Editing Nathan Bedford Forrest (section)

===Military doctrines===
Forrest is considered one of the Civil War's most brilliant tacticians by the historian [[Spencer C. Tucker]].<ref name="Tucker2014">{{cite book |author1=A. W. R. Hawkins III|author2=Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.|author3=Spencer C. Tucker|editor=Spencer C. Tucker|title=500 Great Military Leaders |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SZHgBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA244|year=2014|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-1-59884-758-1|page=244|chapter=Forrest, Nathan Bedford (1821–1877)|access-date=February 26, 2018|archive-date=May 9, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240509162505/https://books.google.com/books?id=SZHgBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA244|url-status=live}}</ref> Forrest fought by simple rules; he maintained that "war means fighting and fighting means killing" and the way to win was "to get there first with the most men".<ref name="Hurst2011p247">{{cite book|author=Jack Hurst|title=Nathan Bedford Forrest: A Biography|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1LIvYI_ER5kC&pg=PA247|year=2011|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=978-0-307-78914-3|page=247|access-date=February 27, 2018|archive-date=May 9, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240509181544/https://books.google.com/books?id=1LIvYI_ER5kC&pg=PA247#v=onepage&q&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref> U.S. Army General [[William Tecumseh Sherman]] called him "that devil Forrest" in wartime communications with [[Ulysses S. Grant]] and considered him "the most remarkable man our civil war produced on either side".<ref name="DerbyWhite1900">{{cite book|author1=George Derby|author2=James Terry White|title=The National Cyclopædia of American Biography|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-TkOAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA38|year=1900|publisher=J.T. White Company|page=38|quote=Sherman called him "the most remarkable man the civil war produced on either side ... He had a genius for strategy which was 'original and to me incomprehensible."|access-date=January 22, 2019|archive-date=May 9, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240509181714/https://books.google.com/books?id=-TkOAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Fredriksen2001">{{cite book|author=John C. Fredriksen|title=America's Military Adversaries: From Colonial Times to the Present|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZJlm7AQK-T4C&pg=PA164|year=2001|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-1-57607-603-3|page=164|access-date=February 26, 2018|archive-date=May 9, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240509181548/https://books.google.com/books?id=ZJlm7AQK-T4C&pg=PA164|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Starr2007" />

Forrest became well known for his early use of maneuver tactics as applied to a mobile horse cavalry deployment.<ref>{{citation |last=Sanders |first=John R. |date=August 17, 1994 |title=Operational Leadership of Nathan Bedford Forrest |location=Newport, R.I. |publisher=Naval War College |url=http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a283415.pdf|access-date=February 7, 2017|archive-date=February 19, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170219222520/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a283415.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> He grasped the doctrines of [[maneuver warfare|mobile warfare]]<ref>{{citation|title=Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History|editor1-last=Heidler|editor1-first=David Stephen|editor2-last=Heidler|editor2-first=Jeanne T.|editor3-last=Coles|editor3-first=David J.|year=2002|publisher=W.W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0-393-04758-5|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=SdrYv7S60fgC&pg=PA722 722]}}</ref> that would eventually become prevalent in the 20th century. Paramount in his strategy was fast movement, even if it meant pushing his horses at a killing pace, to constantly harass the enemy during raids by disrupting their supply trains and communications with the destruction of railroad tracks and the cutting of telegraph lines, as he wheeled around his opponent's flank. The Civil War scholar [[Bruce Catton]] writes:
{{blockquote|Forrest ... used his horsemen as a modern general would use [[motorized infantry]]. He liked horses because he liked fast movement, and his mounted men could get from here to there much faster than any infantry could; but when they reached the field they usually tied their horses to trees and fought on foot, and they were as good as the very best infantry.{{sfn|Catton|1971|p=160}}}}
Forrest is often erroneously quoted as saying his strategy was "to git thar fustest with the mostest". Now often recast as "Getting there firstest with the mostest",<ref>{{citation|url=http://mason.gmu.edu/~fdillon/military.htm|title=for example|publisher=George Mason University|first=Francis H.|last=Dillon|access-date=October 9, 2012|archive-date=August 5, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120805155014/http://mason.gmu.edu/~fdillon/military.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> this misquote first appeared in a ''New York Tribune'' article written to provide colorful comments in reaction to European interest in Civil War generals. The aphorism was addressed and corrected as "Ma'am, I got there first with the most men" by a ''New York Times'' story in 1918.<ref name=Times1918>{{Citation|title=Forrest|url=https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1918/05/28/118141825.pdf|year=1918|author=Times, New York|access-date=October 10, 2012|archive-date=August 18, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180818100733/https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1918/05/28/118141825.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> Though it was a novel and succinct condensation of the [[Principles of War|military principles]] of [[Force concentration|mass]] and [[Maneuver warfare|maneuver]], Bruce Catton writes of the spurious quote:
{{blockquote|Do not, under any circumstances whatever, quote Forrest as saying "fustest" and "mostest". He did not say it that way, and nobody who knows anything about him imagines that he did.{{sfn|Catton|1971|pp=160–61}}}}

