Editing Battle of Gettysburg (section)

===Decisive victory controversies {{anchor|decisive}}===

The nature of the result of the Battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of controversy. Although not seen as overwhelmingly significant at the time, particularly since the war continued for almost two years, in retrospect it has often been cited as the [[Turning point of the American Civil War|"turning point"]], usually in combination with the fall of Vicksburg the following day.<ref name=TP/> This is based on the observation that, after Gettysburg, Lee's army conducted no more strategic offensives—his army merely reacted to the initiative of Ulysses S. Grant in 1864 and 1865—and by the speculative viewpoint of the Lost Cause writers that a Confederate victory at Gettysburg might have resulted in the end of the war.<ref>McPherson, p. 665; Gallagher, ''Lee and His Generals'', pp. 207–208.</ref>
{{Quote box
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|quote=[The Army of the Potomac] had won a victory. It might be less of a victory than Mr. Lincoln had hoped for, but it was nevertheless a victory—and, because of that, it was no longer possible for the Confederacy to win the war. The North might still lose it, to be sure, if the soldiers or the people should lose heart, but outright defeat was no longer in the cards.
|source=[[Bruce Catton]], ''Glory Road''<ref>Catton, p. 331.</ref>
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It is currently a widely held view that Gettysburg was a [[decisive victory]] for the Union, but the term is considered imprecise. It is inarguable that Lee's offensive on July 3 was turned back decisively and his campaign in Pennsylvania was terminated prematurely (although the Confederates at the time argued that this was a temporary setback and that the goals of the campaign were largely met). However, when the more common definition of "decisive victory" is intended—an indisputable military victory of a battle that determines or significantly influences the ultimate result of a conflict—historians are divided. For example, [[David J. Eicher]] called Gettysburg a "strategic loss for the Confederacy" and James M. McPherson wrote that "Lee and his men would go on to earn further laurels. But they never again possessed the power and reputation they carried into Pennsylvania those palmy summer days of 1863."<ref>Eicher, p. 550; McPherson, p. 665</ref>

However, Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones wrote that the "strategic impact of the Battle of Gettysburg was ... fairly limited." Steven E. Woodworth wrote that "Gettysburg proved only the near impossibility of decisive action in the Eastern theater." Edwin Coddington pointed out the heavy toll on the Army of the Potomac and that "after the battle Meade no longer possessed a truly effective instrument for the accomplishments of his task. The army needed a thorough reorganization with new commanders and fresh troops, but these changes were not made until Grant appeared on the scene in March 1864." Joseph T. Glatthaar wrote that "Lost opportunities and near successes plagued the Army of Northern Virginia during its Northern invasion," yet after Gettysburg, "without the distractions of duty as an invading force, without the breakdown of discipline, the Army of Northern Virginia [remained] an extremely formidable force." [[Ed Bearss]] wrote, "Lee's invasion of the North had been a costly failure. Nevertheless, at best the Army of the Potomac had simply preserved the strategic stalemate in the Eastern Theater ..."<ref>Hattaway and Jones, p. 415; Woodworth, p. xiii; Coddington, p. 573; Glatthaar, p. 288; Bearss, p. 202.</ref> Historian Alan Guelzo notes that Gettysburg and Vicksburg did not end the war and that the war would go on for two more years.<ref>Guelzo, p. 463.</ref> He also noted that a little more than a year later Federal armies appeared hopelessly mired in sieges at Petersburg and Atlanta.<ref>Guelzo, p. 464.</ref>

Peter Carmichael refers to the military context for the armies, the "horrendous losses at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, which effectively destroyed Lee's offensive capacity," implying that these cumulative losses were not the result of a single battle. Thomas Goss, writing in the U.S. Army's ''Military Review'' journal on the definition of "decisive" and the application of that description to Gettysburg, concludes: "For all that was decided and accomplished, the Battle of Gettysburg fails to earn the label 'decisive battle'."<ref>Carmichael, p. xvii; {{cite journal |last=Goss |first=Major Thomas |date=July–August 2004 |title=Gettysburg's "Decisive Battle" |journal=Military Review |pages=11–16 |url=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/goss.pdf |access-date=November 11, 2009 |archive-date=February 2, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070202172827/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/goss.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> The military historian [[John Keegan]] agrees. Gettysburg was a landmark battle, the largest of the war and it would not be surpassed. The Union had restored to it the belief in certain victory, and the loss dispirited the Confederacy. If "not exactly a decisive battle", Gettysburg was the end of Confederate use of Northern Virginia as a military buffer zone, the setting for Grant's [[Overland Campaign]].<ref>Keegan, pp. 202, 239.</ref>