Editing Crime (section)

== Criminal justice ==
{{Main|Criminal justice|Crime prevention}}
{{Criminology and penology}}

=== Natural-law theory ===
Justifying the state's use of [[coercion|force]] to coerce compliance with its laws has proven a consistent theoretical problem. One of the earliest justifications involved the theory of [[natural law]]. This posits that the nature of the world or of human beings underlies the standards of [[morality]] or constructs them. [[Thomas Aquinas]] wrote in the 13th century: "the rule and measure of human acts is the [[reason]], which is the first principle of human acts".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Thomas, Aquinas |title=On law, morality, and politics |date=2002 |publisher=Hackett Pub |others=Regan, Richard J., Baumgarth, William P. |isbn=0872206637 |edition=2nd |location=Indianapolis |oclc=50423002}}</ref> He regarded people as by nature [[rationality|rational]] beings, concluding that it becomes morally appropriate that they should behave in a way that conforms to their rational nature. Thus, to be valid, any law must conform to natural law and coercing people to conform to that law is morally acceptable. In the 1760s, [[William Blackstone]] described the thesis:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Blackstone, William |title=Commentaries on the laws of England |date=1979 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |others=William Blackstone Collection (Library of Congress) |isbn=0226055361 |location=Chicago |page=41 |oclc=4832359}}</ref>

: "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."

But [[John Austin (legal philosophy)|John Austin]] (1790–1859), an early [[Legal positivism|positivist]], applied [[utilitarianism]] in accepting the calculating nature of human beings and the existence of an objective morality. He denied that the legal validity of a norm depends on whether its content conforms to morality. Thus, in Austinian terms, a moral code can objectively determine what people ought to do, the law can embody whatever norms the legislature decrees to achieve social utility, but every individual remains free to choose what to do. Similarly, [[H. L. A. Hart|H.L.A. Hart]] saw the law as an aspect of [[sovereignty]], with lawmakers able to adopt any law as a means to a moral end.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus |title=The concept of law |date=1994 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=0198761228 |edition=2nd |location=Oxford |oclc=31410701}}</ref>

Thus the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a proposition of law involved internal [[logic]] and [[consistency]], and that the state's agents used state power with [[Social responsibility|responsibility]]. [[Ronald Dworkin]] rejects Hart's theory and proposes that all individuals should expect the equal respect and concern of those who govern them as a fundamental political right. He offers a theory of compliance overlaid by a theory of [[deference]] (the citizen's duty to obey the law) and a theory of enforcement, which identifies the legitimate goals of enforcement and punishment. Legislation must conform to a theory of legitimacy, which describes the circumstances under which a particular person or group is entitled to make law, and a theory of legislative justice, which describes the law they are entitled or obliged to make.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dworkin, Ronald. |url=https://archive.org/details/takingrightsseri00dwor |title=Taking rights seriously : [with a new appendix, a response to critics] |date=1978 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=0674867114 |location=Cambridge |oclc=4313351 |url-access=registration}}</ref>

There are natural-law theorists who have accepted the idea of enforcing the prevailing morality as a primary function of the law.<ref>{{cite book |last=Finnis |first=John |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-theories/ |title=Natural Law & Natural Rights |publisher=[[Oxford University Press|OUP]] |year=2015 |isbn=978-0199599141 |quote=The moral standards...which Dworkin (in line with natural law theory) treats as capable of being morally objective & true, thus function as a direct source of law and...as already law, except when their fit with the whole set of social-fact sources in the relevant community is so weak that it would be more accurate (according to Dworkin) to say that judges who apply them are applying morality not law. |access-date=2019-07-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190806015838/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-theories/ |archive-date=2019-08-06 |url-status=live |department=3.2 Natural law & (purely) positive law as concurrent dimensions of legal reasoning}}</ref> This view entails the problem that it makes any moral criticism of the law impossible: if conformity with natural law forms a necessary condition for legal validity, all valid law must, by definition, count as morally just. Thus, on this line of reasoning, the legal validity of a norm necessarily entails its moral justice.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Bix |first=Brian H. |date=August 2015 |title=Kelsen, Hart, & legal normativity |department=3.3 Law and morality |journal= Revus|volume=34 |issue=34 |doi=10.4000/revus.3984 |quote=...it was part of the task of a legal theorist to explain the 'normativity' or 'authority' of law, by which they meant 'our sense that ‘legal’ norms provide agents with special reasons for acting, reasons they would not have if the norm were not a ‘legal’ one'...this may be a matter calling more for a psychological or sociological explanation, rather than a philosophical one. |doi-access=free}}</ref>

=== Corrections and punishment ===
{{Main|Corrections|Punishment}}
Authorities may respond to crime through corrections, carrying out punishment as a means to [[censure]] the criminal act.{{Sfn|Hoefnagels|1973|p=138}} Punishment is generally reserved for serious offenses. Individuals regularly engage in activity that could be scrutinized under criminal law but are deemed inconsequential.{{Sfn|Hoefnagels|1973|p=133}} [[Retributive justice]] seeks to create a system of [[accountability]] and punish criminals in a way that knowingly causes suffering.{{Sfn|Hoefnagels|1973|pp=17–18}} This may arise out of a feeling that criminals deserve to suffer and that punishment should exist for its own sake. The existence of punishment also creates an effect of [[Deterrence (penology)|deterrence]] that discourages criminal action for fear of punishment.{{Sfn|Ashworth|Horder|2013|p=16}} 

[[Rehabilitation (penology)|Rehabilitation]] seeks to understand and mitigate the causes of a criminal's unlawful action to prevent [[recidivism]].{{Sfn|Lipsey|Landenberger|Chapman|2004|p=211}} Different criminological theories propose different methods of rehabilitation, including strengthening [[Social network|social networks]], reducing [[poverty]], influencing [[Value (ethics and social sciences)|values]], and providing [[therapy]] for physical and mental ailments.{{Sfn|Lipsey|Landenberger|Chapman|2004|pp=212–213}} Rehabilitative programs may include [[counseling]] or [[vocational education]].{{Sfn|Lipsey|Landenberger|Chapman|2004|p=215}}

Developed nations are less likely to use physical punishments. Instead, they will impose financial penalties or imprisonment.{{sfn|Roth|2014|p=11}} In places with widespread corruption or limited [[rule of law]], crime may be punished extralegally through [[mob rule]] and [[lynching]].{{sfn|Roth|2014|p=24}}

Whether a crime can be resolved through financial compensation varies depending on the culture and the specific context of the crime. Historically, many societies have absolved acts of homicide through compensation to the victim's relatives.{{sfn|Roth|2014|p=23}}