Editing Mutual assured destruction (section)

==== Space weapons ====
* Strategic analysts have criticized the doctrine of MAD for its inability to respond to the proliferation of space weaponry. First, military space systems have unequal dependence across countries. This means that less-dependent countries may find it beneficial to attack a more-dependent country's space weapons, which complicates deterrence. This is especially true for countries like North Korea which have extensive ballistic missiles that could strike space-based systems.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Finch|first1=James P.|last2=Steene|first2=Shawn|date=2011|title=Finding Space in Deterrence: Toward a General Framework for "Space Deterrence"|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26270535|journal=Strategic Studies Quarterly|volume=5|issue=4|pages=10–17|doi=|jstor=26270535|issn=1936-1815}}</ref>  Even across countries with similar dependence, anti-satellite weapons ([[Anti-satellite weapon|ASATs]]) have the ability to remove the command and control of nuclear weapons.{{Citation needed|date=January 2023}} This encourages crisis-instability and pre-emptive nuclear-disabling strikes. Third, there is a risk of asymmetrical challengers.  Countries that fall behind in space weapon advancement may turn to using chemical or biological weapons. This may heighten the risk of escalation, bypassing any deterrent effects of nuclear weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Dorn|first=Bryan|date=2005|title=THE WEAPONISATION OF SPACE: justification and consequences|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45235390|journal=New Zealand International Review|volume=30|issue=3|pages=2–5|jstor=45235390|issn=0110-0262}}</ref>