Editing Franco-Prussian War (section)

==Aftermath==

===Analysis===
[[File:Christian Sell Winterfeldzug 1870.jpg|thumb|German [[uhlans]] and an infantryman escorting captured French soldiers]]
[[File:Yves & Barret L'Europe en ce Moment 1872 Cornell CUL PJM 2082 01.jpg|thumb|Europe at This Moment (1872) – A Political-Geographic Fantasy: An elaborate satirical map reflecting the European situation following the Franco-Prussian war. France had suffered a crushing defeat: the loss of Alsace and parts of Lorraine; The map contains satirical comments on 14 countries]]
The quick German victory over the French stunned neutral observers, many of whom had expected a French victory and a long war. The strategic advantages the Germans had were not appreciated outside Germany until after hostilities had ceased. Other countries quickly discerned the advantages given to the Germans by their military system, and adopted many of their innovations, particularly the [[general staff]], universal conscription, and highly detailed mobilization systems.{{sfn|van Creveld|1977|p=96}}

The Prussian General Staff developed by Moltke proved to be extremely effective, in contrast to the traditional French school. This was in large part because the Prussian General Staff was created to study previous Prussian operations and learn to avoid mistakes. The structure also greatly strengthened Moltke's ability to control large formations spread out over significant distances.{{sfn|Howard|1991|p=23}} The Chief of the General Staff, effectively the commander in chief of the Prussian army, was independent of the minister of war and answered only to the monarch.{{sfn|Irvine|1938|p=192}} The French General Staff—along with those of every other European military—was little better than a collection of assistants for the line commanders. This disorganization hampered the French commanders' ability to [[command and control|exercise control]] of their forces.{{sfn|Howard|1991|pp=23–24}}

In addition, the Prussian military education system was superior to the French model; Prussian staff officers were trained to [[auftragstaktik|exhibit initiative and independent thinking]]. Indeed, this was Moltke's expectation.{{sfn|Holborn|1942|p=159}} The French, meanwhile, suffered from an education and promotion system that stifled intellectual development. According to the military historian Dallas Irvine, the system: {{blockquote|was almost completely effective in excluding the army's brain power from the staff and high command. To the resulting lack of intelligence at the top can be ascribed all the inexcusable defects of French military policy.{{sfn|Irvine|1938|p=192}}}}

[[Albrecht von Roon]], the [[Prussian Minister of War]] from 1859 to 1873, put into effect a series of reforms of the Prussian military system in the 1860s. Among these were two major reforms that substantially increased the military power of Germany. The first was a reorganization of the army that integrated the regular army and the ''[[Landwehr]]'' reserves.{{sfn|Howard|1991|pp=19–20}} The second was the provision for the [[conscription]] of every male Prussian of military age in the event of mobilization.{{sfn|Howard|1991|p=21}} Thus, although the population of France was greater than the population of all of the Northern German states that participated in the war, the Germans mobilized more soldiers for battle.

{| class="wikitable"
|+ Population and soldiers mobilized at the start of the war
!
! scope="col" | Population in 1870
! scope="col" | Mobilized
|-
| {{flag|Second French Empire}}
|align="right"|38,000,000
|align="right"|500,000
|-
| {{flag|North German Confederation}}
|align="right"|32,000,000
|align="right"|550,000
|}

At the start of the Franco-Prussian War, 462,000 German soldiers concentrated on the French frontier while only 270,000 French soldiers could be moved to face them, the French army having lost 100,000 stragglers before a shot was fired, through poor planning and administration.{{sfn|McElwee|1974|p=46}} This was partly due to the peacetime organisations of the armies. Each Prussian Corps was based within a ''Kreis'' (literally "circle") around the chief city in an area. Reservists rarely lived more than a day's travel from their regiment's depot. By contrast, French regiments generally served far from their depots, which in turn were not in the areas of France from which their soldiers were drawn. Reservists often faced several days' journey to report to their depots, and then another long journey to join their regiments. Large numbers of reservists choked railway stations, vainly seeking rations and orders.{{sfn|Howard|1991|p=68}}

The effect of these differences was accentuated by the peacetime preparations. The Prussian General Staff had drawn up minutely detailed [[mobilization]] plans using the railway system, which in turn had been partly laid out in response to recommendations of a Railway Section within the General Staff. The French railway system, with competing companies, had developed purely from commercial pressures and many journeys to the front in Alsace and Lorraine involved long diversions and frequent changes between trains. There was no system of military control of the railways and officers simply commandeered trains as they saw fit. Rail [[Siding (rail)|sidings]] and [[marshalling yard]]s became choked with loaded wagons, with nobody responsible for unloading them or directing them to the destination.{{sfn|Howard|1991|pp=70–71}}

