Editing International Monetary Fund (section)

==Use==
In 2008, the SAIS Review of International Affairs revealed that the average overall use of IMF credit per decade increased, in real terms, by 21% between the 1970s and 1980s, and increased again by just over 22% from the 1980s to the 1991–2005 period. Another study has suggested that since 1950 the continent of Africa alone has received $300&nbsp;billion from the IMF, the World Bank, and affiliate institutions.<ref name="MukherjeeIEOED">{{cite journal |last1=Mukherjee |first1=Bumba |title=International Economic Organizations and Economic Development |journal=SAIS Review of International Affairs |year=2008 |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=123–137 |doi=10.1353/sais.0.0013 |s2cid=154755471 }}</ref>

A study by Bumba Mukherjee found that developing [[Democracy|democratic countries]] benefit more from IMF programs than developing [[Autocracy|autocratic countries]] because policy-making, and the process of deciding where loaned money is used, is more transparent within a democracy.<ref Name= "MukherjeeIEOED" /> One study done by [[Randall Stone]] found that although earlier studies found little impact of IMF programs on balance of payments, more recent studies using more sophisticated methods and larger samples "usually found IMF programs improved the balance of payments".<ref name="Jensen, pp 194-210"/>

===Exceptional Access Framework – sovereign debt===
The Exceptional Access Framework was created in 2003 when [[John B. Taylor]] was Under Secretary of the [[US Treasury]] for International Affairs. The new Framework became fully operational in February 2003 and it was applied in the subsequent decisions on Argentina and Brazil.<ref>[https://www.imf.org/external/np/acc/2004/eng/032304.pdf inf.org: "International Monetary Fund – Review of Exceptional Access Policy"], {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070508080842/https://www.imf.org/external/np/acc/2004/eng/032304.pdf |date=8 May 2007 }}, 23 March 2004</ref> Its purpose was to place some sensible rules and limits on the way the IMF makes loans to support governments with debt problem—especially in emerging markets—and thereby move away from the bailout mentality of the 1990s. Such a reform was essential for ending the crisis atmosphere that then existed in emerging markets. The reform was closely related to and put in place nearly simultaneously with the actions of several emerging market countries to place [[collective action clause]]s in their bond contracts.

In 2010, the framework was abandoned so the IMF could make loans to Greece in an unsustainable and political situation.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://economicsone.com/2014/03/25/why-the-imfs-exceptional-access-framework-is-so-important/ |title=Why the IMF's Exceptional Access Framework is So Important |first1=John |last1=Taylor |date=26 March 2014 |access-date=14 March 2017 |archive-date=6 July 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170706223708/https://economicsone.com/2014/03/25/why-the-imfs-exceptional-access-framework-is-so-important/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=taywsj>{{cite news |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303519404579352883092156074 |title=The Wall Street Journal |newspaper=The Wall Street Journal |date=13 February 2014 |via=online.wsj.com |last1=Taylor |first1=John B. |access-date=2 September 2017 |archive-date=2 May 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160502110355/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303519404579352883092156074 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The topic of sovereign debt restructuring was taken up by IMF staff in April 2013 for the first time since 2005, in a report entitled "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund's Legal and Policy Framework".<ref name="imf.org"/> The paper, which was discussed by the board on 20 May,<ref name="ReferenceA"/> summarised the recent experiences in Greece, St Kitts and Nevis, Belize, and Jamaica. An explanatory interview with deputy director Hugh Bredenkamp was published a few days later,<ref name="ReferenceB"/> as was a deconstruction by Matina Stevis of ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]''.<ref name="blogs.wsj.com"/>

The staff was directed to formulate an updated policy, which was accomplished on 22 May 2014 with a report entitled "The Fund's Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt: Preliminary Considerations", and taken up by the executive board on 13 June.<ref name="efj">[http://armstrongeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/THE-FUNDS-LENDING-FRAMEWORK-AND-SOVEREIGN-June-2014.pdf "The Fund's Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt – Preliminary Considerations" 22 May 2014] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714193756/http://armstrongeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/THE-FUNDS-LENDING-FRAMEWORK-AND-SOVEREIGN-June-2014.pdf|date=14 July 2014}} (also bears date June 2014; team of 20 led by Reza Bakir and supervised by [[Olivier Blanchard]], Sean Hagan, Hugh Bredenkamp, and Peter Dattels)</ref> The staff proposed that "in circumstances where a (Sovereign) member has lost market access and debt is considered sustainable ... the IMF would be able to provide Exceptional Access on the basis of a debt operation that involves an extension of maturities", which was labeled a "reprofiling operation". These reprofiling operations would "generally be less costly to the debtor and creditors—and thus to the system overall—relative to either an upfront debt reduction operation or a bail-out that is followed by debt reduction ... (and) would be envisaged only when both (a) a member has lost market access and (b) debt is assessed to be sustainable, but not with high probability ... Creditors will only agree if they understand that such an amendment is necessary to avoid a worse outcome: namely, a default and/or an operation involving debt reduction ... [[Collective action clause]]s, which now exist in most—but not all—bonds would be relied upon to address collective action problems."<ref name=efj/>