Editing Schlieffen Plan (section)

===1990s–present===
====German reunification====
In the 1990s, after the dissolution of the [[German Democratic Republic]], it was discovered that some Great General Staff records had survived the [[Bombing of Berlin in World War II|Potsdam bombing]] in 1945 and been confiscated by [[Soviet Military Administration in Germany]] authorities. About {{nowrap|3,000 files}} and {{nowrap|50 boxes}} of documents were handed over to the {{lang|de|Bundesarchiv}} ([[German Federal Archives]]) containing the working notes of {{lang|de|Reichsarchiv}} historians, business documents, research notes, studies, field reports, draft manuscripts, galley proofs, copies of documents, newspaper clippings and other papers. The trove shows that {{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}} is a "generally accurate, academically rigorous and straightforward account of military operations", when compared to other contemporary official accounts.{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2013|pp=2–3}} Six volumes cover the first {{nowrap|151 days}} of the war in {{nowrap|3,255 pages}} {{nowrap|(40 per cent}} of the series). The first volumes attempted to explain why the German war plans failed and who was to blame.{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2013|pp=7–8}}

In 2002, ''RH 61/v.96'', a summary of German war planning from 1893 to 1914 was discovered in records written from the late 1930s to the early 1940s. The summary was for a revised edition of the volumes of {{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}} on the Marne campaign and was made available to the public.{{sfn|Zuber|2011|p=17}} Study of pre-war German General Staff war planning and the other records, made an outline of German war-planning possible for the first time, proving many guesses wrong.{{sfnm|1a1=Zuber|1y=2002|1pp=7–9|2a1=Zuber|2y=2011|2p=174}} An inference that ''all'' of Schlieffen's war-planning was offensive, came from the extrapolation of his writings and speeches on ''tactical'' matters to the realm of ''strategy''.{{sfnm|1a1=Zuber|1y=2002|1pp=291, 303–304|2a1=Zuber|2y=2011|2pp=8–9}} In 2014, Terence Holmes wrote

{{quote|There is no evidence here [in Schlieffen's thoughts on the 1901 {{lang|de|Generalstabsreise Ost}} (eastern war game)]—or anywhere else, come to that—of a Schlieffen ''[[credo]]'' dictating a strategic attack through Belgium in the case of a two-front war. That may seem a rather bold statement, as Schlieffen is positively renowned for his will to take the offensive. The idea of attacking the enemy's flank and rear is a constant refrain in his military writings. But we should be aware that he very often speaks of an attack when he means ''counter-attack''. Discussing the proper German response to a French offensive between Metz and Strasbourg [as in the later 1913 French deployment-scheme Plan XVII and actual Battle of the Frontiers in 1914], he insists that the invading army must not be driven back to its border position, but annihilated on German territory, and "that is possible only by means of an attack on the enemy's flank and rear". Whenever we come across that formula we have to take note of the context, which frequently reveals that Schlieffen is talking about a counter-attack in the framework of a defensive strategy.{{sfn|Holmes|2014|p=206}}}}

and the most significant of these errors was an assumption that a model of a two-front war against France and Russia, was the ''only'' German deployment plan. The thought-experiment and the later deployment plan modelled an isolated Franco-German war (albeit with aid from German allies), the 1905 plan was one of three and then four plans available to the Great General Staff. A lesser error was that the plan modelled the decisive defeat of France in one campaign of fewer than forty days and that Moltke the Younger foolishly weakened the attack, by being over-cautious and strengthening the defensive forces in Alsace-Lorraine. {{lang|de|Aufmarsch I West}} had the more modest aim of forcing the French to choose between losing territory or committing the French army to a [[decisive battle]], in which it could be terminally weakened and then finished off later