France also suffered from an outdated tactical system. Although referred to as "[[Napoleon]]ic tactics", this system was developed by [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]] during his time in Russia. Surrounded by a rigid aristocracy with a "Sacred Social Order" mentality, Jomini's system was equally rigid and inflexible. His system simplified several formations that were meant for an entire army, using battalions as the building blocks. His system was simple, but only strong enough to attack in one direction. The system was adopted by the [[House of Bourbon|Bourbons]] to prevent a repeat of when Napoleon I had returned to France, and Napoleon III retained the system upon his ascension to power (hence why they became associated with his family name). The Prussians in contrast did not use battalions as their basic tactical unit, and their system was much more flexible. Companies were formed into columns and attacked in parallel, rather than as a homogeneous battalion-sized block. Attacking in parallel allowed each company to choose its own axis of advance and make the most of local cover. It also permitted the Prussians to fire at oblique angles, raking the French lines with rifle fire. Thus, even though the Prussians had inferior rifles, they still inflicted more casualties with rifle fire than the French, with 53,900 French killed by the Dreyse (70% of their war casualties) versus 25,475 Germans killed by the Chassepot (96% of their war casualties).{{Citation needed|date=November 2023}}

Although [[Austria-Hungary]] and [[Denmark]] had both wished to avenge their recent military defeats against Prussia, they chose not to intervene in the war due to a lack of confidence in the French. These countries did not have a documented alliance with France, and they were too late to start a war. After the rapid and stunning victories of Prussia, they preferred to abandon any plans to intervene in the war altogether. Napoleon III also failed to cultivate alliances with the [[Russian Empire]] and the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]], partially due to the diplomatic efforts of the Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck had bought Tsar Alexander II's complicity by promising to help restore his naval access to the Black Sea and Mediterranean (cut off by the treaties ending the Crimean War), other powers were less biddable.{{Sfn|Wawro|2003|p=238}} "Seizing upon the distraction of the Franco-Prussian War, Russia in November 1870 had begun rebuilding its naval bases in the Black Sea, a clear violation of the treaty that had ended the [[Crimean War]] fourteen years earlier".{{Sfn|Wawro|2003|p=290}} After the peace of Frankfurt in 1871, a rapprochement between France and Russia was born. "Instead of forging ties with Russia in the east and further crippling France in the west, Bismarck's miscalculation had opened the door to future relations between Paris and St. Petersburg. The culmination of this new relationship will finally be the [[Franco-Russian Alliance|Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894]]; an alliance that explicitly refers to the perceived threat of Germany and its military response".<ref>Chris Kempshall, ''British, French and American Relations on the Western Front, 1914–1918'', Canterbury, Kent, UK, 2018, (ISBN 978-3-319-89464-5), p. 31.</ref>

The United Kingdom saw nothing wrong with the strengthening of Prussia on the European continent, viewing France as its traditional rival in international affairs. [[Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston|Lord Palmerston]], the head of the British cabinet in 1865, wrote: "The current Prussia is too weak to be honest and independent in its actions. And, taking into account the interests of the future, it is highly desirable for Germany as a whole became strong, so she was able to keep the ambitious and warlike nation, France, and Russia, which compress it from the West and the East".<ref>Jasper Ridley, ''Lord Palmerston'' (1970), p. 582</ref> English historians criticize the then British policy, pointing out that Palmerston misunderstood Bismarck's policy due to his adherence to outdated ideas.<ref>William Baring Pemberton, ''Lord Palmerston'' (Batchworth Press, 1954) p.  332</ref> Over time, Britain began to understand that the military defeat of France meant a radical change in the European balance of power. In the future, the development of historical events is characterized by a gradual increase in Anglo-German contradictions. "The colonial quarrels, [[Anglo-German naval arms race|naval rivalry]] and disagreement over the European balance of power which drove Britain and Germany apart, were in effect the strategical and geopolitical manifestations of the relative shift in the economic power of these two countries between 1860 and 1914".<ref>Paul M. Kennedy. ''The rise of the Anglo-German antagonism, 1860–1914''. London; Boston : Allen & Unwin. 1980. p. 410.</ref>

After the Peace of Prague in 1866, the nominally independent German states of Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt (the southern part that was not included in the North German Union) remained. Despite the fact that there was a strong opposition to Prussia in the ruling circles and in the war of 1866 they participated on the side of Austria against Prussia, they were forced to reckon with a broad popular movement in favor of German unity and were also afraid of angering their strong neighbor in the form of Prussia. After the diplomatic provocation in Bad Ems, these states had no room for maneuver, the war was presented by Bismarck as a war for national independence against an external enemy. All these states joined the Prussian war from the very beginning of hostilities. In January 1871, these states became part of the German Empire.

