Editing Ethics (section)

== History ==
{{main|History of ethics}}
[[File:Head of Laozi marble Tang Dynasty (618-906 CE) Shaanxi Province China.jpg|thumb|alt=Head of Laozi marble Tang Dynasty (618–906 CE) Shaanxi Province China|According to [[Laozi]]'s teachings, which are central to conceptions of ethics in [[Daoism]], humans should aim to live in harmony with the [[Dao|natural order of the universe]].]]
The history of ethics studies how moral philosophy has developed and evolved in the course of history.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|p=394}} | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=622}} }}</ref> It has its origin in ancient civilizations. In [[ancient Egypt]], the concept of [[Maat]] was used as an ethical principle to guide behavior and maintain order by emphasizing the importance of truth, balance, and harmony.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brandon|1975|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eBy8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA474 474]}} | {{harvnb|Ortiz|2020|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=he7QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT7 Preface]}} | {{harvnb|Karenga|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ams2OPbmHMUC&pg=PA175 175–176]}} | {{harvnb|Armour|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3z5OzHgtK4sC&pg=PA134 134]}} }}</ref>{{efn|The first explicit discussions of Maat as a concept date to about 2100&nbsp;BCE.<ref>{{harvnb|Lipson|Binkley|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uVt7c3UX-zMC&pg=PA80 80]}}</ref>}} In [[ancient India]] starting in the 2nd millennium&nbsp;BCE,<ref>{{harvnb|Doniger|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nNsXZkdHvXUC&pg=PA103 103]}}</ref> the [[Vedas]] and later [[Upanishads]] were composed as the foundational texts of [[Hindu philosophy]] and discussed the role of [[Dharma|duty]] and the [[Karma|consequences of one's actions]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=Indian Philosophy: A Brief Historical Overview, The Ancient Period of Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Pappu|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sn-qD-gCX18C&pg=PA400 400]}} | {{harvnb|Sinha|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Vp_cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA81 81–82]}} }}</ref> [[Buddhist ethics]] originated in ancient India between the 6th and 5th centuries&nbsp;BCE and advocated [[Karuṇā|compassion]], [[Ahimsa|non-violence]], and the pursuit of [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|enlightenment]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thapar|1978|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fK3VTUrWsD0C&pg=PA48 48]}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Dalai Lama|2007}} }}</ref> [[Ancient China]] in the 6th century&nbsp;BCE{{efn|Dates for the emergence of Daoism are disputed and some theorists suggest a later date between the 4th and 3rd centuries&nbsp;BCE.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dynes|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pxjOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60]}} | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2. Classical Sources for Our Understanding of Daoism}} }}</ref>}} saw the emergence of [[Confucianism]], which focuses on moral conduct and [[self-cultivation]] by acting in agreement with virtues, and [[Daoism]], which teaches that human behavior should be in harmony with the [[Dao|natural order of the universe]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 1b. Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) of the Analects, § 1e. The Daodejing}} | {{harvnb|Boyd|Timpe|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OIskEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA64 64]}} | {{harvnb|Slingerland|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gSReaja3V3IC&pg=PA77 77]}} | {{harvnb|Junru|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jaOZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT87 87]}} }}</ref>

In [[ancient Greece]], [[Socrates]] ({{circa|469–399&nbsp;BCE}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=178}}</ref> emphasized the importance of inquiry into what a good life is by critically questioning established ideas and exploring concepts like virtue, justice, courage, and wisdom.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=623}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=394–396, 398}} }}</ref> According to [[Plato]] ({{circa|428–347&nbsp;BCE|lk=no}}),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=156}}</ref> to lead a good life means that the different parts of the soul are in harmony with each other.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=623}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=396–398}} }}</ref> For [[Aristotle]] (384–322&nbsp;BCE),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=13}}</ref> a good life is associated with being happy by cultivating virtues and flourishing.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=623}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=397–398}} }}</ref> Starting in the 4th century&nbsp;BCE, the close relation between right action and happiness was also explored by the [[Hellenistic]] schools of [[Epicureanism]], which recommended a simple lifestyle without indulging in sensory pleasures, and [[Stoicism]], which advocated living in tune with reason and virtue while practicing self-mastery and becoming immune to disturbing emotions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=623}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=399–400}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Epicureanism, § Stoicism}} }}</ref>

