Editing Balfour Declaration (section)

=== Evolution of British opinion ===

{{Quote box|width=256px|bgcolor=#c6dbf7|align=right|quote=
"It is said that the effect of the Balfour Declaration was to leave the Moslems and Christians dumbfounded&nbsp;... It is impossible to minimise the bitterness of the awakening. They considered that they were to be handed over to an oppression which they hated far more than the Turk's and were aghast at the thought of this domination&nbsp;... Prominent people openly talk of betrayal and that England has sold the country and received the price&nbsp;... Towards the Administration [the Zionists] adopted the attitude of "We want the Jewish State and we won't wait", and they did not hesitate to avail themselves of every means open to them in this country and abroad to force the hand of an Administration bound to respect the "Status Quo" and to commit it, and thereby future Administrations, to a policy not contemplated in the Balfour Declaration&nbsp;... What more natural than that [the Moslems and Christians] should fail to realise the immense difficulties the Administration was and is labouring under and come to the conclusion that the openly published demands of the Jews were to be granted and the guarantees in the Declaration were to become but a dead letter?"
| source=Report of the [[Palin Commission]], August 1920{{sfn|Palin Commission|1920|p=10}}
}}

The British policy as stated in the declaration was to face numerous challenges to its implementation in the following years. The first of these was the indirect peace negotiations which took place between Britain and the Ottomans in December 1917 and January 1918 during a pause in the hostilities for the rainy season;{{sfn|Grainger|2006|p=218}} although these peace talks were unsuccessful, archival records suggest that key members of the War Cabinet may have been willing to permit leaving Palestine under nominal Turkish sovereignty as part of an overall deal.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=347–360}}

In October 1919, almost a year after the end of the war, [[George Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston|Lord Curzon]] succeeded Balfour as Foreign Secretary. Curzon had been a member of the 1917 Cabinet that had approved the declaration, and according to British historian [[Sir David Gilmour, 4th Baronet|Sir David Gilmour]], Curzon had been "the only senior figure in the British government at the time who foresaw that its policy would lead to decades of Arab–Jewish hostility".{{sfn|Gilmour|1996|p=67}} He therefore determined to pursue a policy in line with its "narrower and more prudent rather than the wider interpretation".{{sfn|Gilmour|1996|p=66|ps=; Gilmour quotes: Curzon to Allenby, 16&nbsp;July 1920, CP&nbsp;112/799}} Following [[Bonar Law]]'s appointment as Prime Minister in late 1922, Curzon wrote to Law that he regarded the declaration as "the worst" of Britain's Middle East commitments and "a striking contradiction of our publicly declared principles".<ref>{{harvnb|Gilmour|1996|p=67}}; Gilmour quotes: Curzon to Bonar Law, 14&nbsp;December 1922, Bonar Law Papers, 111/12/46</ref>

In August 1920 the report of the [[Palin Commission]], the first in a long line of British [[Public inquiry|Commissions of Inquiry]] on the question of Palestine during the Mandate period,{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=35}} noted that "The Balfour Declaration&nbsp;... is undoubtedly the starting point of the whole trouble". The conclusion of the report, which was not published, mentioned the Balfour Declaration three times, stating that "the causes of the alienation and exasperation of the feelings of the population of Palestine" included:

* "inability to reconcile the Allies' declared policy of self-determination with the Balfour Declaration, giving rise to a sense of betrayal and intense anxiety for their future";{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=84}}
* "misapprehension of the true meaning of the Balfour Declaration and forgetfulness of the guarantees determined therein, due to the loose rhetoric of politicians and the exaggerated statements and writings of interested persons, chiefly Zionists";{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=84}} and
* "Zionist indiscretion and aggression since the Balfour Declaration aggravating such fears".{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=84}}

