Editing Political status of Taiwan (section)

=== Third Taiwan Strait crisis ===
{{Main|Third Taiwan Strait Crisis}}
[[File:ROCN kang ding class.jpg|thumb|300px|[[Republic of China Navy|ROCS]] {{sclass|Kang Ding|frigate|1}} with [[Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk|S-70C]] helicopter]]<!--ROCS=Republic of China Ship, USS=United States Ship, etc.-->

In 1996, the PRC began conducting [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis|military exercises near Taiwan]], and launched several [[ballistic missile]]s over the island. The saber-rattling was done in response to the possible re-election of then President Lee Teng-hui.<ref>Scobell, A. (1999). Show of force: the PLA and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Working Paper, 1–24.</ref> The United States, under President Clinton, sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region, reportedly sailing them into the Taiwan Strait.<ref>Ross, R. S. (2000). The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation: Coercion, credibility, and the use of force. International Security, 25(2), 87–123.</ref> The PRC, unable to track the ships' movements, and probably unwilling to escalate the conflict, quickly backed down. The event had little impact on the outcome of the election, since none of Lee's contestants were strong enough to defeat him, but it is widely believed that the PRC's aggressive acts, far from intimidating the Taiwanese population, gave Lee a boost that pushed his share of votes over 50 percent.<ref>Yu, T. (1997). Taiwanese democracy under threat: impact and limit of Chinese military coercion. Pacific affairs, 7–36.</ref>
This was an aggressively serious escalation in response to the Taiwan Strait and the ongoing conflict between China and Taiwan. This hostile reaction by mainland China is the result of China implementing Putnam's [[Two-level game theory]]. This theory suggests that the chief negotiator of a state must balance and abide by both international and domestic interests, and in some cases must focus more on domestic interests. In the case of China, "a serious escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait and raised the specter of war—one that could conceivably draw in the United States. This turn of events is either the result of pressure by hawkish, hardline soldiers on moderate, mild-mannered statesmen for a tougher, more aggressive response to Taiwan, or a strong consensus among both civilian and military leaders in the Politburo."<ref>Scobell, A. (1999). Show of force: the PLA and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Working Paper, p. 7. Par. 3–5, Lines 1–10.</ref>