Editing Hafez al-Assad (section)

=== Yom Kippur War ===
{{main|Yom Kippur War|l1 = Yom Kippur War}}

==== Planning ====
[[File:Hafez Assad during Yom Kippur War aganist Israel.jpg|thumb|248x248px|Assad and his generals planning the war.]]
Since the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, Assad was convinced that the Israelis had won the war by subterfuge;{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}} after gaining power, his top foreign-policy priority was to regain the Arab territory lost in the war.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}} Assad reaffirmed Syria's rejection of the 1967 [[UN Security Council Resolution 242]] because he believed it stood for the "liquidation of the [[Palestinian nationalism|Palestine question]]".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}} He believed, and continued to believe until long into his rule, that the only way to get Israel to negotiate with the Arabs was through war.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}}

When Assad took power, Syria was isolated;{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=185}} planning an attack on Israel, he sought allies and war material.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=186}} Ten weeks after gaining power, Assad visited the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=186}} The Soviet leadership was wary of supplying the Syrian government, viewing Assad's rise to power with a reserve and believing him to lean further West than Jadid did.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=187}} While he soon understood that the Soviet relationship with the Arabs would never be as deep as the United States' relationship with Israel, he needed its weapons.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=187}} Unlike his predecessors (who tried to win Soviet support with socialist policies), Assad was willing to give the Soviets a stable presence in the Middle East through Syria, access to Syrian naval bases (giving them a role in the peace process) and help in curtailing American influence in the region.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=187}} The Soviets responded by sending arms to Syria.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=187}} The new relationship bore fruit, and between February 1971 and October 1973 Assad met several times with [[List of leaders of the Soviet Union|Soviet leader]] [[Leonid Brezhnev]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=188}}
[[File:Hafez Assad with a Syrian soldier on the Golan Heights during October war in 1973.jpg|left|thumb|253x253px|Assad visits positions of the Syrian army.]]
Assad believed that Syria would have no chance in a war against Israel without Egyptian participation.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} He believed that if the [[United Arab Republic]] had not collapsed, the Arabs would already have liberated Palestine.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} For a war against Israel, Syria needed to establish another front.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} However, by this time Syria's relations with Egypt and Jordan were shaky at best.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} Planning for war began in 1971 with an agreement between Assad and [[Anwar Sadat]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=189}} In the beginning, the renewed Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based upon the proposed [[Federation of Arab Republics]] (FAR), a federation initially encompassing Egypt, Libya, Sudan (which left soon after FAR's first summit) and Syria.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=190}} Assad and Sadat used the FAR summits to plan war strategy, and by 1971 they had appointed Egyptian General Muhammad Sadiq supreme commander of both armies.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=192}} From 1972 to 1973, the countries filled their arsenals and trained their armies.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=192}} In a secret meeting of the Egyptian–Syrian Military Council from 21 to 23 August 1973, the two chiefs of staff (Syrian Youssef Chakkour and Egyptian [[Saad el-Shazly]]) signed a document declaring their intention to go to war against Israel.{{sfn|Seale|1990|pp=193–194}} During a meeting of Assad, Sadat and their respective defense ministers (Tlass and [[Hosni Mubarak]]) on 26–27 August, the two leaders decided to go to war together.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=194}}

Egypt went to war for a reason different from Syria's.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=195}} While Assad wanted to regain lost Arab territory, Sadat wished to strengthen Egypt's position in its peace policy toward Israel.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=195}} The Syrians were deceived by Sadat and the Egyptians, which would play a major role in the Arab defeat.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=197}} Egyptian Chief of Staff Shazly was convinced from the beginning that Egypt could not mount a successful full-scale offensive against Israel; therefore, he campaigned for a limited war.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=197}} Sadat knew that Assad would not participate in the war if he knew his real intentions.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=197}} Since the collapse of the UAR, the Egyptians were critical of the Ba'athist government; they saw it as an untrustworthy ally.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=197}}