{{quote|The plan was predicated on a situation when there would be no enemy in the east [...] there was no six-week deadline for completing the western offensive: the speed of the Russian advance was irrelevant to a plan devised for a war scenario excluding Russia.|Holmes{{sfn|Holmes|2003|pp=513–516}}}}

and Moltke made no more alterations to {{lang|de|Aufmarsch I West}} but came to prefer {{lang|de|Aufmarsch II West}} and tried to apply the offensive strategy of the former to the latter.{{sfn|Zuber|2010|p=133}}

====Robert Foley====
In 2005, [[Robert T. Foley|Robert Foley]] wrote that Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger had recently been severely criticised by [[Martin Kitchen]], who had written that Schlieffen was a narrow-minded [[technocrat]], obsessed with [[minutiae]]. [[Arden Bucholz]] had called Moltke too untrained and inexperienced to understand war planning, which prevented him from having a war policy from 1906 to 1911; it was the failings of both men that caused them to keep a strategy that was doomed to fail. Foley wrote that Schlieffen and Moltke had good reason to retain {{lang|de|Vernichtungsstrategie}} as the foundation of their planning, despite their doubts as to its validity. Schlieffen had been convinced that only in a short war was there the possibility of victory and that by making the army operationally superior to its potential enemies, {{lang|de|Vernichtungsstrategie}} could be made to work. The unexpected weakening of the Russian army in 1904–1905 and the exposure of its incapacity to conduct a modern war, which was expected to continue for a long time, made a short war possible again. Since the French had a defensive strategy, the Germans would have to take the initiative and invade France, which was shown to be feasible by war games in which French border fortifications were outflanked.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=79–80}}

Moltke continued with the offensive plan, after it was seen that the enfeeblement of Russian military power had been for a much shorter period than Schlieffen had expected. The substantial revival in Russian military power that began in 1910 would certainly have matured by 1922, making the Tsarist army unbeatable. The end of the possibility of a short, eastern war and the certainty of increasing Russian military power meant that Moltke had to look to the west for a quick victory, before Russian mobilisation was complete. Speed meant an offensive strategy and made doubts about the possibility of forcing defeat on the French army irrelevant. The only way to avoid becoming bogged down in the French fortress zones was by a flanking move into terrain where open warfare was possible and the German army could fight a {{lang|de|Bewegungskrieg}} (a war of manoeuvre). Moltke used the assassination of [[Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria|Archduke Franz Ferdinand]] on 28 June 1914, as an excuse to attempt {{lang|de|Vernichtungsstrategie}} against France, before Russian rearmament deprived Germany of any hope of victory.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=80–81}}

====Terence Holmes====
In 2013, Holmes published a summary of his thinking about the Schlieffen Plan and the debates about it in ''Not the Schlieffen Plan''. He wrote that people believed that the Schlieffen Plan was for a grand offensive against France to gain a decisive victory in six weeks. The Russians would be held back and then defeated with reinforcements rushed by rail from the west. Holmes wrote that no-one had produced a source showing that Schlieffen intended a huge right-wing flanking move into France, ''in a two-front war''. The 1905 Memorandum was for ''War against France'', in which Russia would be unable to participate. Schlieffen had thought about such an attack on two general staff rides ({{lang|de|Generalstabsreisen}}) in 1904, on the staff ride of 1905 and in the deployment plan {{lang|de|Aufmarsch West}} I, for 1905–06 and 1906–07, in which all of the German army fought the French. In none of these plans was a two-front war contemplated; the common view that Schlieffen thought that such an offensive would guarantee victory in a two-front war was wrong. In his last exercise critique in December 1905, Schlieffen wrote that the Germans would be so outnumbered against France and Russia, that the Germans must rely on a counter-offensive strategy against both enemies, to eliminate one as quickly as possible.{{sfn|Holmes|2014a|pp=55–57}}