Ethical thought in the [[medieval period]] was strongly influenced by religious teachings. [[Christian philosophy|Christian philosophers]] interpreted moral principles as [[divine command]]s originating from God.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=623}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|p=401}} }}</ref> [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1224–1274&nbsp;CE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=185}}</ref> developed [[natural law]] ethics by claiming that ethical behavior consists in following the laws and order of nature, which he believed were created by God.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=623}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=403–404}} }}</ref> In the Islamic world, philosophers like [[Al-Farabi]] ({{circa|878–950&nbsp;CE|lk=no}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=63}}</ref> and [[Avicenna]] (980–1037&nbsp;CE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=19}}</ref> synthesized ancient Greek philosophy with the ethical teachings of Islam while emphasizing the harmony between reason and faith.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mattila|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5rptEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2]}} | {{harvnb|Sajoo|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=C7aKDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60]}} }}</ref> In medieval India, Hindu philosophers like [[Adi Shankara]] ({{circa|700–750&nbsp;CE|lk=no}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=175}}</ref> and [[Ramanuja]] (1017–1137&nbsp;CE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=160}}</ref>{{efn|Modern scholars have questioned these traditionally cited dates, suggesting that Ramanuja's life ran from 1077 to 1157.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ranganathan|loc=1. Rāmānuja's Life and Works}} | {{harvnb|Sydnor|2012|p=20}} }}</ref>}} saw the practice of spirituality to attain [[Moksha|liberation]] as the highest goal of human behavior.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dalal|2021|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Ranganathan|loc=Lead section, § 4b. Rāmānuja's Soteriology}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Dalal|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DH0vmD8ghdMC&pg=PA465 465]}} }}</ref>

[[File:1914 George Edward Moore (cropped).jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|alt=Photo of George Edward Moore|[[G. E. Moore]]'s book ''[[Principia Ethica]]'' was partly responsible for the emergence of metaethics in the 20th century.]]

Moral philosophy in the modern period was characterized by a shift toward a secular approach to ethics. [[Thomas Hobbes]] (1588–1679)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=88}}</ref> identified self-interest as the primary drive of humans. He concluded that it would lead to "a war of every man against every man" unless a [[social contract]] is established to avoid this outcome.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=624}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=404–406}} }}</ref> [[David Hume]] (1711–1776)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=91}}</ref> thought that only moral sentiments, like [[empathy]], can motivate ethical actions while he saw reason not as a motivating factor but only as what anticipates the consequences of possible actions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=624}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=408–409}} }}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=105}}</ref> by contrast, saw reason as the source of morality. He formulated a [[Deontology|deontological theory]], according to which the ethical value of actions depends on their conformity with moral laws independent of their outcome. These laws take the form of [[categorical imperative]]s, which are universal requirements that apply to every situation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=625}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=410–412}} }}</ref>

[[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=82}}</ref> saw Kant's categorical imperative on its own as an empty formalism and emphasized the role of social institutions in providing concrete content to moral duties.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=625}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=414–415}} }}</ref> According to the Christian philosophy of [[Søren Kierkegaard]] (1813–1855),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=110}}</ref> the [[Fear and Trembling#Teleological suspension of the ethical|demands of ethical duties are sometimes suspended]] when doing God's will.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2020|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191835759.001.0001/acref-9780191835759-e-117 Teleological Suspension of the Ethical]}} | {{harvnb|Gellman|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LYOpcYXhCkMC&pg=PA45 45]}} }}</ref> [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=144}}</ref> formulated criticisms of both Christian and Kantian morality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Leiter|2021|loc=§ 1.1 Scope of the Critique: Morality in the Pejorative Sense}} | {{harvnb|Bailey|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xXyHAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147 147]}} }}</ref> Another influential development in this period was the formulation of [[utilitarianism]] by [[Jeremy Bentham]] (1748–1832)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=25}}</ref> and [[John Stuart Mill]] (1806–1873).<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=132}}</ref> According to the utilitarian doctrine, actions should promote happiness while reducing suffering and the right action is the one that produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|pp=624–625}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=412–414}} }}</ref>

