Editing Truth (section)

===Kant (1724–1804)===
[[Immanuel Kant]] endorses a definition of truth along the lines of the correspondence theory of truth.<ref name=StanfordCorr/> Kant writes in the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'': "The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed".<ref name = "Kant-1781">Kant, Immanuel (1781/1787), ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]''. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A58/B82.</ref> He denies that this correspondence definition of truth provides us with a test or criterion to establish which judgements are true. He states in his logic lectures:<ref name = "Kant-1801">Kant, Immanuel (1801), ''The Jäsche Logic'', in ''Lectures on Logic''. Translated and edited by J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 557–558.</ref>
<blockquote>...{{nbsp}}Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only ''by cognizing it''.<!-- I wonder if the original had this cursive... --> Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object.{{pb}} The ancients called such a circle in explanation a ''diallelon''. And actually the logicians were always reproached with this mistake by the sceptics, who observed that with this definition of truth it is just as when someone makes a statement before a court and in doing so appeals to a witness with whom no one is acquainted, but who wants to establish his credibility by maintaining that the one who called him as witness is an honest man. The accusation was grounded, too. Only the solution of the indicated problem is impossible without qualification and for every man.{{nbsp}}...</blockquote>
This passage makes use of his distinction between nominal and real definitions. A nominal definition explains the meaning of a linguistic expression. A real definition describes the essence of certain [[Object (philosophy)|objects]] and enables us to determine whether any given item falls within the definition.<ref name = "Vanzo-Kant">Alberto Vanzo, "Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth", ''Kant-Studien'', 101 (2010), pp. 147–166.</ref> Kant holds that the definition of truth is merely nominal and, therefore, we cannot employ it to establish which judgements are true. According to Kant, the ancient skeptics were critical of the logicians for holding that, by means of a merely nominal definition of truth, they can establish which judgements are true. They were trying to do something that is "impossible without qualification and for every man".<ref name = "Kant-1801" />