Editing Nathan Bedford Forrest (section)

====Criticism====

Military historian Christopher Rein takes a dim view of Forrest. While agreeing that Forrest was a skilled cavalryman, perhaps the best on the Confederate side, and tactically shrewd, Rein points out that the latter quality was most evident only in smaller engagements such as the [[First Battle of Murfreesboro]], [[Battle of Brice's Crossroads|Brice's Crossroads]] and [[Battle of Parker's Cross Roads|Parker's Cross Roads]], victories that were strategically peripheral to the Confederate cause and often came through bluffery or at the expense of inferior enemy troops. Forrest's celebrated personal bravery, willingness to lead from the front and get "in the mix" may have earned him considerable admiration in his day from both sides in the war, Rein notes. But those virtues, he continues, are useful to armies when they are demonstrated by junior officers and enlisted men, not generals who must consider the larger picture, as Forrest failed to do when he led troops to [[Battle of Ebenezer Church|Ebenezer Church]] rather than prepare a more robust defense at [[Battle of Selma|Selma]], a loss that effectively ended the war as the Union destroyed the Confederacy's last manufacturing center.{{sfn|Rein|2022|p=61}}

As part of larger formations, writes Rein, Forrest's tendency to take the initiative and fight without consulting his superiors hurt the Confederacy more than once. His failures at Chickamauga left Bragg with a more ephemeral victory than he might have otherwise gained, at [[Battle of Tupelo|Tupelo]] he escaped but at the cost of his ability to mount serious raids on Sherman's supply lines, and [[Battle of Johnsonville|Johnsonville]], despite its overwhelming success, hurt the Confederacy as it led Hood to delay his advance into Tennessee, allowing Thomas to consolidate his defenses for the [[Battle of Nashville]], where Union victory ended the [[Army of Tennessee]] as a force to reckon with, and with it the Confederacy's [[Western Theater of the American Civil War|Western Theater]] campaign.{{sfn|Rein|2022|p=61}}

In the anthology ''The Worst Military Leaders in History'', Rein further contends that the glorification of Forrest and his tactical brilliance by his many defenders, many like him minimally educated U.S. military cadets from the South who have seen him as also exemplifying the Southern virtues celebrated by the [[Lost Cause of the Confederacy]] myth, has had longterm negative effects on U.S. military performance:{{sfn|Rein|2022|pp=63–64}}
{{blockquote|... [G]reat leadership is only one aspect of command. Forrest was certainly a skilled ''tactician'', but great commanders must have ''strategic'' vision, or some semblance of how their victories translate into successful ''operations'' (known as "operational art") and, ultimately, into strategic victory. Otherwise, the commander runs the risk of falling into the same traps set for American commanders in Vietnam or Iraq: winning an unbroken string of tactical victories but never translating those successes into the strategic conditions necessary for a decisive victory.}}