Editing Space Shuttle (section)

==Space Shuttle program==
{{main|Space Shuttle program}}
The Space Shuttle flew from April 12, 1981,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–24}} until July 21, 2011.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–398}}  Throughout the program, the Space Shuttle had 135 missions,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–398}} of which 133 returned safely.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–80, 304}} Throughout its lifetime, the Space Shuttle was used to conduct scientific research,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–188}} deploy commercial,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–66}} military,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–68}} and scientific payloads,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–148}} and was involved in the construction and operation of [[Mir]]<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–216}} and the ISS.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–264}} During its tenure, the Space Shuttle served as the only U.S. vehicle to launch astronauts, of which there was no replacement until the launch of [[Crew Dragon Demo-2]] on May 30, 2020.<ref name="demo-2">{{cite web |last1=Finch |first1=Josh |last2=Schierholz |first2=Stephanie |last3=Herring |first3=Kyle |last4=Lewis |first4=Marie |last5=Huot |first5=Dan |last6=Dean |first6=Brandi |title=NASA Astronauts Launch from America in Historic Test Flight of SpaceX Crew Dragon |work=Release 20-057 |publisher=NASA |date=May 31, 2020 |url=https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-astronauts-launch-from-america-in-historic-test-flight-of-spacex-crew-dragon |access-date=June 10, 2020 |archive-date=August 20, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200820044825/https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-astronauts-launch-from-america-in-historic-test-flight-of-spacex-crew-dragon/ |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Budget===
The overall NASA budget of the Space Shuttle program has been estimated to be $221&nbsp;billion (in 2012 dollars).<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III−488}} The developers of the Space Shuttle advocated for reusability as a cost-saving measure, which resulted in higher development costs for presumed lower costs-per-launch. During the design of the Space Shuttle, the Phase B proposals were not as cheap as the initial Phase A estimates indicated; Space Shuttle program manager Robert Thompson acknowledged that reducing cost-per-pound was not the primary objective of the further design phases, as other technical requirements could not be met with the reduced costs.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III−489−490}} Development estimates made in 1972 projected a per-pound cost of payload as low as $1,109 (in 2012) per pound, but the actual payload costs, not to include the costs for the research and development of the Space Shuttle, were $37,207 (in 2012) per pound.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III−491}} Per-launch costs varied throughout the program and were dependent on the rate of flights as well as research, development, and investigation proceedings throughout the Space Shuttle program. In 1982, NASA published an estimate of $260&nbsp;million (in 2012) per flight, which was based on the prediction of 24 flights per year for a decade. The per-launch cost from 1995 to 2002, when the orbiters and ISS were not being constructed and there was no recovery work following a loss of crew, was $806&nbsp;million. NASA published a study in 1999 that concluded that costs were $576&nbsp;million (in 2012) if there were seven launches per year. In 2009, NASA determined that the cost of adding a single launch per year was $252&nbsp;million (in 2012), which indicated that much of the Space Shuttle program costs are for year-round personnel and operations that continued regardless of the launch rate. Accounting for the entire Space Shuttle program budget, the per-launch cost was $1.642&nbsp;billion (in 2012).<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III−490}}

===Disasters===
{{main|Space Shuttle Challenger disaster|Space Shuttle Columbia disaster}}

