Editing Battle of Britain (section)

===Tactics===
[[File:Aircraft of the Royal Air Force, 1939-1945- Supermarine Spitfire. CH1451.jpg|thumb|''X4474'', a late production Mk I Spitfire of [[No. 19 Squadron RAF|19 Squadron]], September 1940. During the battle 19 Squadron was part of the Duxford Wing.]]

====Fighter formations====
In the late 1930s, Fighter Command expected to face only bombers over Britain, not single-engined fighters. A series of "Fighting Area Tactics" were formulated and rigidly adhered to, involving a series of manoeuvres designed to concentrate a squadron's firepower to bring down bombers. RAF fighters flew in tight, [[vic formation|v-shaped sections]] ("vics") of three aircraft, with four such "sections" in tight formation. Only the [[squadron leader]] at the front was free to watch for the enemy; the other pilots had to concentrate on keeping station.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=249}}</ref> Training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognised the weaknesses of this structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics during the battle because replacement pilots{{snd}}often with only minimal flying time{{snd}}could not be readily retrained,<ref>{{harvnb|Price|1996|p=26}}</ref> and inexperienced pilots needed firm leadership in the air only rigid formations could provide.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=250}}</ref> German pilots dubbed the RAF formations ''Idiotenreihen'' ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack.<ref name="Bungay 2000, p. 260."/><ref>{{harvnb|Holmes|2007|p=61}}</ref>

Front line RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies of their own tactics. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron formations used much looser formations with one or two "weavers" flying independently above and behind to provide increased observation and rear protection; these tended to be the least experienced men and were often the first to be shot down without the other pilots even noticing that they were under attack.<ref name="Bungay 2000, p. 260."/><ref>{{harvnb|Price|1980|pp=28–30}}</ref> During the battle, [[No. 74 Squadron RAF|74 Squadron]] under Squadron Leader [[Adolph Malan|Adolph "Sailor" Malan]] adopted a variation of the German formation called the "fours in line astern", which was a vast improvement on the old three aircraft "vic". Malan's formation was later generally used by Fighter Command.<ref>{{harvnb|Price|1996|p=55}}</ref>

====Squadron- and higher-level deployment====
The weight of the battle fell upon 11 Group. Keith Park's tactics were to dispatch individual squadrons to intercept raids. The intention was to subject incoming bombers to continual attacks by relatively small numbers of fighters and try to break up the tight German formations. Once formations had fallen apart, stragglers could be picked off one by one. Where multiple squadrons reached a raid the procedure was for the slower Hurricanes to tackle the bombers while the more agile Spitfires held up the fighter escort. This ideal was not always achieved, resulting in occasions when Spitfires and Hurricanes reversed roles.<ref name="Orange 2001, pp. 96, 100">{{harvnb|Orange|2001|pp=96, 100}}</ref> Park also issued instructions to his units to engage in frontal attacks against the bombers, which were more vulnerable to such attacks. Again, in the environment of fast-moving, three-dimensional air battles, few RAF fighter units were able to attack the bombers from head-on.<ref name="Orange 2001, pp. 96, 100"/>

[[File:The Battle of Britain HU54418.jpg|thumb|[[Royal Air Force]] (RAF) pilots during the Battle of Britain, with a [[Hawker Hurricane]] Mk I ''P3522'' in the backdrop]]

During the battle, some commanders, notably Leigh-Mallory, proposed squadrons be formed into "[[Big Wing]]s," consisting of at least three squadrons, to attack the enemy ''en masse'', a method pioneered by [[Douglas Bader]].

Proponents of this tactic claimed interceptions in large numbers caused greater enemy losses while reducing their own casualties. Opponents pointed out the big wings would take too long to form up, and the strategy ran a greater risk of fighters being caught on the ground refuelling. The big wing idea also caused pilots to overclaim their kills, due to the confusion of a more intense battle zone. This led to the belief big wings were far more effective than they actually were.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|pp=276–277, 309–310, 313–314, 320–321, 329–330, 331}}</ref>

The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as 12 Group was tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids. The delay in forming up Big Wings meant the formations often did not arrive at all or until after German bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=356}}</ref> Dowding, to highlight the problem of the Big Wing's performance, submitted a report compiled by Park to the Air Ministry on 15 November. In the report, he highlighted that during the period of 11 September – 31 October, the extensive use of the Big Wing had resulted in just 10 interceptions and one German aircraft destroyed, but his report was ignored.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=359}}</ref> Post-war analysis agrees Dowding and Park's approach was best for 11 Group.

Dowding's removal from his post in November 1940 has been blamed on this struggle between Park and Leigh-Mallory's daylight strategy. The intensive raids and destruction wrought during [[the Blitz]] damaged both Dowding and Park in particular, for the failure to produce an effective night-fighter defence system, something for which the influential Leigh-Mallory had long criticised them.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=354}}</ref>