British public and government opinion became increasingly unfavourable to state support for Zionism; even Sykes had begun to change his views in late 1918.{{efn|Diplomat and Sykes's biographer, [[Shane Leslie]], wrote in 1923 of Sykes: "His last journey to Palestine had raised many doubts, which were not set at rest by a visit to Rome. To Cardinal Gasquet he admitted the change of his views on Zionism, and that he was determined to qualify, guide and, if possible, save the dangerous situation which was rapidly arising. If death had not been upon him it would not have been too late."{{sfn|Leslie|1923|p=284}}}} In February 1922 Churchill telegraphed Samuel, who had begun his role as High Commissioner for Palestine 18 months earlier, asking for cuts in expenditure and noting:{{Blockquote|In both Houses of Parliament there is growing movement of hostility, against Zionist policy in Palestine, which will be stimulated by recent [[Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe|Northcliffe]] articles.{{efn|group=qt|[[Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe|Viscount Northcliffe]], who owned ''The Times'', the ''Daily Mail'', and other publishing totalling around two fifths of the total British newspaper circulation, published a statement from Cairo on 15&nbsp;February 1922 (p.&nbsp;10) suggesting Palestine risked becoming a second Ireland. Further articles were published in ''The Times'' on 11&nbsp;April (p.&nbsp;5), 26&nbsp;April (p.&nbsp;15), 23&nbsp;June (p.&nbsp;17), 3&nbsp;July (p.&nbsp;15) and 25&nbsp;July (p.&nbsp;15){{sfn|Defries|2014|p=103}}}} I do not attach undue importance to this movement, but it is increasingly difficult to meet the argument that it is unfair to ask the British taxpayer, already overwhelmed with taxation, to bear the cost of imposing on Palestine an unpopular policy.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=57|ps=; &nbsp;Huneidi cites: CO 733/18, Churchill to Samuel, Telegram, Private and Personal, 25&nbsp;February 1922}}}}
Following the issuance of the Churchill White Paper in June 1922, the House of Lords rejected a Palestine Mandate that incorporated the Balfour Declaration by 60 votes to 25, following a motion issued by [[John Dickson-Poynder, 1st Baron Islington|Lord Islington]].{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=58}}<ref>[[Hansard]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1922/jun/21/palestine-mandate Palestine Mandate]: HL Deb 21 June 1922 vol 50 cc994-1033 (outcome of the vote cc1033 on next page)</ref> The vote proved to be only symbolic as it was subsequently overruled by a vote in the House of Commons following a tactical pivot and variety of promises made by Churchill.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=58}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|Churchill concluded the Commons debate with the following argument: "Palestine is all the more important to us&nbsp;... in view of the ever-growing significance of the Suez Canal; and I do not think £1,000,000 a year&nbsp;... would be too much for Great Britain to pay for the control and guardianship of this great historic land, and for keeping the word that she has given before all the nations of the world."<ref>[[Hansard]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1922/jul/04/colonial-office Colonial Office]: HC&nbsp;Deb 04&nbsp;July 1922 vol&nbsp;156 cc221–343 (outcome of the vote cc343)</ref> Mathew described Churchill's manoeuvre as follows: "...&nbsp;the judgment was overturned by a large majority in the Commons, a result not of a sudden opinion shift but of Churchill's skillful opportunism in turning at the last minute a general debate on funding for the colonies worldwide into a vote of confidence on the government's Palestine policy, emphasizing in his concluding remarks not a Zionist argument but imperial and strategic considerations.{{sfn|Mathew|2011|p=36}}}}

In February 1923, following the change in government, Cavendish, in a lengthy memorandum for the Cabinet, laid the foundation for a secret review of Palestine policy:

{{blockquote|It would be idle to pretend that the Zionist policy is other than an unpopular one. It has been bitterly attacked in Parliament and is still being fiercely assailed in certain sections of the press. The ostensible grounds of attack are threefold:(1) the alleged violation of the McMahon pledges; (2) the injustice of imposing upon a country a policy to which the great majority of its inhabitants are opposed; and (3) the financial burden upon the British taxpayer&nbsp;...{{sfn|Quigley|2011|p=269}}}}

His covering note asked for a statement of policy to be made as soon as possible and that the cabinet ought to focus on three questions: (1) whether or not pledges to the Arabs conflict with the Balfour declaration; (2) if not, whether the new government should continue the policy set down by the old government in the 1922 White Paper; and (3) if not, what alternative policy should be adopted.{{sfn|Huneidi|1998|p=33}}

[[Stanley Baldwin]], replacing Bonar Law as Prime Minister, in June 1923 set up a cabinet sub-committee whose terms of reference were:

{{blockquote|examine Palestine policy afresh and to advise the full Cabinet whether Britain should remain in Palestine and whether if she remained, the pro-Zionist policy should be continued.{{sfn|Cohen|2010|p=6}}}}

The Cabinet approved the report of this committee on 31 July 1923. Describing it as "nothing short of remarkable", Quigley noted that the government was admitting to itself that its support for Zionism had been prompted by considerations having nothing to do with the merits of Zionism or its consequences for Palestine.{{sfn|Quigley|2011|p=279}} As Huneidi noted, "wise or unwise, it is well nigh impossible for any government to extricate itself without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect, if not honour."{{sfn|Huneidi|1998|p=37}}

The wording of the declaration was thus incorporated into the British [[Mandate for Palestine]], a legal instrument that created Mandatory Palestine with an explicit purpose of putting the declaration into effect and was finally formalized in September 1923.{{sfn|Renton|2016|p=16}}{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|p=31}} Unlike the declaration itself, the Mandate was legally binding on the British government.{{sfn|Renton|2016|p=16}} In June 1924, Britain made its report to the Permanent Mandates Commission for the period July 1920 to the end of 1923 containing nothing of the candor reflected in the internal documents; the documents relating to the 1923 reappraisal stayed secret until the early 1970s.{{sfn|Quigley|2011|pp=280–2}}