motorized in 1940.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|p=29}}

Half of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, but they were less well-equipped than the British and French or the Imperial German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern in which a small number of well-equipped and "elite" divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".{{sfn|Frieser|2005|pp=29–30, 33}} In 2003, John Mosier wrote that while the French soldiers in 1940 were better trained than German soldiers, as were the Americans later and that the German Army was the least mechanized of the major armies, its leadership cadres were larger and better and that the high standard of leadership was the main reason for the successes of the German army in World War II, as it had been in World War I.{{sfn|Mosier|2003|pp=284–288}}

===''Luftwaffe''===
[[James Corum]] wrote that it was a myth that the ''Luftwaffe'' had a doctrine of [[terror bombing]] in which civilians were attacked to break the will or aid the collapse of an enemy by the ''Luftwaffe'' in ''blitzkrieg'' operations. After the bombing of Guernica in 1937 and the [[Rotterdam Blitz]] in 1940, it was commonly assumed that terror bombing was a part of ''Luftwaffe'' doctrine. During the interwar period, the ''Luftwaffe'' leadership rejected the concept of terror bombing in favour of battlefield support and [[interdiction]] operations:{{sfn|Corum|1997|p=7}}

{{blockquote|The vital industries and transportation centers that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. Civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of the attacking the vital war industries – and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale – was ruled as acceptable.{{sfn|Corum|1997|p=240}}}}

Corum continued: [[General]] [[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]] compiled a doctrine known as ''The Conduct of the Aerial War''. This document, which the ''Luftwaffe'' adopted, rejected [[Giulio Douhet]]'s theory of terror bombing. Terror bombing was deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist. Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the ''Luftwaffe's'' main operations; destruction of the enemy armed forces. The bombings of Guernica, Rotterdam and [[Bombing of Warsaw in World War II|Warsaw]] were tactical missions in support of military operations and were not intended as strategic terror attacks.{{sfn|Corum|1997|pp=143–144, 146, 7}}

J. P. Harris wrote that most Luftwaffe leaders from Goering through the general staff believed, as did their counterparts in Britain and the United States, that strategic bombing was the chief mission of the air force and that given such a role, the Luftwaffe would win the next war and that

{{blockquote|Nearly all lectures concerned the strategic uses of airpower; virtually none discussed tactical co-operation with the Army. Similarly in the military journals, emphasis centred on 'strategic' bombing. The prestigious Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, the War Ministry's journal, which was founded in 1936, published a number of theoretical pieces on future developments in air warfare. Nearly all discussed the use of strategic airpower, some emphasising that aspect of air warfare to the exclusion of others. One author commented that European military powers were increasingly making the bomber force the heart of their airpower. The manoeuvrability and technical capability of the next generation of bombers would be 'as unstoppable as the flight of a shell.{{sfn|Harris|1995|p=346}}}}

The Luftwaffe ended up with an air force consisting mainly of relatively short-range aircraft, but that does not prove that the German air force was solely interested in "tactical" bombing. It happened because the German aircraft industry lacked the experience to build a long-range bomber fleet quickly and because Hitler was insistent on the very rapid creation of a numerically large force. It is also significant that Germany's position in the centre of Europe to a large extent obviated the need to make a clear distinction between bombers suitable only for "tactical" purposes and those necessary for strategic purposes in the early stages of a likely future war.{{sfn|Harris|1995|pp=346–347}}

===Fuller and Liddell Hart===
The British theorists [[John Frederick Charles Fuller]] and Captain [[Basil Henry Liddell Hart]] have often been associated with the development of blitzkrieg, but that is a matter of controversy. In recent years historians have uncovered that Liddell Hart distorted and falsified facts to make it appear as if his ideas has been adopted. After the war Liddell Hart imposed his own perceptions after the event by claiming that the mobile tank warfare has been practiced by the ''Wehrmacht'' was a result of his influence.{{sfn|Naveh|1997|p=108}} By manipulation and contrivance, Liddell Hart distorted the actual circumstances of the blitzkrieg formation, and he obscured its origins. By his indoctrinated idealization of an ostentatious concept, he reinforced the myth of blitzkrieg. Imposing retrospectively his own perceptions of mobile warfare upon the shallow concept of blitzkrieg, he "created a theoretical imbroglio that has taken 40 years to unravel".{{sfn|Naveh|1997|pp=108–109}} Blitzkrieg was not an official doctrine, and historians in recent times have come to the conclusion that it did not exist as such:{{efn|name=misconception of blitzkrieg}}

