Editing Iran–Iraq War (section)

===1983–84: Stalemate and war of attrition===

[[File:Map of the frontlines in the Iran-Iraq War.jpg|thumb|The furthest ground gains made by both sides during the war]]

After the failure of the 1982 summer offensives, Iran believed that a major effort along the entire breadth of the front would yield victory. In 1983, the Iranians launched five major assaults along the front. None achieved substantial success, as the Iranians staged more massive "human wave" attacks.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> By this time, it was estimated that no more than 70 Iranian fighter aircraft were still operational at any given time. Iran had its own helicopter repair facilities, left over from before the revolution, and often used helicopters for close air support.<ref name=cooper03_214 /><ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

Iranian fighter pilots had superior training compared to their Iraqi counterparts, as most had received training from US officers before the [[Iranian revolution|1979 revolution]],<ref>{{cite book|title=The Role of Airpower in the Iran–Iraq War|last=Bergquist|first=Ronald E.|publisher=Air University Press|year=1988|isbn=978-1-234-87718-7|location=Alabama|page=56}}</ref> and continued to dominate in combat.<ref>{{cite book|last=Razoux|first=Pierre|title=The Iran–Iraq War|year=2015|publisher=The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, MA|isbn=978-0-674-08863-4|pages=568–572}}</ref> However, aircraft shortages, the size of defended territory/airspace, and American intelligence supplied to Iraq allowed the Iraqis to exploit gaps in Iranian airspace. Iraqi air campaigns met little opposition, striking over half of Iran, as the Iraqis were able to gain air superiority towards the end of the war.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1988-06-01/iran-iraq-war-military-analysis|title=The Iran–Iraq War: A Military Analysis|journal=Foreign Affairs|date=28 January 2009|access-date=16 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181128193219/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1988-06-01/iran-iraq-war-military-analysis|archive-date=28 November 2018|url-status=live|last1=Segal|first1=David|volume=66|issue=Summer 1988}}</ref>

====Operation Before the Dawn====
In [[Operation Before the Dawn]], launched 6 February 1983, the Iranians shifted focus from the southern to the central and northern sectors. Employing 200,000 "last reserve" Revolutionary Guardsmen, Iran attacked along a {{convert|40|km|mi|abbr=on}} stretch near [[Al Amarah|al-Amarah, Iraq]], about {{convert|200|km|mi|abbr=on}} southeast of Baghdad, in an attempt to reach the highways connecting northern and southern Iraq. The attack was stalled by {{convert|60|km|mi|abbr=on}} of hilly escarpments, forests, and river torrents blanketing the way to al-Amarah, but the Iraqis could not force the Iranians back. Iran directed artillery on Basra, Al Amarah, and [[Mandali, Iraq|Mandali]].<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

The Iranians suffered a large number of casualties clearing minefields and breaching Iraqi [[anti-tank mine]]s, which Iraqi engineers were unable to replace. After this battle, Iran reduced its use of human wave attacks, though they still remained a key tactic as the war went on.<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 />

Further Iranian attacks were mounted in the Mandali–Baghdad north-central sector in April 1983, but were repelled by Iraqi mechanised and infantry divisions. Casualties were high, and by the end of 1983, an estimated 120,000 Iranians and 60,000 Iraqis had been killed. Iran held the advantage in the [[war of attrition]]. In 1983, Iran had an estimated population of 43.6 million to Iraq's 14.8 million, and the discrepancy continued to grow throughout the war.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />

====Dawn Operations====
From early 1983–1984, Iran launched a series of four ''Valfajr'' (Dawn) Operations, that eventually numbered to 10. During [[Operation Dawn (1983)|Operation Dawn-1]], in early February 1983, 50,000 Iranian forces attacked westward from Dezful and were confronted by 55,000 Iraqi forces. The Iranian objective was to cut off the road from Basra to Baghdad in the central sector. The Iraqis carried out 150 air sorties against the Iranians, and even bombed Dezful, Ahvaz, and Khorramshahr in retribution. The Iraqi counterattack was broken up by Iran's 92nd Armoured Division.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

[[File:These photograph was taken in 1984 by the Iraqis at Salahedin camp, near Takrit, Iraq.jpg|thumbnail|Iranian [[Prisoner of war|POWs]] in 1983 near [[Tikrit]], Iraq]]

