Editing Neville Chamberlain (section)

== Legacy and reputation ==
[[File:Nevilleplaque.jpg|thumb|alt=Round blue plaque on a brick wall. It says "BIRMINGHAM CIVIC SOCIETY", "NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN M.P.", "LIVED NEAR HERE 1911–1940", "PRIME MINISTER 1937–1940".|[[Blue plaque]] honouring Chamberlain, Edgbaston, Birmingham]]

A few days before his death, Neville Chamberlain wrote,

{{blockquote| So far as my personal reputation is concerned, I am not in the least disturbed about it. The letters which I am still receiving in such vast quantities so unanimously dwell on the same point, namely without Munich the war would have been lost and the Empire destroyed in 1938&nbsp;... I do not feel the opposite view&nbsp;... has a chance of survival. Even if nothing further were to be published giving the true inside story of the past two years I should not fear the historian's verdict.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=449}}}}

''Guilty Men'' was not the only Second World War tract that damaged Chamberlain's reputation. ''We Were Not All Wrong'', published in 1941, took a similar tack to ''Guilty Men'', arguing that Liberal and Labour MPs, and a small number of Conservatives, had fought against Chamberlain's appeasement policies. The author, Liberal MP [[Geoffrey Mander]], had voted against conscription in 1939.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=116}} Another polemic against Conservative policies was ''Why Not Trust the Tories''<!-- No question mark in title --> (1944, written by "Gracchus", who was later revealed to be future Labour minister [[Aneurin Bevan]]), which castigated the Conservatives for the foreign policy decisions of Baldwin and Chamberlain. Though a few Conservatives offered their own versions of events, most notably MP [[Quintin Hogg, Baron Hailsham of St Marylebone|Quintin Hogg]] in his 1945 ''[[The Left Was Never Right]]'', by the end of the war, there was a very strong public belief that Chamberlain was culpable for serious diplomatic and military misjudgements that had nearly caused Britain's defeat.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=76–80}}

Chamberlain's reputation was devastated by these attacks from the left. In 1948, with the publication of ''The Gathering Storm'', the first volume of Churchill's six-volume set, ''The Second World War'', Chamberlain sustained an even more serious assault from the right. While Churchill stated privately, "this is not history, this is my case", his series was still hugely influential.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=105–06}} Churchill depicted Chamberlain as well-meaning but weak, blind to the threat posed by Hitler, and oblivious to the fact that (according to Churchill) Hitler could have been removed from power by a grand coalition of European states. Churchill suggested that the year's delay between Munich and war worsened Britain's position, and criticised Chamberlain for both peacetime and wartime decisions.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=108–09}} In the years following the publication of Churchill's books, few historians questioned his judgment.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=106}}

Anne Chamberlain, the former premier's widow, suggested that Churchill's work was filled with matters that "are not real misstatements that could easily be corrected, but wholesale omissions and assumptions that certain things are now recognised as facts which actually have no such position".{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=107}}

Many of Chamberlain's family letters and his extensive personal papers were bequeathed by his family in 1974 to the Birmingham University Archives.<ref>{{cite web|title=XNC – Papers of Neville Chamberlain. 1. Family correspondence and other papers. NC1/2 (Transcribed Chamberlain family letters)|url=http://calmview.bham.ac.uk/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=XNC%2f1%2f2 |publisher=National Archives – University of Birmingham|access-date= 15 February 2013|quote=The letters were transcribed in 1915 by Norah Kenrick [wife of Neville Chamberlain's cousin and friend, W. Byng Kenrick] from the original letters then in the possession of Clara Martineau [daughter of Chamberlain's uncle, Thomas Martineau].}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=NC13/17/197-237 XNC Papers of Neville Chamberlain|url=http://calmview.bham.ac.uk/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=XNC%2F13%2F17 |publisher=Birmingham University Archives|access-date=2 March 2013}}</ref> During the war, the Chamberlain family had commissioned historian [[Keith Feiling]] to produce an official biography, and gave him access to Chamberlain's private diaries and papers.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=133–36}} While Feiling had the right of access to official papers as the official biographer of a recently deceased person, he may not have been aware of the provision, and the [[Cabinet Secretary (United Kingdom)|Cabinet Secretary]] denied his requests for access.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=vii}}