In 1914, Moltke the Younger attacked Belgium and France with {{nowrap|34 corps,}} rather than the {{frac|48|1|2}} corps specified in the Schlieffen Memorandum, Moltke had insufficient troops to advance around the west side of Paris and six weeks later, the Germans were digging-in on the [[Aisne (river)|Aisne]]. The post-war idea of a six-week timetable, derived from discussions in May 1914, when Moltke had said that he wanted to defeat the French "in six weeks from the start of operations". The deadline did not appear in the Schlieffen Memorandum and Holmes wrote that Schlieffen would have considered six weeks to be far too long to wait in a war against France ''and'' Russia. Schlieffen wrote that the Germans must "wait for the enemy to emerge from behind his defensive ramparts" and intended to defeat the French army by a counter-offensive, tested in the general staff ride west of 1901. The Germans concentrated in the west and the main body of the French advanced through Belgium into Germany. The Germans then made a devastating counter-attack on the left bank of the Rhine near the Belgian border. The hypothetical victory was achieved by the 23rd day of mobilisation; nine active corps had been rushed to the eastern front by the 33rd day for a counter-attack against the Russian armies. Even in 1905, Schlieffen thought the Russians capable of mobilising in {{nowrap|28 days}} and that the Germans had only three weeks to defeat the French, which could not be achieved by a promenade through France.{{sfn|Holmes|2014a|pp=57–58}}

The French were required by the treaty with Russia, to attack Germany as swiftly as possible but could advance into Belgium only ''after'' German troops had infringed Belgian sovereignty. Joffre had to devise a plan for an offensive that avoided Belgian territory, which would have been followed in 1914, had the Germans not invaded Belgium first. For this contingency, Joffre planned for three of the five French armies (about {{nowrap|60 per cent}} of the French first-line troops) to invade Lorraine on 14 August, to reach the river Saar from Sarrebourg to Saarbrücken, flanked by the German fortress zones around Metz and Strasbourg. The Germans would defend against the French, who would be enveloped on three sides then the Germans would attempt an encircling manoeuvre from the fortress zones to annihilate the French force. Joffre understood the risks but would have had no choice, had the Germans used a defensive strategy. Joffre would have had to run the risk of an encirclement battle against the French First, Second and Fourth armies. In 1904, Schlieffen had emphasised that the German fortress zones were not havens but jumping-off points for a surprise counter-offensive. In 1914, it was the French who made a surprise attack from the {{lang|fr|Région Fortifiée de Paris}} (Paris fortified zone) against a weakened German army.{{sfn|Holmes|2014a|p=59}}

Holmes wrote that Schlieffen never intended to invade France through Belgium, in a war against France ''and'' Russia,

{{quote|If we want to visualize Schlieffen's stated principles for the conduct of a two front war coming to fruition under the circumstances of 1914, what we get in the first place is the image of a gigantic {{lang|de|Kesselschlacht}}  to pulverise the French army on German soil, the very antithesis of Moltke's disastrous lunge deep into France. That radical break with Schlieffen's strategic thinking ruined the chance of an early victory in the west on which the Germans had pinned all their hopes of prevailing in a two-front war.{{sfn|Holmes|2014a|pp=60–61}}}}