==== The war ====
[[File:Column of Syrian tanks and armored vehicles invades Golan Heights in the beginning of the Yom Kippur war, 1973.jpg|thumb|274x274px|Column of the Syrian tank and Armoured vehicles entering Golan Heights, 1973.]]
At 14:05 on 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces (attacking through the [[Sinai Peninsula]]) and Syrian forces (attacking the [[Golan Heights]]) crossed the border into Israel and penetrated the Israeli defense lines.{{sfn|Seale|1990|pp=197–199}} The Syrian forces on the Golan Heights met with more intense fighting than their Egyptian counterparts, but by 8 October had broken through the Israeli defenses.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=205}} The early successes of the Syrian army were due to its officer corps (where officers were promoted because of merit and not politics) and its ability to handle advanced Soviet weaponry: tanks, artillery batteries, aircraft, [[Man-portable air-defense system|man-portable missiles]], the [[9M14 Malyutka|Sagger]] anti-tank weapon and the [[2K12 Kub]] anti-aircraft system on mobile launchers.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=205}} With the help of these weapons, Egypt and Syria defeated Israel's armor and air supremacy.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=205}} Egypt and Syria announced the war to the world first, accusing Israel of starting it, mindful of the importance of avoiding appearing as the aggressor (Israel accused the Arab powers of starting the Six-Day War when they launched [[Operation Focus]]).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=205}} In any case, early Syrian successes helped rectify the loss of face they had suffered following the Six-Day War.
[[File:Hafez al-Assad addresses Syrian troops fighting in the war against Israel.jpg|thumb|Assad speech to his soldiers, October 1973.]]
The main reason for the reversal of fortune was Egypt's operational pause from 7 to 14 October.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=205}} After capturing parts of the Sinai, the Egyptian campaign halted and the Syrians were left fighting the Israelis alone.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=207}} The Egyptian leaders, believing their war aims accomplished, dug in.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=208}} While their early successes in the war had surprised them, War Minister General [[Ahmad Ismail Ali]] advised caution.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=208}} In Syria, Assad and his generals waited for the Egyptians to move.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=208}} When the Israeli government learned of Egypt's modest war strategy, it ordered an "immediate continuous action" against the Syrian military.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=208}} According to Patrick Seale, "For three days, 7, 8, and 9 October, Syrian troops on the Golan faced the full fury of the Israeli air force as, from first light to nightfall, wave after wave of aircraft swooped down to bomb, strafe and napalm their tank concentration and their fuel and ammunition carriers right back to the [[Purple Line (ceasefire line)|Purple Line]]."{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=209}} By 9 October, the Syrians were retreating behind the Purple Line (the Israeli–Syrian border since the Six-Day War).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=210}} By 13 October the war was lost, but (in contrast to the Six-Day War) the Syrians were not crushed; this earned Assad respect in Syria and abroad.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=211}}
[[File:Hafez al-Assad on the front lines during the Yom Kippur War.jpg|left|thumb|206x206px|Assad on the front line of the October war.]]
On 14 October, Egypt began a limited offensive against Israel for political reasons.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=212}} Sadat needed Assad on his side for his peace policy with Israel to succeed,{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=212}} and military action as a means to an end.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=212}} The renewed Egyptian military offensive was ill-conceived. A week later, due to Egyptian inactivity, the Israelis had organised and the Arabs had lost their most important advantage.{{sfn|Seale|1990|pp=212–213}} While the military offensive gave Assad hope, this was an illusion; the Arabs had already lost the war militarily.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=213}} Egypt's behavior during the war caused friction between Assad and Sadat.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=213}} Assad, still inexperienced in foreign policy, believed that the Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based on trust and failed to understand Egypt's duplicity.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=213}} Although it was not until after the war that Assad would learn that Sadat was in contact with American National Security Advisor [[Henry Kissinger]] almost daily during the war, the seeds of distrust had been sown.{{sfn|Seale|1990|pp=214–215}} Around this time, Sadat called for an American-led ceasefire agreement between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; however, he was unaware that under Kissinger's tenure the United States had become a staunch supporter of Israel.{{sfn|Seale|1990|pp=215–218}}
[[File:Hafez Assad raising flag over Quneitra.jpg|thumb|The iconic moment of Assad raising the Syrian flag over Kuneitra, which he gained after the war.]]
On 16 October, Sadat—without telling Assad—called for a ceasefire in a speech to the [[People's Assembly of Egypt|People's Assembly]], the Egyptian legislative body.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=219}} Assad was not only surprised but could not comprehend why Sadat trusted "American goodwill for a satisfactory result".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=219}} [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Soviet Premier]] [[Alexei Kosygin]] visited Cairo, urging Sadat to accept a ceasefire without the condition of Israeli withdrawal from the [[Israeli-occupied territories|occupied territories]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=220}} While Sadat was reluctant at first, Kosygin returned on 18 October with satellite images showing 300 Israeli tanks in Egyptian territory.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=220}} The blow to Sadat's morale was such that he sent a cable to Assad, obliquely saying that all hope was lost.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=220}} Assad, who was in a better position, was still optimistic.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=221}} Under Soviet influence, Egypt called for a ceasefire on 22 October 1973, direct negotiations between the warring parties and the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=221}} The ceasefire resolution did not call for Israeli withdrawal from its occupied territories.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=221}} Assad was annoyed since he had not been informed beforehand of Sadat's change in policy (which affected them both).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=221}} On 23 October the Syrian government accepted the ceasefire, spelling out its understanding of UN Resolution 338 (withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories and the safeguarding of Palestinian rights).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=224}}