Editing Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (section)

===Postwar commentary on motives of Stalin and Hitler===
Some scholars believe that, from the very beginning of the Tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, the Soviets clearly required the other parties to agree to a Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,<ref name="Grogin"/> and for Finland to be included in the Soviet sphere of influence.<ref name="Scandinavia">{{cite book|last=Salmon|first=Patrick|title=Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940|year=2002|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}.</ref>

On the timing of German rapprochement, many historians agree that the dismissal of [[Maxim Litvinov]], whose Jewish ethnicity was viewed unfavourably by [[Nazi Germany]], removed an obstacle to negotiations with Germany.{{Sfn|Nekrich|Ulam|Freeze|1997|pp=109–10}}<ref>{{cite book|last=Israėli︠|first=Viktor Levonovich|title=On the Battlefields of the Cold War: A Soviet Ambassador's Confession|publisher=Penn State Press|year=2003|isbn=0-271-02297-3|page=10}}.</ref>{{Sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=480–1}}{{Sfn|Ulam|1989|p=508}}<ref name="Herf 2006 97–98">{{cite book|last=Herf|first=Jeffrey|title=The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust|url=https://archive.org/details/jewishenemynazip00herf_880|url-access=limited|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=2006|isbn=0-674-02175-4|pages=[https://archive.org/details/jewishenemynazip00herf_880/page/n107 97]–98}}.</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Osborn|first=Patrick R|title=Operation Pike: Britain Versus the Soviet Union, 1939–1941|publisher=Greenwood|year=2000|isbn=0-313-31368-7|page=xix}}.</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Levin|first=Nora|title=The Jews in the Soviet Union Since 1917: Paradox of Survival|publisher=NYU Press|year=1988|isbn=0-8147-5051-6|page=330|quote=[Litvinov] was referred to by the German radio as 'Litvinov-Finkelstein' – was dropped in favor of Vyascheslav Molotov. 'The eminent Jew', as Churchill put it, 'the target of German antagonism was flung aside{{nbsp}}... like a broken tool{{nbsp}}... The Jew Litvinov was gone and Hitler's dominant prejudice placated.'}}</ref>{{Sfn|Roberts|1992b|loc=Introduction|ps =: 'Perhaps the only thing that can be salvaged from the wreckage of the orthodox interpretation of Litvinov's dismissal is some notion that, by appointing Molotov foreign minister, Stalin was preparing for the contingency of a possible deal with Hitler. In view of Litvinov's Jewish heritage and his militant anti-Nazism, that is not an unreasonable supposition. But it is a hypothesis for which there is as yet no evidence. Moreover, we shall see that what evidence there is suggests that Stalin's decision was determined by a quite different set of circumstances and calculations.'}} Stalin immediately directed Molotov to "purge the ministry of Jews."{{Sfn|Resis|2000|p=35}}<ref name="Herf 2006 97–98"/><ref>{{cite book|last=Moss|first=Walter|title=A History of Russia: Since 1855|publisher=Anthem|year=2005|isbn=1-84331-034-1|page=283}}</ref> Given Litvinov's prior attempts to create an anti-fascist coalition, association with the doctrine of [[collective security]] with France and Britain and a pro-Western orientation<ref>{{cite book|last=Gorodetsky|first=Gabriel |title=Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1991: A Retrospective|publisher=Routledge|year=1994|isbn=0-7146-4506-0|page=55}}.</ref> by the standards of the Kremlin, his dismissal indicated the existence of a Soviet option of rapprochement with Germany.{{Sfn|Resis|2000|p=51}}{{Efn|According to Paul Flewers, Stalin's [[s:Author:Joseph Stalin|address]] to the eighteenth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 10 March 1939, discounted any idea of German designs on the Soviet Union. Stalin had intended: "To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them." This was intended to warn the Western powers that they could not necessarily rely upon the support of the Soviet Union.<ref name="What Next"/>}} Likewise, Molotov's appointment served as a signal to Germany that the Soviet Union was open to offers.{{Sfn|Resis|2000|p=51}} The dismissal also signaled to France and Britain the existence of a potential negotiation option with Germany.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|pp=696–8}}{{Sfn|Resis|2000|pp=33–56}} One British official wrote that Litvinov's termination also meant the loss of an admirable technician or shock-absorber but that Molotov's "modus operandi" was "more truly Bolshevik than diplomatic or cosmopolitan."{{Sfn|Watson|2000|p=699}} Carr argued that the Soviet Union's replacement of Litvinov with Molotov on 3 May 1939 indicated not an irrevocable shift towards alignment with Germany but rather was Stalin's way of engaging in hard bargaining with the British and the French by appointing a proverbial hard man to the Foreign Commissariat.{{sfn|Carr|1979|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=PgBsST4r9CQC&pg=PA129 129–130]}} Historian [[Albert Resis]] stated that the Litvinov dismissal gave the Soviets freedom to pursue faster German negotiations but that they did not abandon British–French talks.{{Sfn|Resis|2000|p=33|ps =: 'By replacing Litvinov with Molotov, Stalin significantly increased his options in foreign policy. Litvinov's dismissal served as a warning to London and Paris that Moscow had a third option-rapprochement with Germany. After Litvinov's dismissal, the pace of Soviet–German contacts quickened. This did not, however, mean that Moscow had abandoned the search for collective security, now exemplified by the Soviet draft triple alliance. Meanwhile, Molotov's appointment served as an additional signal to Berlin that Moscow was open to offers. The signal worked; the warning did not.'}} Derek Watson argued that Molotov could get the best deal with Britain and France because he was not encumbered with the baggage of collective security and could negotiate with Germany.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|pp=695–722|ps =: 'The choice of Molotov reflected not only the appointment of a nationalist and one of Stalin's leading lieutenants, a Russian who was not a Jew and who could negotiate with Nazi Germany, but also someone unencumbered with the baggage of collective security who could obtain the best deal with Britain and France, if they could be forced into an agreement.'}} [[Geoffrey Roberts]] argued that Litvinov's dismissal helped the Soviets with British–French talks because Litvinov doubted or maybe even opposed such discussions.{{Sfn|Roberts|1992b|pp=639–57|ps =: 'the foreign policy factor in Litvinov's downfall was the desire of Stalin and Molotov to take charge of foreign relations in order to pursue their policy of a triple alliance with Britain and France – a policy whose utility Litvinov doubted and may even have opposed or obstructed.'}}