[[File:Simone de Beauvoir2.png|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Photo of Simone de Beauvoir|[[Simone de Beauvoir]] explored moral philosophy from the perspective of [[existentialism]].<ref>{{harvnb|Bergoffen|Burke|2023|loc=Lead section, § 5. ''The Ethics of Ambiguity'': Bad Faith, the Appeal, the Artist}}</ref>]]

An important development in [[Contemporary ethics|20th-century ethics]] in [[analytic philosophy]] was the emergence of metaethics.<ref>{{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=626}}</ref> Significant early contributions to this field were made by [[G. E. Moore]] (1873–1958),<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=443}}</ref> who argued that moral values are essentially different from other [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] found in the natural world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=626}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=418–419}} }}</ref> [[R. M. Hare]] (1919–2002)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=294}}</ref> followed this idea in formulating his [[Universal prescriptivism|prescriptivism]], which states that moral statements are commands that, unlike regular [[judgment]]s, are neither true nor false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=626}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=429–430}} }}</ref> [[J. L. Mackie]] (1917–1981)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=406}}</ref> suggested that every moral statement is false since there are no moral facts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=14–15}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|1988|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-msmrkE-67IC&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref> An influential argument for moral realism was made by [[Derek Parfit]] (1942–2017),<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=504}}</ref> who argued that morality concerns objective features of reality that give people reasons to act in one way or another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McDonald|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zCAxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT95 95–96]}} | {{harvnb|Lazari-Radek|Singer|2017|pp=282–283}} }}</ref> [[Bernard Williams]] (1929–2003)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=737}}</ref> agreed with the close relation between reasons and ethics but defended a subjective view instead that sees reasons as internal [[mental states]] that may or may not reflect external reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chappell|Smyth|2023|loc=§ 5. Internal and External Reasons}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|1999|pp=281–282}} }}</ref>

Another development in this period was the revival of ancient [[virtue ethics]] by philosophers like [[Philippa Foot]] (1920–2010).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=262}} | {{harvnb|Norman|2005|p=627}} }}</ref> In the field of political philosophy, [[John Rawls]] (1921–2002)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=589}}</ref> relied on [[Kantian ethics]] to analyze [[social justice]] as [[Justice as Fairness|a form of fairness]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Das|2021|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=a4w4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT118 118–119]}} | {{harvnb|Wenar|2021|loc=§ 4. Justice as Fairness: Justice Within a Liberal Society}} }}</ref> In continental philosophy, [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenologists]] such as [[Max Scheler]] (1874–1928)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=620}}</ref> and [[Nicolai Hartmann]] (1882–1950)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=296}}</ref> built ethical systems based on the claim that values have objective reality that can be investigated using the phenomenological method.<ref>{{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=421–422}}</ref> Existentialists like [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905–1980)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=168}}</ref> and [[Simone de Beauvoir]] (1908–1986),<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=74}}</ref> by contrast, held that values are created by humans and explored the consequences of this view in relation to individual freedom, responsibility, and authenticity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=426–428}} | {{harvnb|Bergoffen|Burke|2023|loc=Lead section, § 5. ''The Ethics of Ambiguity'': Bad Faith, the Appeal, the Artist}} }}</ref> This period also saw the emergence of [[feminist ethics]], which questions traditional ethical assumptions associated with a male perspective and puts alternative concepts, like [[Ethics of care|care]], at the center.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Norlock|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Imafidon|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5_i_CQAAQBAJ&pg=PT211 211]}} }}</ref>