{{blockquote|It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success. In hindsight—and with some help from Liddell Hart—this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design.{{sfn|Paret|Craig|Gilbert|1986|p=585}}{{sfn|Naveh|1997|p=108}}}}

The early 1950s literature transformed blitzkrieg into a historical military doctrine, which carried the signature of Liddell Hart and Guderian. The main evidence of Liddell Hart's deceit and "tendentious" report of history can be found in his letters to [[Erich von Manstein]], Heinz Guderian, and the relatives and associates of [[Erwin Rommel]]. Liddell Hart, in letters to Guderian, "imposed his own fabricated version of blitzkrieg on the latter and compelled him to proclaim it as original formula".{{sfn|Naveh|1997|p=109}}{{sfn|Danchev|1998|p=239}} [[Kenneth Macksey]] found Liddell Hart's original letters to Guderian in the latter's papers. Liddell Hart requested Guderian to give him credit for "impressing him" with his ideas of armored warfare. When Liddell Hart was questioned about this in 1968 and the discrepancy between the English and German editions of Guderian's memoirs, "he gave a conveniently unhelpful though strictly truthful reply. ('There is nothing about the matter in my file of correspondence with Guderian himself except... that I thanked him... for what he said in that additional paragraph'.)".{{sfn|Danchev|1998|pp=235–239}}

During the First World War, Fuller had been a staff officer attached to the [[Royal Tank Regiment|new tank corps]]. He developed [[Plan 1919]] for massive independent tank operations, which he claimed were subsequently studied by the German military. It is variously argued that Fuller's wartime plans and post-war writings were inspirations or that his readership was low and German experiences during the war received more attention. The German view of themselves as the losers of the war may be linked to the senior and experienced officers' undertaking a thorough review in studying and rewriting of all of their Army doctrine and training manuals.{{sfn|Corum|1992|p=39}}

Fuller and Liddell Hart were "outsiders". Liddell Hart was unable to serve as a soldier after 1916 after being gassed on the Somme, and Fuller's abrasive personality resulted in his premature retirement in 1933.{{sfn|Harris|1995a|p=244}} Their views had limited impact in the British army; the War Office permitted the formation of an [[Experimental Mechanized Force]] on 1 May 1927, composed of tanks, motorized infantry, [[Birch gun|self-propelled artillery]] and motorized engineers but the force was disbanded in 1928 on the grounds that it had served its purpose. A new experimental brigade was intended for the next year and became a permanent formation in 1933, during the cuts of the {{nowrap|1932/33–1934/35}} financial years.{{sfn|Harris|1995a|pp=197, 210–219, 220–221, 237}}

===Continuity===
It has been argued that blitzkrieg was not new, and that the Germans did not invent something called blitzkrieg in the 1920s and 1930s.{{sfn|Citino|2005|p=311}}{{sfn|Frieser|2005|pp=326–328}} Rather, the German concept of wars of movement and concentrated force were seen in wars of [[Prussia]] and the [[Unification of Germany|German Wars of Unification]]. The first European general to introduce rapid movement, concentrated power and integrated military effort was Swedish King [[Gustavus Adolphus]] during the [[Thirty Years' War]]. The appearance of the aircraft and tank in the First World War, called an RMA, offered the German military a chance to get back to the traditional war of movement as practiced by [[Moltke the Elder]]. The so-called "blitzkrieg campaigns" of 1939 to around 1942 were well within that operational context.{{sfn|Citino|2005|p=311}}

