Editing Hirohito (section)

====Showa Tenno Dokuhaku Roku====
In December 1990, the [[Bungeishunjū]] published the Showa tenno dokuhaku roku (Dokuhaku roku), which recorded conversations Hirohito held with five Imperial Household Ministry officials between March and April 1946, containing twenty-four sections.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=5}} The Dokuhaku roku recorded Hirohito speaking retroactively on topics arranged chronologically from 1919 to 1946, right before the [[Tokyo War Crimes Trials]].{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=5}}

In Hirohito's monologue: <blockquote>It doesn't matter much if an incident occurs in Manchuria, as it is rural; however, if something were to happen in the Tientsin-Peking area, Anglo-American intervention would likely worsen and could lead to a clash.<ref name="Bix 1992 343–344">{{cite journal |last=Bix |first=Herbert |title=The Showa Emperor's "Monologue" and the Problem of War Responsibility |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/132824 |date=1992 |issue=2 |journal=The Journal of Japanese Studies |volume=18 |pages=343–344|doi=10.2307/132824 |jstor=132824 }}</ref></blockquote>

While he could justify the aggression of his military in China's northeastern provinces, he lacked confidence in Japan's capacity to win a war against the United States and Britain. He was also more aware than his military commanders of Japan's vulnerability to an economic blockade by Western powers.<ref name="Bix 1992 343–344"/>

Japan signed the [[Tripartite Pact]] in 1940 and another agreement in December 1941 that forbade Japan from signing a separate peace treaty with the United States.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} In the Dokuhaku roku, Hirohito said:

<blockquote>(In 1941,) we thought we could achieve a draw with the US, or at best win by a six to four margin; but total victory was nearly impossible ... When the war actually began, however, we gained a miraculous victory at Pearl Harbor and our invasions of Malaya and Burma succeeded far quicker than expected. So, if not for this (agreement), we might have achieved peace when we were in an advantageous position.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}}</blockquote>

The passage in the Dokuhaku roku refutes the theory that Hirohito wanted an early conclusion to the war owing to his value for peace. Instead, it provides evidence that he desired its end because of Japan's early military victories in Pearl Harbor and Southeast Asia.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}}

In September 1944, Prime Minister [[Kuniaki Koiso]] proposed that a settlement and concessions, such as the return of Hong Kong, should be given to [[Chiang Kai-shek]], so that Japanese troops in China could be diverted to the [[Pacific War]].{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=15-16}} Hirohito rejected the proposal and did not want to give concessions to China because he feared it would signal Japanese weakness, create defeatism at home, and trigger independence movements in occupied countries.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=16}}

As the war shifted unfavorably for Japan, his sentiments were recorded in the Dokuhaku roku as follows:
<blockquote> I hoped to give the enemy one good bashing somewhere, and then seize a chance for peace. Yet I didn't want to ask for peace before Germany did because then we would lose trust in the international community for having violated that corollary agreement.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=18}}</blockquote>

As the war front progressed northward, Hirohito persistently hoped for the Japanese military to deliver a "good bashing" at some point during the war, which meant securing a decisive victory and then leveraging that success to negotiate the most favorable terms possible for Japan.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-19}} In the autumn of 1944, he hoped for a victory at [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]], but Japan suffered defeat.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} On 14 February 1945, [[Fumimaro Konoe]] wrote a proposal to Hirohito, urging him to quell extremist elements within the military and end the war.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} Konoe argued that although surrendering to America might preserve imperial rule, it would not survive a communist revolution he believed was imminent.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} Hirohito was troubled by the ambiguity surrounding America's commitment to upholding imperial rule.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} He considered the advice of Army Chief of Staff [[Yoshijirō Umezu]], who advocated for continuing the fight to the bitter end, believing that the Americans could be lured into a trap on Taiwan, where they could be defeated.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} However, the Americans avoided Taiwan.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} Despite the defeat at the [[Battle of Okinawa]] and acknowledging Japan's imminent unconditional surrender following this defeat, Hirohito persisted in seeking another battlefield where a "good bashing" could be achieved, considering locations such as [[Yunnan]] or [[British rule in Burma|Burma]].{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}}

In August 1945, Hirohito agreed to the [[Potsdam Declaration]] because he thought that the American occupation of Japan would uphold imperial rule in Japan.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=5}}