====Holmes–Zuber debate====
[[Image:Schlieffen Plan.jpg|thumb|{{centre|"Western Front 1914; Schlieffen Plan of 1905. French Plan XVII" ([[United States Military Academy|USMA]]) "...a mishmash...." and "An armchair strategist's dream....", according to Terry Zuber (2011){{sfn|Zuber|2011|pp=54–57}}{{sfn|Schuette|2014|p=38}}{{sfn|Stoneman|2006|pp=142–143}}}}]]
Zuber wrote that the Schlieffen Memorandum was a "rough draft" of a plan to attack France in a one-front war, which could not be regarded as an operational plan, as the memo was never typed up, was stored with Schlieffen's family and envisioned the use of units not in existence. The "plan" was not published after the war when it was being called an infallible recipe for victory, ruined by the failure of Moltke adequately to select and maintain the aim of the offensive. Zuber wrote that if Germany faced a war with France and Russia, the real Schlieffen Plan was for defensive counter-attacks.{{sfn|Zuber|2011|p=176}}{{efn|Zuber wrote that Map 2 "Western Front 1914. Schlieffen Plan of 1905. French Plan XVII" in ''The West Point Atlas of American Wars 1900–1953'' (volume II, 1959) was a ''mish-mash'' of the real Schlieffen Plan map, the German plan of 1914 and the 1914 campaign. The map did not depict accurately Schlieffen's plan, the German plan of 1914 or the conduct of the 1914 campaign ("...an attempt to substitute 'little map, big arrows' for the systematic study of all three").{{sfn|Zuber|2011|pp=54–57}}}} Holmes supported Zuber in his analysis that Schlieffen had demonstrated in his thought-experiment and in {{lang|de|Aufmarsch I West}}, that {{frac|48|1|2}} corps (1.36 million front-line troops) was the ''minimum'' force necessary to win a ''decisive'' battle against France or to take strategically important territory. Holmes asked why Moltke attempted to achieve either objective with {{nowrap|34 corps}} (970,000 first-line troops) only {{nowrap|70 per cent}} of the minimum required.{{sfn|Holmes|2014|p=211}}

In the 1914 campaign, the retreat by the French army denied the Germans a decisive battle, leaving them to breach the "secondary fortified area" from the {{lang|fr|Région Fortifiée de Verdun}} (Verdun fortified zone), along the Marne to the {{lang|fr|Région Fortifiée de Paris}} (Paris fortified zone).{{sfn|Holmes|2014|p=211}} If this "secondary fortified area" could not be overrun in the opening campaign, the French would be able to strengthen it with field fortifications. The Germans would then have to break through the reinforced line in the opening stages of the next campaign, which would be much more costly. Holmes wrote that

{{quote|Schlieffen anticipated that the French could block the German advance by forming a continuous front between Paris and Verdun. His argument in the 1905 memorandum was that the Germans could achieve a decisive result only if they were strong enough to outflank that position by marching around the western side of Paris while simultaneously pinning the enemy down all along the front. He gave precise figures for the strength required in that operation: {{frac|33|1|2}} corps (940,000 troops), including {{nowrap|25 active}} corps (''active'' corps were part of the standing army capable of attacking and ''reserve'' corps were reserve units mobilized when war was declared and had lower scales of equipment and less training and fitness). Moltke's army, along the front from Paris to Verdun, consisted of {{nowrap|22 corps}} (620,000 combat troops), only {{nowrap|15 of}} which were active formations.|Holmes{{sfn|Holmes|2014|p=211}}}}

Lack of troops made "an empty space where the Schlieffen Plan requires the right-wing (of the German force) to be". In the final phase of the first campaign, the German right-wing was supposed to be "outflanking that position (a line west from Verdun, along the Marne to Paris) by advancing west of Paris across the lower Seine" but in 1914 "Moltke's right-wing was operating east of Paris against an enemy position connected to the capital city...he had no right-wing at all in comparison with the Schlieffen Plan". Breaching a defensive line from Verdun, west along the Marne to Paris, was impossible with the forces available, something Moltke should have known.{{sfn|Holmes|2014|p=197}}

Holmes could not adequately explain this deficiency but wrote that Moltke's preference for offensive tactics was well known and thought that, unlike Schlieffen, Moltke was an advocate of the ''strategic'' offensive,

{{quote|Moltke subscribed to a then fashionable belief that the moral advantage of the offensive could make up for a lack of numbers on the grounds that "the stronger form of combat lies in the offensive" because it meant "striving after positive goals".|Holmes{{sfn|Holmes|2014|p=213}}}}

