Editing Bayesian inference (section)

===Bayesian epistemology===
[[Bayesian epistemology]] is a movement that advocates for Bayesian inference as a means of justifying the rules of inductive logic.

[[Karl Popper]] and [[David Miller (philosopher)|David Miller]] have rejected the idea of Bayesian rationalism, i.e. using Bayes rule to make epistemological inferences:<ref>{{cite book|first =David |last =Miller|title = Critical Rationalism|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=bh_yCgAAQBAJ|isbn = 978-0-8126-9197-9|year = 1994|publisher = Open Court|location = Chicago}}</ref> It is prone to the same [[vicious circle]] as any other [[justificationism|justificationist]] epistemology, because it presupposes what it attempts to justify. According to this view, a rational interpretation of Bayesian inference would see it merely as a probabilistic version of [[falsifiability|falsification]], rejecting the belief, commonly held by Bayesians, that high likelihood achieved by a series of Bayesian updates would prove the hypothesis beyond any reasonable doubt, or even with likelihood greater than 0.