Editing Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig (section)

====Doullens====
Haig had a GHQ Reserve which was massed in the north, 72 hours' march away, to protect the Channel Ports. The French Commander-in-Chief, [[Philippe Pétain|Pétain]], agreed to place two French armies under Fayolle as a reserve in the Somme valley, but could not agree to Haig's request to send 20 French divisions to Amiens.<ref name="Travers 1992, p.66-7">Travers 1992, pp. 66–67.</ref>

24 March was "probably the most traumatic day (Haig) had endured since" First Ypres in 1914. Half of BEF supplies came into Le Havre, Rouen and Dieppe and passed by train through Amiens, making it a major choke point.<ref name="Sheffield 2011, p.272">Sheffield 2011, p. 272.</ref> Planning that winter had left open the question of whether the BEF would retreat southwest or form "an island" around the Channel Ports through which Haig's armies drew the other half of their supplies. A retreat on the ports does not seem to have been decided until some days after 21 March.<ref>Travers 1992, pp. 69–70.</ref>

This is one of the occasions where doubt has been cast on the authenticity of Haig's diary. For example, Haig's typed diary – probably based on notes prepared in April – describes Pétain as "almost unbalanced and most anxious", claiming that after attending a Cabinet meeting in Paris, where he had been ordered to "cover Paris at all costs",<ref name="Sheffield 2011, p.273">Sheffield 2011, p. 273.</ref> he threatened to retreat on Paris, leaving the British right flank uncovered. Tim Travers argues that Pétain said at the meeting that he would only retreat on Paris if Haig retreated on the Channel Ports, and that Pétain had come away satisfied that Haig would not break contact. In a postwar exchange of letters with Haig Pétain denied that he had ordered a retreat on Paris or had threatened Haig that he might, a recollection which Herbert Lawrence appears to have supported.<ref>Travers 1992, pp. 66–68.</ref> It has been suggested that Haig and Lawrence may simply have misunderstood his intentions, and that any factual errors in Haig's diary were honest if mistaken recollections.<ref name="Sheffield 2011, p.275"/>

Haig's letter of 25 March, sent via [[Maxime Weygand|Weygand]], asked for 20 French divisions to cover the southern British flank as the BEF fought its way back "covering the Channel Ports".<ref name="Sheffield & Bourne 2005, p.8">Sheffield & Bourne 2005, p. 8.</ref> The letter is ambiguous and does not specifically mention a retreat "to" the ports. Sheffield argues that orders to Third Army were not a precursor to retreat but "a means to an end", pointing to orders for, if needs be, a counterattack onto the northern flank of the German attackers,<ref name="Sheffield 2011, p.275"/> and also argues that although GHQ had a duty to consider contingency plans, unlike in 1940, evacuation was never actually likely.<ref name="Sheffield 2011, p.279">Sheffield 2011, p. 279.</ref> Wilson claimed that Haig suggested Pétain be appointed Allied generalissimo (which is not consistent with Haig's later claim that Pétain was unwilling to help the British) and that he proposed Foch over Haig's objections.<ref name="Travers 1992, p.68">Travers 1992, p. 68.</ref>

At the Doullens Conference (26 March), Haig accepted the appointment of [[Ferdinand Foch|Foch]] to coordinate reserves of all nationalities wherever he saw fit. In his typed diary Haig claimed much of the credit for Foch's appointment and to have insisted that he have wider powers over Pétain than Clemenceau had wanted to grant him.<ref name="Sheffield & Bourne 2005, p.8"/> Milner, who represented the British government at Doullens, recorded that Clemenceau was unhappy with Pétain's recent efforts, but claimed that he himself had persuaded Haig to accept the appointment of Foch; Haig's official biographer Duff Cooper gave Haig the credit but commented that the idea had probably occurred to several participants simultaneously.<ref>Gollin, 1964, pp. 505–507.</ref>

After a German offensive near Arras ("Mars", 28 March<ref name="Sheffield 2011, p.277">Sheffield 2011, p. 277.</ref>) was beaten back, between 29 and 31 March the Germans pushed on Amiens. A Canadian brigade took part in an action at [[Battle of Moreuil Wood|Moreuil Wood]]. Attacks on 4 April (Villers-Bretonneux, east of Amiens) and 5 April on the Third Army front were beaten back by British and Australian forces, although contingency plans were still being prepared to cover Rouen and Le Havre in case Amiens fell.<ref>Sheffield 2011, p. 278.</ref>