Though Feiling produced what historian David Dutton described in 2001 as "the most impressive and persuasive single-volume biography" of Chamberlain (completed during the war and published in 1946), he could not repair the damage already done to Chamberlain's reputation.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=133–36}}

Conservative MP [[Iain Macleod]]'s 1961 biography of Chamberlain was the first major biography of a revisionist school of thought on Chamberlain. The same year, [[A. J. P. Taylor]], in his ''[[The Origins of the Second World War]]'', found that Chamberlain had adequately rearmed Britain for defence (though a rearmament designed to defeat Germany would have taken massive additional resources) and described Munich as "a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life&nbsp;... <nowiki>[and]</nowiki> for those who had courageously denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles".{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=143–44}}

The adoption of the "[[thirty-year rule]]" in 1967 made available many of the papers of the Chamberlain government over the subsequent three years, helping to explain why Chamberlain acted as he did.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=181}} The resultant works greatly fuelled the revisionist school, although they also included books that strongly criticised Chamberlain, such as [[Keith Middlemas]]'s 1972 ''Diplomacy of Illusion'' (which portrayed Chamberlain as a seasoned politician with strategic blindness when it came to Germany). Released papers indicated that, contrary to claims made in ''Guilty Men'', Chamberlain had neither ignored the advice of the Foreign Office nor had he disregarded and run roughshod over his Cabinet.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=157–61}} Other released papers showed that Chamberlain had considered seeking a grand coalition amongst European governments like that later advocated by Churchill, but had rejected it on the grounds that the division of Europe into two camps would make war more, not less likely.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=162–64}} They also showed that Chamberlain had been advised that the Dominions, pursuing independent foreign policies under the [[Statute of Westminster 1931|Statute of Westminster]], had indicated that Chamberlain could not depend on their help in the event of a Continental war.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=167–68}} The Chiefs of Staff report, which indicated that Britain could not forcibly prevent Germany from conquering Czechoslovakia, was first publicly known at this time.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=172}} In reaction to the revisionist school of thought regarding Chamberlain a post-revisionist school emerged beginning in the 1990s, using the released papers to justify the initial conclusions of ''Guilty Men''. Oxford historian [[R. A. C. Parker]] argued that Chamberlain could have forged a close alliance with France after the ''Anschluss'', in early 1938, and begun a policy of containment of Germany under the auspices of the [[League of Nations]]. While many revisionist writers had suggested that Chamberlain had had few or no choices in his actions, Parker argued that Chamberlain and his colleagues had chosen appeasement over other viable policies.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=182–84}} In his two volumes, ''Chamberlain and Appeasement'' (1993) and ''Churchill and Appeasement'' (2000), Parker stated that Chamberlain, due to his "powerful, obstinate personality" and his skill in debate, caused Britain to embrace appeasement instead of effective deterrence.{{sfn|Macklin|2006|pp=106–07}} Parker also suggested that had Churchill held high office in the second half of the 1930s Churchill would have built a series of alliances which would have deterred Hitler, and perhaps would have caused Hitler's domestic opponents to procure his removal.{{sfn|Macklin|2006|pp=106–07}}

Dutton observes that Chamberlain's reputation, for good or ill, will probably always be closely tied to evaluation of his policy toward Germany:

{{blockquote| Whatever else may be said of Chamberlain's public life his reputation will in the last resort depend upon assessments of this moment <nowiki>[Munich] and this policy [appeasement].</nowiki> This was the case when he left office in 1940 and it remains so sixty years later. To expect otherwise is rather like hoping that [[Pontius Pilate]] will one day be judged as a successful provincial administrator of the Roman Empire.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=7}}}}