At the outbreak of war, the German army had no radically new theory of war. The operational thinking of the German army had not changed significantly since the First World War or since the late 19th century. J. P. Harris and [[Robert M. Citino]] point out that the Germans had always had a marked preference for short decisive campaigns but were unable to achieve short-order victories in First World War conditions. The transformation from the stalemate of the First World War into tremendous initial operational and strategic success in the Second World War was partly the employment of a relatively-small number of mechanized divisions, most importantly the Panzer divisions, and the support of an exceptionally powerful [[air force]].{{sfn|Harris|1995|pp=344–345}}

===Guderian===
Heinz Guderian is widely regarded as being highly influential in developing the military methods of warfare used by Germany's tank men at the start of the Second World War. That style of warfare brought the maneuver back to the fore and placed an emphasis on the offensive. Along with the shockingly-rapid collapse in the armies that opposed it, that came to be branded as blitzkrieg warfare.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|p=7}}

After Germany's military reforms of the Guderian emerged as a strong proponent of mechanized forces. Within the Inspectorate of Transport Troops, Guderian and colleagues performed theoretical and field exercise work. Guderian met with opposition from some in the General Staff, who were distrustful of the new weapons and who continued to view the infantry as the primary weapon of the army. Among them, Guderian claimed, was Chief of the General Staff [[Ludwig Beck]] (1935–1938), who he alleged was skeptical that armored forces could be decisive. That claim has been disputed by later historians. James Corum wrote:

{{blockquote|Guderian expressed a hearty contempt for General Ludwig Beck, chief of the General Staff from 1935 to 1938, whom he characterized as hostile to ideas of modern mechanised warfare: [Corum quoting Guderian] "He [Beck] was a paralysing element wherever he appeared.... [S]ignificantly of his way of thought was his much-boosted method of fighting which he called delaying defence". This is a crude caricature of a highly competent general who authored Army Regulation 300 (Troop Leadership) in 1933, the primary tactical manual of the German Army in World War II, and under whose direction the first three panzer divisions were created in 1935, the largest such force in the world of the time.{{sfn|Corum|1992|pp=140–141}}}}

By Guderian's account, he single-handedly created the German tactical and operational methodology. Between 1922 and 1928 Guderian wrote a number of articles concerning military movement. As the ideas of making use of the combustible engine in a protected encasement to bring mobility back to warfare developed in the German army, Guderian was a leading proponent of the formations that would be used for this purpose. He was later asked to write an explanatory book, which was titled ''Achtung Panzer!'' (1937) in which he explained the theories of the tank men and defended them.

Guderian argued that the tank would be the decisive weapon of the next war. "If the tanks succeed, then victory follows", he wrote. In an article addressed to critics of tank warfare, he wrote that "until our critics can produce some new and better method of making a successful land attack other than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our beliefs that tanks—properly employed, needless to say—are today the best means available for land attack".

Addressing the faster rate at which defenders could reinforce an area than attackers could penetrate it during the First World War, Guderian wrote that "since reserve forces will now be motorized, the building up of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be; the chances of an offensive based on the timetable of artillery and infantry co-operation are, as a result, even slighter today than they were in the last war." He continued, "We believe that by attacking with tanks we can achieve a higher rate of movement than has been hitherto obtainable, and—what is perhaps even more important—that we can keep moving once a breakthrough has been made".{{sfn|Guderian|2001|pp=39–46}}{{efn|Guderian's remarks are from an unnamed article published in the National Union of German Officers, 15 October 1937 as quoted in ''Panzer Leader'', pp. 39–46.}} Guderian additionally required for tactical radios to be widely used to facilitate coordination and command by having one installed in all tanks.

Guderian's leadership was supported, fostered and institutionalized by his supporters in the Reichswehr General Staff system, which worked the Army to greater and greater levels of capability through massive and systematic Movement Warfare war games in the 1930s. Guderian's book incorporated the work of theorists such as [[Ludwig von Eimannsberger|Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger]], whose book, ''The Tank War'' (''Der Kampfwagenkrieg'') (1934) gained a wide audience in the German Army. Another German theorist, Ernst Volckheim, wrote a huge amount on tank and combined arms tactics and was influential to German thinking on the use of armored formations, but his work was not acknowledged in Guderian's writings.{{sfn|Corum|1992|p=139}}