Editing Suez Crisis (section)

=== Israel ===
On the eve of the invasion, [[David Ben-Gurion]] outlined to [[Guy Mollet]], the French Prime minister, his plan for a 'new order' in the Middle East. This consisted of (a) Israel occupying and annexing both the Gaza Strip and the Sinai;(b) an Israeli annexation of [[Southern Lebanon]], and the creation of a [[Maronites|Christian Maronite state]] in the remaining territory; (c) the dismantling of Jordan by dividing its land between Israel and Iraq, with Israel annexing the [[West Bank]] and Iraq undertaking in a peace treaty to absorb the Palestinian refugees in the former, and in Jordanian refugee camps. Aspiring also to overthrow Nasser, the plan foresaw Israeli exercising control over the [[Gulf of Aqaba]].<ref>[[Nur Masalha]], [https://www.jstor.org/stable/195819 The 1956-57 'Occupation of the Gaza Strip: Israeli Proposals to Resettle the Palestinian Refugees,'] [[British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies]], Vol. 23, No. 1  May 1996, pp. 55-68 p.57.</ref>

Israel wanted to reopen the [[Straits of Tiran]] leading to the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and saw the opportunity to strengthen its southern border and to weaken what it saw as a dangerous and hostile state. This was particularly felt in the form of attacks injuring approximately 1,300 civilians emanating from the Egyptian-held [[Gaza Strip]],<ref>Chaim Herzog and Shlomo Gazit, ''The Arab–Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the 1948 War of Independence to the Present'' (3rd ed. 2008) pp. 113–117</ref> during the period of [[Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956|Israel's Border Wars]]

The Israelis were also deeply troubled by Egypt's procurement of large amounts of Soviet weaponry that included 530 armoured vehicles, of which 230 were tanks; 500 guns; 150 [[MiG-15]] jet fighters; 50 [[Ilyushin Il-28]] bombers; submarines and other naval craft. The influx of this advanced weaponry altered an already shaky balance of power.{{Sfn|Schiff|1974|pp=65–66}} Israel was alarmed by the Czech arms deal, and believed it had only a narrow window of opportunity to hit Egypt's army.<ref name="Kandil2012p47">{{Cite book |last=Kandil |first=Hazem |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Y5ShC2rO40YC |title=Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt |date=13 November 2012 |publisher=Verso Books |isbn=978-1-8446-7962-1 |page=47 |quote=(Israel) "was alarmed by the Czech arms deal, and believed it had only a narrow window of opportunity to cripple Cairo's drive for military parity".}}</ref> Additionally, Israel believed Egypt had formed a secret alliance with Jordan and Syria.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Ben-Gurion Exchange with Soviet Premier Bulganin Regarding Threat to Israel (November 1956) |url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ben-gurion-exchange-with-soviet-premier-bulganin-regarding-threat-to-israel-november-1956 |access-date=2023-03-17 |website=Jewish Virtual Library}}</ref>

Notably, the strategic alignment of Israel and Britain leading up to the Suez invasion, as represented in the [[Protocol of Sèvres]], "marked the end of the estrangement between [[United Kingdom|Britain]] and the [[Zionist movement]] that went back to the [[White Paper of 1939]]."<ref>Khalidi, Rashid. ''The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–2017''. Ebook edition. London: Profile Books, 2020, 179.</ref>