During [[Operation Dawn 2|Operation Dawn-2]], the Iranians directed insurgency operations by [[proxy war|proxy]] in April 1983 by supporting the Kurds in the north. With Kurdish support, the Iranians attacked on 23 July 1983, capturing the Iraqi town of Haj Omran and maintaining it against an Iraqi poison gas counteroffensive.{{citation needed|date=June 2020}} This operation incited Iraq to later conduct indiscriminate chemical attacks against the Kurds.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" /> The Iranians attempted to further exploit activities in the north on 30 July 1983, during [[Operation Dawn-3]]. Iran saw an opportunity to sweep away Iraqi forces controlling the roads between the Iranian mountain border towns of Mehran, [[Dehloran]] and [[Elam]]. Iraq launched airstrikes, and equipped attack helicopters with chemical [[warhead]]s. While ineffective, it demonstrated both the Iraqi general staff's and Saddam's increasing interest in using chemical weapons. In the end, 17,000 had been killed on both sides,{{clarify|date=November 2012|reason=Total or on each side?}} with no gain for either country.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

The focus of [[Operation Dawn-4]] in September 1983 was the northern sector in Iranian Kurdistan. Three Iranian regular divisions, the Revolutionary Guard, and [[Kurdistan Democratic Party]] (KDP) elements amassed in [[Marivan]] and [[Sardasht, West Azerbaijan|Sardasht]] in a move to threaten the major Iraqi city [[Suleimaniyah]]. Iran's strategy was to press Kurdish tribes to occupy the Banjuin Valley, which was within {{convert|45|km|mi|abbr=on}} of Suleimaniyah and {{convert|140|km|mi|abbr=on}} from the oilfields of [[Kirkuk]]. To stem the tide, Iraq deployed [[Mi-8]] attack helicopters equipped with chemical weapons and executed 120 sorties against the Iranian force, which stopped them {{convert|15|km|mi|abbr=on}} into Iraqi territory.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

5,000 Iranians and 2,500 Iraqis died.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" /> Iran gained {{convert|110|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of its territory back in the north, gained {{convert|15|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of Iraqi land, and captured 1,800 Iraqi prisoners while Iraq abandoned large quantities of valuable weapons and war [[materiel]] in the field. Iraq responded to these losses by firing a series of SCUD-B missiles into the cities of Dezful, [[Masjid Soleiman]], and [[Behbehan]]. Iran's use of artillery against Basra while the battles in the north raged created multiple fronts, which effectively confused and wore down Iraq.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

====Iran's change in tactics====
Previously, the Iranians had outnumbered the Iraqis on the battlefield, but Iraq expanded their [[military draft]], pursuing a policy of total war, and by 1984, the armies were equal in size. By 1986, Iraq had twice as many soldiers as Iran. By 1988, Iraq had 1&nbsp;million soldiers, giving it the fourth largest army in the world. Some of its equipment, such as tanks, outnumbered Iran's by at least five to one. Iranian commanders, however, remained more tactically skilled.<ref name=pollack04 />

After the Dawn Operations, Iran attempted to change tactics. In the face of increasing Iraqi defence in depth, as well as increased [[armament]]s and manpower, Iran could no longer rely on simple human wave attacks.<ref name=wilson07>{{cite magazine|url=http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/PF-Iran-Iraq.pdf|title=The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran–Iraq War: When Dismounted Light Infantry Made the Difference|last=Wilson|first=Ben|date=July–August 2007|publisher=U.S. Army: Foreign Military Studies Office|magazine=Infantry|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029201227/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/PF-Iran-Iraq.pdf|archive-date=29 October 2013}}</ref> Iranian offensives became more complex and involved extensive manoeuvre warfare using primarily light infantry. Iran launched frequent, and sometimes smaller offensives to slowly gain ground and deplete the Iraqis through attrition.<ref name=wilson07 /> They wanted to drive Iraq into economic failure by wasting money on weapons and war mobilisation, and to deplete their smaller population by bleeding them dry, in addition to creating an anti-government [[insurgency]]. They were successful in Kurdistan, but not southern Iraq.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=wilson07 /><ref name="Dunn 1998" />

Iran supported their attacks with heavy weaponry when possible and with better planning, although the brunt of the battles still fell to the infantry. The Army and Revolutionary Guards worked together better as their tactics improved.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Human wave attacks became less frequent, although were still used. To negate the Iraqi advantage of defence in depth, static positions, and heavy firepower, Iran began to concentrate on areas where the Iraqis could not use their heavy weaponry, such as marshes, valleys, and mountains, and frequently using infiltration tactics.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

Iran began training troops in infiltration, patrolling, night-fighting, marsh warfare, and mountain warfare.<ref name=wilson07 /> They began training thousands of Revolutionary Guard [[commandos]] in [[amphibious warfare]],<ref name=csis8>{{cite book|chapter-url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap08.pdf|publisher=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]|title=The Lessons of Modern War&nbsp;– Volume II: Iran–Iraq War|chapter=Phase Five: New Iranian Efforts at "Final Offensives", 1986–1887|access-date=21 September 2012|archive-date=7 June 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130607125439/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap08.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> as southern Iraq is marshy and filled with wetlands. Iran used [[speedboats]] to cross the marshes and rivers in southern Iraq and landed troops on the opposing banks, where they would dig and set up [[pontoon bridge]]s across the rivers and wetlands to allow heavy troops and supplies to cross. Iran also learned to integrate foreign guerrilla units as part of their military operations. On the northern front, Iran began working heavily with the Peshmerga. Iranian military advisors organised the Kurds into raiding parties of 12 guerrillas, which would attack Iraqi command posts, troop formations, infrastructure (including roads and supply lines), and government buildings. The oil refineries of Kirkuk became a favourite target, and were often hit by homemade Peshmerga rockets.<ref name=wilson07 />