On January 28, 1986, [[STS-51-L]] disintegrated 73 seconds after launch, due to the failure of the right SRB, killing all seven astronauts on board ''Challenger''. The disaster was caused by the low-temperature impairment of an O-ring, a mission-critical seal used between segments of the SRB casing. Failure of the O-ring allowed hot combustion gases to escape from between the booster sections and burn through the adjacent ET, leading to a sequence of catastrophic events which caused the orbiter to disintegrate.<ref name=challenger_report>{{cite web|url=https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Rogers_Commission_Report_Vol1.pdf|last1=Rogers|first1=William P.|author-link1=William P. Rogers|last2=Armstrong|first2=Neil A.|author-link2=Neil A. Armstrong|last3=Acheson|first3=David C.|author-link3=David Campion Acheson|last4=Covert|first4=Eugene E.|author-link4=Eugene E. Covert|last5=Feynman|first5=Richard P.|author-link5=Richard Feynman|last6=Hotz|first6=Robert B.|last7=Kutyna|first7=Donald J.|author-link7=Donald J. Kutyna|last8=Ride|first8=Sally K|author-link8=Sally Ride|last9=Rummel|first9=Robert W.|last10=Sutter|first10=Joseph F.|author-link10=Joseph F. Sutter|last11=Walker|first11=Arthur B.C.|author-link11=Arthur B. C. Walker Jr.|last12=Wheelon|first12=Albert D.|last13=Yeager|first13=Charles E.|author-link13=Chuck Yeager|title=Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident|publisher=NASA|date=June 6, 1986|access-date=July 13, 2021|volume=1|archive-date=July 13, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210713081155/https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Rogers_Commission_Report_Vol1.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>{{rp|71}} Repeated warnings from design engineers voicing concerns about the lack of evidence of the O-rings' safety when the temperature was below {{convert|53|F|C}} had been ignored by NASA managers.<ref name=challenger_report />{{rp|148}}

On February 1, 2003, ''Columbia'' disintegrated during re-entry, killing all seven of the [[STS-107]] crew, because of damage to the [[Reinforced carbon-carbon|carbon-carbon]] leading edge of the wing caused during launch. Ground control engineers had made three separate requests for high-resolution images taken by the Department of Defense that would have provided an understanding of the extent of the damage, while NASA's chief TPS engineer requested that astronauts on board ''Columbia'' be allowed to leave the vehicle to inspect the damage. NASA managers intervened to stop the Department of Defense's imaging of the orbiter and refused the request for the spacewalk,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–323}}<ref name="century_of_flight_columbia">{{cite web |title=The Columbia Accident |publisher=Century of Flight |url=http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/space/Columbia%20accident.htm |access-date=May 28, 2019 |archive-date=September 26, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926220336/http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/space/Columbia%20accident.htm |url-status=live}}</ref> and thus the feasibility of scenarios for astronaut repair or rescue by ''Atlantis'' were not considered by NASA management at the time.<ref name="sts-107_timeline">{{cite web |url=https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Timelines/master_timeline.htm |title=NASA Columbia Master Timeline |date=March 10, 2003 |website=NASA |access-date=May 28, 2019 |archive-date=December 25, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171225231450/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Timelines/master_timeline.htm |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Criticism===
{{main|Criticism of the Space Shuttle program}}

The partial reusability of the Space Shuttle was one of the primary design requirements during its initial development.<ref name="dev_space_shuttle" />{{rp|164}} The technical decisions that dictated the orbiter's return and re-use reduced the per-launch payload capabilities. The original intention was to compensate for this lower payload by lowering the per-launch costs and a high launch frequency. However, the actual costs of a Space Shuttle launch were higher than initially predicted, and the Space Shuttle did not fly the intended 24 missions per year as initially predicted by NASA.<ref name="griffin">{{cite magazine |last=Griffin |first=Michael D. |title=Human Space Exploration: The Next 50 Years |magazine=Aviation Week |date=March 14, 2007 |url=https://aviationweek.typepad.com/space/2007/03/human_space_exp.html |access-date=June 15, 2020 |archive-date=August 7, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200807201318/https://aviationweek.typepad.com/space/2007/03/human_space_exp.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–489–490}}

The Space Shuttle was originally intended as a launch vehicle to deploy satellites, which it was primarily used for on the missions prior to the ''Challenger'' disaster. NASA's pricing, which was below cost, was lower than expendable launch vehicles; the intention was that the high volume of Space Shuttle missions would compensate for early financial losses. The improvement of expendable launch vehicles and the transition away from commercial payloads on the Space Shuttle resulted in expendable launch vehicles becoming the primary deployment option for satellites.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III–109–112}} A key customer for the Space Shuttle was the [[National Reconnaissance Office]] (NRO) responsible for spy satellites. The existence of NRO's connection was classified through 1993, and secret considerations of NRO payload requirements led to lack of transparency in the program. The proposed [[Shuttle-Centaur]] program, cancelled in the wake of the ''Challenger'' disaster, would have pushed the spacecraft beyond its operational capacity.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Cook |first1=Richard |title=Challenger Revealed: An Insider's Account of How the Reagan Administration Caused the Greatest Tragedy of the Space Ag |date=2007 |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=978-1560259800}}</ref>