The French [[breech-loading rifle]], the [[Chassepot]], had a longer range than the German needle gun; {{convert|1400|m|yd}} compared to {{convert|550|m|yd|abbr=on}}. The French also had an early machine-gun type weapon, the [[mitrailleuse]], which could fire its thirty-seven barrels at a range of around {{convert|1100|m|yd|abbr=on}}.{{sfn|Wawro|2003|pp=52–53}} It was developed in such secrecy that little training with the weapon had occurred, leaving French gunners with little experience; the gun was treated like artillery and in this role it was ineffective. Worse still, once the small number of soldiers who had been trained how to use the new weapon became casualties, there were no replacements who knew how to operate the mitrailleuse.{{sfn|Bailey|2004|p=217}}

The French were equipped with bronze, rifled [[muzzle-loading]] artillery, while the Prussians used new steel breech-loading guns, which had a far longer range and a faster rate of fire.{{sfn|Howard|1991|pp=35–36}} Prussian gunners strove for a high rate of fire, which was discouraged in the French army in the belief that it wasted ammunition. In addition, the Prussian artillery batteries had 30% more guns than their French counterparts (8 guns per Prussian battery compared to 6 French guns). The Prussian guns typically opened fire at a range of {{convert|2|–|3|km|mi}}, beyond the range of French artillery or the Chassepot rifle. The Prussian batteries could thus destroy French artillery with impunity, before being moved forward to directly support infantry attacks.{{sfn|Bailey|2004|pp=216–217}} The Germans fired 30,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 362,662 field artillery rounds.{{sfn|German General Staff|1884|p=195}}

===Effects on military thought===
The events of the Franco-Prussian War had great influence on military thinking over the next forty years. Lessons drawn from the war included the need for a general staff system, the scale and duration of future wars and the tactical use of artillery and cavalry. The bold use of artillery by the Prussians, to silence French guns at long range and then to directly support infantry attacks at close range, proved to be superior to the defensive doctrine employed by French gunners. Likewise, the war showed that breech-loading cannons were superior to muzzle-loaded cannons, just as the [[Austro-Prussian War]] of 1866 had demonstrated for rifles. The Prussian tactics and designs were adopted by European armies by 1914, exemplified in the [[Canon de 75 modèle 1897|French 75]], an artillery piece optimised to provide direct fire support to advancing infantry. Most European armies ignored the evidence of the [[Russo-Japanese War]] of {{nowrap|1904–1905}} which suggested that infantry armed with new smokeless-powder rifles could engage gun crews effectively in the open. This forced gunners to fire at longer range using [[indirect fire]], usually from a position of cover.{{sfn|Bailey|2004|pp=218–219}} The heavy use of fortifications and dugouts in the Russo-Japanese war also greatly undermined the usefulness of field artillery which was not designed for indirect fire.

At the [[Battle of Mars-la-Tour|Battle of Mars-La-Tour]], the Prussian 12th Cavalry Brigade, commanded by General [[Adalbert von Bredow]], conducted a charge against a French artillery battery. The attack was a costly success and came to be known as "von Bredow's Death Ride", but which nevertheless was held to prove that cavalry charges could still prevail on the battlefield. Use of traditional cavalry on the battlefields of 1914 proved to be disastrous, due to accurate, long-range rifle fire, machine-guns and artillery.{{sfn|Howard|1979|pp=156–157}} Bredow's attack had succeeded only because of an unusually effective artillery bombardment just before the charge, along with favorable terrain that masked his approach.{{sfn|Bailey|2004|p=218}}{{sfn|Howard|1979|pp=156–157}}

A third influence was the effect on notions of entrenchment and its limitations. While the American Civil War had famously involved entrenchment in the final years of the war, the Prussian system had overwhelmed French attempts to use similar tactics. With Prussian tactics seeming to make entrenchment and prolonged offensive campaigns ineffective, the experience of the American Civil War was seen as that of a musket war, not a rifle war.{{Citation needed|date=November 2023}} Many European armies were convinced of the viability of the "[[cult of the offensive]]" because of this, and focused their attention on aggressive bayonet charges over infantry fire. These would needlessly expose men to artillery fire in 1914, and entrenchment would return with a vengeance.{{Citation needed|date=November 2023}}

===Casualties===
The Germans deployed a total of 33,101 officers and 1,113,254 men into France, of whom they lost 1,046 officers and 16,539 enlisted men killed in action. Another 671 officers and 10,050 men died of their wounds, for total battle deaths of 28,306. Disease killed 207 officers and 11,940 men, with [[typhoid]] accounting for 6,965. 4,009 were missing and presumed dead; 290 died in accidents and 29 committed suicide. Among the missing and captured were 103 officers and 10,026 men. The wounded amounted to 3,725 officers and 86,007 men.{{sfn|Clodfelter|2017|p=187}}

French battle deaths were 77,000, of which 41,000 were killed in action and 36,000 died of wounds. More than 45,000 died of sickness. Total deaths were 138,871, with 136,540 being suffered by the army and 2,331 by the navy. The wounded totaled 137,626; 131,000 for the army and 6,526 for the navy. French prisoners of war numbered 383,860. In addition, 90,192 French soldiers were interned in Switzerland and 6,300 in Belgium.{{sfn|Clodfelter|2017|p=187}}

During the war the [[International Committee of the Red Cross]] (ICRC) established an international tracing agency in [[Basel]] for prisoners of that war. The holdings of the "Basel Agency" were later transferred to the ICRC headquarters in [[Geneva]] and integrated into the [[International Committee of the Red Cross archives|ICRC archives]], where they are accessible today.<ref>{{Cite web |date=30 April 2016 |title=Agency Archives |url=https://blogs.icrc.org/cross-files/individual-archives/ |access-date=28 July 2020 |website=International Committee of the Red Cross – CROSS-files}}</ref>