The German offensive of 1914 failed because the French refused to fight a decisive battle and retreated to the "secondary fortified area". Some German territorial gains were reversed by the Franco-British counter-offensive against the 1st Army ({{lang|de|[[Generaloberst]]}} [[Alexander von Kluck]]) and 2nd Army ({{lang|de|Generaloberst}} [[Karl von Bülow]]), on the German right (western) flank, during the First Battle of the Marne {{nowrap|(5–12 September).}}{{sfn|Strachan|2003|pp=242–262}}

====Humphries and Maker====
In 2013, Mark Humphries and John Maker published ''Germany's Western Front 1914'', an edited translation of the {{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}} volumes for 1914, covering German grand strategy in 1914 and the military operations on the Western Front to early September. Humphries and Maker wrote that the interpretation of strategy put forward by Delbrück had implications about war planning and began a public debate, in which the German military establishment defended its commitment to {{lang|de|Vernichtunsstrategie}}. The editors wrote that German strategic thinking was concerned with creating the conditions for a decisive (war determining) battle in the west, in which an envelopment of the French army from the north would inflict such a defeat on the French as to end their ability to prosecute the war within forty days. Humphries and Maker called this a simple device to fight France and Russia simultaneously and to defeat one of them quickly, in accordance with {{nowrap|150 years}} of German military tradition. Schlieffen may or may not have written the 1905 memorandum as a plan of operations but the thinking in it was the basis for the plan of operations devised by Moltke the Younger in 1914. The failure of the 1914 campaign was a calamity for the German Empire and the Great General Staff, which was disbanded by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2013|p=10}}

Some of the writers of {{lang|de|Die Grenzschlachten im Westen}} (The Frontier Battles in the West [1925]), the first volume of {{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}}, had already published memoirs and analyses of the war, in which they tried to explain why the plan failed in terms that confirmed its validity. Foerster, head of the {{lang|de|Reichsarchiv}} from 1920 and reviewers of draft chapters like Groener, had been members of the Great General Staff and were part of a post-war "annihilation school".{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2013|pp=11–12}} Under these circumstances, the objectivity of the volume can be questioned as an instalment of the "battle of the memoirs", despite the claim in the foreword written by Foerster, that the {{lang|de|Reichsarchiv}} would show the war as it actually happened ({{lang|de|wie es eigentlich gewesen}}), in the tradition of Leopold von Ranke. It was for the reader to form conclusions and the editors wrote that though the volume might not be entirely objective, the narrative was derived from documents lost in 1945. The Schlieffen Memorandum of 1905 was presented as an operational idea, which in general was the only one that could solve the German strategic dilemma and provide an argument for an increase in the size of the army. The adaptations made by Moltke were treated in {{lang|de|Die Grenzschlachten im Westen}}, as necessary and thoughtful sequels of the principle adumbrated by Schlieffen in 1905 and that Moltke had tried to implement a plan based on the 1905 memorandum in 1914. The {{lang|de|Reichsarchiv}} historians's version showed that Moltke had changed the plan and altered its emphasis because it was necessary in the conditions of 1914.{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2013|pp=12–13}}

The failure of the plan was explained in {{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}} by showing that command in the German armies was often conducted with vague knowledge of the circumstances of the French, the intentions of other commanders and the locations of other German units. Communication was botched from the start and orders could take hours or days to reach units or never arrive. {{lang|de|[[Auftragstaktik]]}}, the decentralised system of command that allowed local commanders discretion within the commander's intent, operated at the expense of co-ordination. Aerial reconnaissance had more influence on decisions than was sometimes apparent in writing on the war but it was a new technology, the results of which could contradict reports from ground reconnaissance and be difficult for commanders to resolve. It always seemed that the German armies were on the brink of victory, yet the French kept retreating too fast for the German advance to surround them or cut their lines of communication. Decisions to change direction or to try to change a local success into a strategic victory were taken by army commanders ignorant of their part in the OHL plan, which frequently changed. {{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}} portrays Moltke in command of a war machine "on autopilot", with no mechanism of central control.{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2013|pp=13–14}}