The fatal ''Challenger'' and ''Columbia'' disasters demonstrated the safety risks of the Space Shuttle that could result in the loss of the crew. The spaceplane design of the orbiter limited the abort options, as the abort scenarios required the controlled flight of the orbiter to a runway or to allow the crew to egress individually, rather than the abort escape options on the [[Apollo (spacecraft)|Apollo]] and [[Soyuz (spacecraft)|Soyuz]] space capsules.<ref name="shuttle_safety_comparison">{{cite magazine |last=Klesius |first=Mike |title=Spaceflight Safety: Shuttle vs. Soyuz vs. Falcon 9 |magazine=[[Air & Space]] |date=March 31, 2010 |url=https://www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/spaceflight-safety-shuttle-vs-soyuz-vs-falcon-9-134341766/ |access-date=June 15, 2020 |archive-date=August 7, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200807105239/https://www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/spaceflight-safety-shuttle-vs-soyuz-vs-falcon-9-134341766/ |url-status=live}}</ref> Early safety analyses advertised by NASA engineers and management predicted the chance of a catastrophic failure resulting in the death of the crew as ranging from 1 in 100 launches to as rare as 1 in 100,000.<ref name="ieee_challenger">{{cite magazine |last1=Bell |first1=Trudy |last2=Esch |first2=Karl |title=The Challenger Disaster: A Case of Subjective Engineering |magazine=IEEE Spectrum |publisher=[[IEEE]] |date=January 28, 2016 |url=https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-space-shuttle-a-case-of-subjective-engineering |access-date=June 18, 2020 |archive-date=May 29, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190529071012/https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-history/heroic-failures/the-space-shuttle-a-case-of-subjective-engineering |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="feynman_appendix">{{cite web |last=Feynman |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Feynman |title=Appendix F – Personal observations on the reliability of the Shuttle |work=Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident |publisher=NASA |date=June 6, 1986 |url=https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Appendix-F.txt |access-date=June 18, 2020 |archive-date=August 7, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200807102802/https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Appendix-F.txt |url-status=live}}</ref> Following the loss of two Space Shuttle missions, the risks for the initial missions were reevaluated, and the chance of a catastrophic loss of the vehicle and crew was found to be as high as 1 in 9.<ref name="npr_safety">{{cite web |last1=Flatow |first1=Ira |last2=Hamlin |first2=Teri |last3=Canga |first3=Mike |title=Earlier Space Shuttle Flights Riskier Than Estimated |work=Talk of the Nation |publisher=[[NPR]] |date=March 4, 2011 |url=https://www.npr.org/2011/03/04/134265291/early-space-shuttle-flights-riskier-than-estimated |access-date=June 18, 2020 |archive-date=August 8, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200808054138/https://www.npr.org/2011/03/04/134265291/early-space-shuttle-flights-riskier-than-estimated |url-status=live}}</ref> NASA management was criticized afterwards for accepting increased risk to the crew in exchange for higher mission rates. Both the ''[[Rogers Commission Report|Challenger]]'' and ''[[Columbia Accident Investigation Board|Columbia]] '' reports explained that NASA culture had failed to keep the crew safe by not objectively evaluating the potential risks of the missions.<ref name="feynman_appendix" /><ref name="columbia_report">{{cite web |title=Columbia Accident Investigation Board |publisher=NASA |date=August 2003 |url=https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/CAIB_medres_full.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041109135216/http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/CAIB_medres_full.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=November 9, 2004 |access-date=June 18, 2020}}</ref>{{rp|195–203}}

=== Retirement ===
{{Main|Space Shuttle retirement}}
[[File:STS-135 Atlantis' final tow back.jpg|thumb|right|alt=Atlantis being towed back with some workers in the front after its final landing|''Atlantis'' after its final landing, marking the end of the Space Shuttle Program]]