[[E. H. Carr]] stated: "In return for 'non-intervention' Stalin secured a breathing space of immunity from German attack."{{sfn|Carr|1979|p=136}} According to Carr, the "bastion" created by means of the pact "was and could only be, a line of defense against potential German attack."{{sfn|Carr|1979|p={{page needed|date =August 2013}}}} According to Carr, an important advantage was that "if Soviet Russia had eventually to fight Hitler, the Western Powers would already be involved."{{sfn|Carr|1979|p={{page needed|date =August 2013}}}}{{sfn|Taylor|1961|pp=262–3}} However, during the last decades, that view has been disputed. Historian [[Werner Maser]] - who served the German army during the second World War<ref>{{cite journal|title=Werner Maser|journal=The New York Times|year=2007|page=60}}</ref> - stated that "the claim that the Soviet Union was at the time threatened by [[Hitler]], as Stalin supposed{{nbsp}}... is a legend, to whose creators Stalin himself belonged.{{sfn|Maser|1994|p=64}} In Maser's view, "neither Germany nor Japan were in a situation [of] invading the USSR even with the least perspective {{sic}} of success," which must not have been known to Stalin.{{sfn|Maser|1994|p=42}} Carr further stated that for a long time, the primary motive of Stalin's sudden change of course was assumed to be the fear of German aggressive intentions.{{Sfn|Carr|1949a|pp=3–17}} On the other hand, Soviet-born Australian historical writer Alex Ryvchin characterized the pact as "a Soviet deal with the devil, which contained a secret protocol providing for the remaining independent states of East-Central Europe to be treated as courses on some debauched degustation menu for two of the greatest monsters in history."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ryvchin |first=Alex |date=4 August 2022 |title=Understanding the Russo–Ukrainian War Through the Prism of Russian History |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2022.2105487 |journal=Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=184–187 |doi=10.1080/23739770.2022.2105487 |s2cid=251353823 |issn=2373-9770}}</ref>