====Battle of the Marshes====
{{Main|Battle of the Marshes|Operation Dawn 5|Operation Dawn 6|Operation Kheibar}}

[[File:Murdered Iraqi POW 2.jpg|thumb|upright=1|An Iraqi POW who was shot by Iranian troops after they conquered the Iraqi Majnoon oil field in October 1984]]

By 1984, the Iranian ground forces were reorganised well enough for the Revolutionary Guard to start [[Operation Kheibar]],<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 /><ref name=cooper03_205 /> which lasted from 24 February to 19 March.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|171|date=November 2012}} On 15 February 1984, the Iranians began launching attacks against the central section of the front, where the Second Iraqi Army Corps was deployed: 250,000 Iraqis faced 250,000 Iranians.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The goal of this new major offensive was the capture of Basra-Baghdad Highway, cutting off Basra from Baghdad and setting the stage for an eventual attack upon the city. The Iraqi high command had assumed that the [[marshlands]] above Basra were natural barriers to attack, and had not reinforced them. The marshes negated Iraq's advantage in armour, and absorbed artillery rounds and bombs.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Prior to the attack, Iranian [[commandos]] on helicopters had landed behind Iraqi lines and destroyed Iraqi artillery. Iran launched two preliminary attacks prior to the main offensive, [[Operation Dawn 5]] and [[Operation Dawn 6|Dawn 6]].<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

[[Operation Kheibar]] began on 24 February with Iranian infantrymen crossing the [[Hawizeh Marshes]] using motorboats and transport helicopters in an [[amphibious assault]].<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> The Iranians attacked the vital oil-producing [[Majnoon Island]] by landing troops via helicopters onto the islands and severing communication between Amareh and Basra.<ref name=cooper03_205>{{cite web|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_205.shtml|author=Thomas Coper and Farzad Bishop|title=Persian Gulf War, 1980–1988: The Mother of All Build-Ups|date=9 September 2003|work=Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Database|publisher=Air Combat Information Group|access-date=9 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131115022800/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_205.shtml|archive-date=15 November 2013|url-status=usurped}}</ref> They then continued the attack towards [[al-Qurnah|Qurna]].<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> By 27 February, they had captured the island, but suffered catastrophic helicopter losses to the [[Iraqi Air Force|IrAF]]. On that day, a massive array of Iranian helicopters transporting Pasdaran troops were intercepted by Iraqi combat aircraft ([[Mikoyan|MiGs]], Mirages and Sukhois). In what was essentially an aerial slaughter, Iraqi jets shot down 49 of the 50 Iranian helicopters.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> At times, fighting took place in waters over {{convert|2|m|ft|abbr=on}} deep. Iraq ran live [[electrical cables]] through the water, electrocuting numerous Iranian troops and then displaying their corpses on state television.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

By 29 February, the Iranians had reached the outskirts of Qurna and were closing in on the [[Highway 8 (Iraq)|Baghdad–Basra highway]].<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> They had broken out of the marshes and returned to open terrain, where they were confronted by Iraqi artillery, tanks, air power, and [[mustard gas]]. 1,200 Iranian soldiers were killed in the counter-attack. The Iranians retreated back to the marshes, though they still held onto them along with Majnoon Island.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|44}}

[[File:152 mm howitzer D-20 belong to Military of Iran.jpg|thumb|Iranians firing a 152mm D-20 howitzer]]
The Battle of the Marshes saw an Iraqi defence that had been under continuous strain since 15 February. They were relieved by their use of chemical weapons and [[Defence in depth|defence-in-depth]], where they layered defensive lines: even if the Iranians broke through the first line, they were usually unable to break through the second due to exhaustion and heavy losses.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|171|date=November 2012}} They largely relied on [[Mi-24]] Hind to "hunt" the Iranians in the marshes.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> At least 20,000 Iranians were killed in the marsh battles.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" /> Iran used the marshes as a springboard for future attacks/infiltrations.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

Four years into the war, the human cost to Iran had been 170,000 combat fatalities and 340,000 wounded. Iraqi combat fatalities were estimated at 80,000 with 150,000 wounded.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

{{anchor|1984: 'Tanker War' in Persian Gulf|Persian Gulf tanker war}}