====Criticism====

Military historian Christopher Rein takes a dim view of Forrest. While agreeing that Forrest was a skilled cavalryman, perhaps the best on the Confederate side, and tactically shrewd, Rein points out that the latter quality was most evident only in smaller engagements such as the [[First Battle of Murfreesboro]], [[Battle of Brice's Crossroads|Brice's Crossroads]] and [[Battle of Parker's Cross Roads|Parker's Cross Roads]], victories that were strategically peripheral to the Confederate cause and often came through bluffery or at the expense of inferior enemy troops. Forrest's celebrated personal bravery, willingness to lead from the front and get "in the mix" may have earned him considerable admiration in his day from both sides in the war, Rein notes. But those virtues, he continues, are useful to armies when they are demonstrated by junior officers and enlisted men, not generals who must consider the larger picture, as Forrest failed to do when he led troops to [[Battle of Ebenezer Church|Ebenezer Church]] rather than prepare a more robust defense at [[Battle of Selma|Selma]], a loss that effectively ended the war as the Union destroyed the Confederacy's last manufacturing center.{{sfn|Rein|2022|p=61}}

As part of larger formations, writes Rein, Forrest's tendency to take the initiative and fight without consulting his superiors hurt the Confederacy more than once. His failures at Chickamauga left Bragg with a more ephemeral victory than he might have otherwise gained, at [[Battle of Tupelo|Tupelo]] he escaped but at the cost of his ability to mount serious raids on Sherman's supply lines, and [[Battle of Johnsonville|Johnsonville]], despite its overwhelming success, hurt the Confederacy as it led Hood to delay his advance into Tennessee, allowing Thomas to consolidate his defenses for the [[Battle of Nashville]], where Union victory ended the [[Army of Tennessee]] as a force to reckon with, and with it the Confederacy's [[Western Theater of the American Civil War|Western Theater]] campaign.{{sfn|Rein|2022|p=61}}

In the anthology ''The Worst Military Leaders in History'', Rein further contends that the glorification of Forrest and his tactical brilliance by his many defenders, many like him minimally educated U.S. military cadets from the South who have seen him as also exemplifying the Southern virtues celebrated by the [[Lost Cause of the Confederacy]] myth, has had longterm negative effects on U.S. military performance:{{sfn|Rein|2022|pp=63–64}}
{{blockquote|... [G]reat leadership is only one aspect of command. Forrest was certainly a skilled ''tactician'', but great commanders must have ''strategic'' vision, or some semblance of how their victories translate into successful ''operations'' (known as "operational art") and, ultimately, into strategic victory. Otherwise, the commander runs the risk of falling into the same traps set for American commanders in Vietnam or Iraq: winning an unbroken string of tactical victories but never translating those successes into the strategic conditions necessary for a decisive victory.}}