Two weeks after [[Soviet occupation of Baltic states|Soviet armies had entered the Baltic states]], Berlin requested Finland to permit the transit of German troops, and five weeks later Hitler issued a secret directive "to take up the Russian problem, to think about war preparations," a war whose objective would include establishment of a Baltic confederation.<ref>{{cite book|first=Franz|last=Halder|author-link=Franz Halder|title=Generaloberst Halder. Kriegstagebuch|place=Stuttgart|year=1962|volume=II|pages=31–2}}.</ref>

A number of German historians have debunked the claim that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike, such as [[Andreas Hillgruber]], [[Rolf-Dieter Müller]], and [[Christian Hartmann (historian)|Christian Hartmann]], but they also acknowledge that the Soviets were aggressive to their neighbors.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hillgruber |first=Andreas |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5woxABMUOlIC |title=Germany and the Two World Wars |date=1981 |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=978-0-674-35322-0 |pages=86 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Hartmann |first=Christian |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1005849626 |title=Operation Barbarossa: Nazi Germany's War in the East, 1941-1945 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-19-870170-5 |location= |pages=24 |language=en |oclc=1005849626}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last1=Müller|first1=Rolf-Dieter|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/836636715|title=Hitler's war in the east, 1941-1945: a critical assessment|last2=Ueberschär|first2=Gerd R|date=2002|publisher=Berghahn|isbn=978-1-84545-501-9|location=New York|pages=39–40|language=en|oclc=836636715}}</ref>

According to Stalin's daughter, [[Svetlana Alliluyeva]] she "remembered her father saying after [the war]: 'Together with the Germans we would have been invincible'."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lukacs |first1=John |title=June 1941: Hitler and Stalin |date=2006 |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven London |isbn=0300123647 |page=160}}</ref>

Russian [[Trotskyism|Trotskyist]] historian, [[Vadim Rogovin]] argued that Stalin had destroyed thousands of foreign communists capable of leading socialist change in their respective countries. He referenced the thousands of German communists that were handed over from Stalin to the Gestapo after the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Rogovin also noted that sixteen members of the [[Central Committee]] of the [[German Communist Party]] became victims of Stalinist terror.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Rogovin |first1=Vadim Zakharovich |title=Was There an Alternative? Trotskyism: a Look Back Through the Years |date=2021 |publisher=Mehring Books |isbn=978-1-893638-97-6 |pages=380 |language=en}}</ref> Similarly, historian [[Eric D. Weitz]] discussed the areas of collaboration between the regimes in which hundreds of German citizens, the majority of whom were Communists, had been handed over to the Gestapo from Stalin's administration. Weitz also stated that a higher proportion of the KPD Politburo members had died in the Soviet Union than in Nazi Germany.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Weitz |first1=Eric D. |title=Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State |date=13 April 2021 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-22812-9 |page=280 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JOgSEAAAQBAJ&dq=stalin+handed+over+german+communists+gestapo&pg=PA280 |language=en |access-date=30 October 2023 |archive-date=6 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231106233635/https://books.google.com/books?id=JOgSEAAAQBAJ&dq=stalin+handed+over+german+communists+gestapo&pg=PA280 |url-status=live }}</ref> However, according to the work of [[Wilhelm Mensing]], there is no evidence which suggests that the Soviets specifically targeted German and Austrian Communists or others who perceived themselves as "anti-fascists" for deportations to Nazi Germany.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mensing |first=Wilhelm |date=2006 |title=Eine "Morgengabe" Stalins an den Paktfreund Hitler? Die Auslieferung deutscher Emigranten an das NS-Regime nach Abschluß des Hitler-Stalin-Pakts – eine zwischen den Diktatoren arrangierte Preisgabe von "Antifaschisten"? |url=https://zeitschrift-fsed.fu-berlin.de/index.php/zfsed/article/view/236 |journal=Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat |language=de |volume=20 |issue=20 |issn=0948-9878}}</ref>