The Space Shuttle retirement was announced in January 2004.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-347}}  President [[George W. Bush]] announced his [[Vision for Space Exploration]], which called for the retirement of the Space Shuttle once it completed construction of the ISS.<ref name="vision">{{cite web
 |title = The Vision for Space Exploration
 |publisher = NASA
 |date = February 2004
 |url = https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/55583main_vision_space_exploration2.pdf
 |access-date = July 6, 2020
|archive-date = January 11, 2012
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20120111212213/http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/55583main_vision_space_exploration2.pdf
 |url-status = live
}}</ref><ref name="bush_speech">{{cite web |last=Bush |first=George W. |author-link=George W. Bush |date=January 14, 2004 |title=President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration Program |url=https://history.nasa.gov/Bush%20SEP.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041018053912/https://history.nasa.gov/Bush%20SEP.htm |archive-date=October 18, 2004 |access-date=July 6, 2020 |publisher=NASA}}</ref> To ensure the ISS was properly assembled, the contributing partners determined the need for 16 remaining assembly missions in March 2006.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-349}} One additional Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission was approved in October 2006.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-352}} Originally, [[STS-134]] was to be the final Space Shuttle mission. However, the ''Columbia'' disaster resulted in additional orbiters being prepared for [[STS-3xx|launch on need]] in the event of a rescue mission. As ''Atlantis'' was prepared for the final launch-on-need mission, the decision was made in September 2010 that it would fly as [[STS-135]] with a four-person crew that could remain at the ISS in the event of an emergency.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-355}} STS-135 launched on July 8, 2011, and landed at the KSC on July 21, 2011, at 5:57&nbsp;a.m.&nbsp;EDT (09:57&nbsp;UTC).<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-398}} From then until the launch of [[SpaceX Dragon 2#Crew Dragon|Crew Dragon]] Demo-2 on May 30, 2020, the US launched its astronauts aboard Russian Soyuz spacecraft.<ref name="nytimes_crewdragon">{{cite web |last=Chang |first=Kenneth |title=SpaceX Lifts NASA Astronauts to Orbit, Launching New Era of Spaceflight |work=The New York Times |date=May 30, 2020 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/science/spacex-nasa-astronauts.html |access-date=July 5, 2020 |archive-date=August 10, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200810172446/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/science/spacex-nasa-astronauts.html |url-status=live}}</ref>

Following each orbiter's final flight, it was processed to make it safe for display. The OMS and RCS systems used presented the primary dangers due to their toxic [[hypergolic propellant]], and most of their components were permanently removed to prevent any dangerous outgassing.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-443}} ''Atlantis'' is on display at the [[Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex]] in Florida,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-456}} ''Discovery'' is on display at the [[Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center]] in Virginia,<ref name="jenkins2016" />{{rp|III-451}} ''Endeavour'' is on display at the [[California Science Center]] in Los Angeles,<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-457}} and ''Enterprise'' is displayed at the [[Intrepid Museum|''Intrepid'' Museum]] in New York.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-464}} Components from the orbiters were transferred to the US Air Force, ISS program, and Russian and Canadian governments. The engines were removed to be used on the [[Space Launch System]], and spare RS-25 nozzles were attached for display purposes.<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|III-445}}

For many [[Artemis program]] missions, the Space Launch System's two solid rocket boosters' engines and casings and four main engines and the [[Orion (spacecraft)|Orion spacecraft's]] main engine will all be previously flown Space Shuttle main engines, solid rocket boosters, and [[Orbital Maneuvering System]] engines. They are refurbished legacy engines from the Space Shuttle program, some of which even date back to the early 1980s. For example, [[Artemis I]] had components that flew on 83 of the 135 Space Shuttle missions. From Artemis I to [[Artemis IV]] recycled Shuttle main engines will be used before manufacturing new engines. From Artemis I to [[Artemis III]] recycled Shuttle solid rocket boosters' engines and steel casings are to be used before building new ones. From Artemis I to [[Artemis VI]] the Orion main engine will use six previously flown Space Shuttle OMS engines.<ref>http://www.collectspace.com/news/news-082422a-artemis-i-space-shuttle-hardware.html . Retrieved March 15, 2025.</ref><ref>https://www.nasa.gov/missions/artemis/orion/fired-up-engines-and-motors-put-artemis-mission-in-motion/ . Retrieved March 15, 2025.</ref><ref>https://www.nasa.gov/reference/sls-space-launch-system-solid-rocket-booster/ . Retrieved March 15, 2025.</ref>
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