Editing Hafez al-Assad (section)

==== Planning ====
[[File:Hafez Assad during Yom Kippur War aganist Israel.jpg|thumb|248x248px|Assad and his generals planning the war.]]
Since the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, Assad was convinced that the Israelis had won the war by subterfuge;{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}} after gaining power, his top foreign-policy priority was to regain the Arab territory lost in the war.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}} Assad reaffirmed Syria's rejection of the 1967 [[UN Security Council Resolution 242]] because he believed it stood for the "liquidation of the [[Palestinian nationalism|Palestine question]]".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}} He believed, and continued to believe until long into his rule, that the only way to get Israel to negotiate with the Arabs was through war.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}}

When Assad took power, Syria was isolated;{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}} planning an attack on Israel, he sought allies and war material.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=186}} Ten weeks after gaining power, Assad visited the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=186}} The Soviet leadership was wary of supplying the Syrian government, viewing Assad's rise to power with a reserve and believing him to lean further West than Jadid did.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=187}} While he soon understood that the Soviet relationship with the Arabs would never be as deep as the United States' relationship with Israel, he needed its weapons.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=187}} Unlike his predecessors (who tried to win Soviet support with socialist policies), Assad was willing to give the Soviets a stable presence in the Middle East through Syria, access to Syrian naval bases (giving them a role in the peace process) and help in curtailing American influence in the region.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=187}} The Soviets responded by sending arms to Syria.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=187}} The new relationship bore fruit, and between February 1971 and October 1973 Assad met several times with [[List of leaders of the Soviet Union|Soviet leader]] [[Leonid Brezhnev]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=188}}
[[File:Hafez Assad with a Syrian soldier on the Golan Heights during October war in 1973.jpg|left|thumb|253x253px|Assad visits positions of the Syrian army.]]
Assad believed that Syria would have no chance in a war against Israel without Egyptian participation.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} He believed that if the [[United Arab Republic]] had not collapsed, the Arabs would already have liberated Palestine.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} For a war against Israel, Syria needed to establish another front.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} However, by this time Syria's relations with Egypt and Jordan were shaky at best.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} Planning for war began in 1971 with an agreement between Assad and [[Anwar Sadat]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} In the beginning, the renewed Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based upon the proposed [[Federation of Arab Republics]] (FAR), a federation initially encompassing Egypt, Libya, Sudan (which left soon after FAR's first summit) and Syria.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=190}} Assad and Sadat used the FAR summits to plan war strategy, and by 1971 they had appointed Egyptian General Muhammad Sadiq supreme commander of both armies.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=192}} From 1972 to 1973, the countries filled their arsenals and trained their armies.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=192}} In a secret meeting of the Egyptian–Syrian Military Council from 21 to 23 August 1973, the two chiefs of staff (Syrian Youssef Chakkour and Egyptian [[Saad el-Shazly]]) signed a document declaring their intention to go to war against Israel.{{sfn|Seale|1990|pp=193–194}} During a meeting of Assad, Sadat and their respective defense ministers (Tlass and [[Hosni Mubarak]]) on 26–27 August, the two leaders decided to go to war together.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=194}}

Egypt went to war for a reason different from Syria's.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=195}} While Assad wanted to regain lost Arab territory, Sadat wished to strengthen Egypt's position in its peace policy toward Israel.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=195}} The Syrians were deceived by Sadat and the Egyptians, which would play a major role in the Arab defeat.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=197}} Egyptian Chief of Staff Shazly was convinced from the beginning that Egypt could not mount a successful full-scale offensive against Israel; therefore, he campaigned for a limited war.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=197}} Sadat knew that Assad would not participate in the war if he knew his real intentions.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=197}} Since the collapse of the UAR, the Egyptians were critical of the Ba'athist government; they saw it as an untrustworthy ally.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=197}}