Editing Baby boomers (section)

== Political evolution ==
In Europe, the period between the middle to the late twentieth century could be described as an era of mass politics, meaning people were generally loyal to a chosen political party. Political debates were mostly about economic questions, such as wealth redistribution, taxation, jobs, and the role of government. But as countries transitioned from having industrial economies to a post-industrial and globalized world, and as the twentieth century became the twenty-first, topics of political discourse changed to other questions and polarization due to competing values intensified.<ref name="Eatwell-2018">{{Cite book|last1=Eatwell|first1=Roger|title=National Populism – The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy|last2=Goodwin|first2=Matthew|publisher=Pelican Book|year=2018|isbn=978-0-241-31200-1|location=Great Britain|chapter=Chapter 6: De-alignment}}</ref>

Scholars such as [[Ronald Inglehart]] traced the roots of this new 'culture conflict' all the way back to the 1960s, which witnessed the emergence of the Baby Boomers, who were generally university-educated middle-class voters. Whereas their predecessors in the twentieth century—the Lost Generation, the Greatest Generation, and the Silent Generation—had to endure severe poverty and world wars, focused on economic stability or simple survival, the Baby Boomers benefited from an economically secure, if not affluent, upbringing and as such tended to be drawn to 'post-materialist' values. Major topics for political discussion at that time were things like the sexual revolution, civil rights, nuclear weaponry, ethnocultural diversity, environmental protection, European integration, and the concept of 'global citizenship'. Some mainstream parties, especially the social democrats, moved to the left in order to accommodate these voters. In the twenty-first century, supporters of post-materialism lined up behind causes such as LGBT rights, climate change, multiculturalism, and various [[Media activism|political campaigns on social media]]. Inglehart called this the "Silent Revolution". But not everyone approved, giving rise to what Piero Ignazi called the "Silent Counter-Revolution".<ref name="Eatwell-2018" /> The university-educated and non-degree holders have very different upbringing, live very different lives, and as such hold very different values.<ref name="Eatwell-2018c">{{Cite book|last1=Eatwell|first1=Roger|title=National Populism – The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy|last2=Goodwin|first2=Matthew|publisher=Pelican Book|year=2018|isbn=978-0-241-31200-1|location=Great Britain|chapter=Chapter 3: Distrust}}</ref> Education plays a role in this 'culture conflict' as national populism appeals most strongly to those who finished high school but did not graduate from university while the experience of higher education has been shown to be linked to having a socially liberal mindset. Degree holders tend to favor tolerance, individual rights, and group identities whereas non-degree holders lean towards [[conformity]], and maintaining order, customs, and traditions.<ref name="Eatwell-2018b">{{Cite book|last1=Eatwell|first1=Roger|title=National Populism – The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy|last2=Goodwin|first2=Matthew|publisher=Pelican Book|year=2018|isbn=978-0-241-31200-1|location=Great Britain|chapter=Chapter 1: Myths|author-link=Roger Eatwell|author-link2=Matthew Goodwin}}</ref> While the number of university-educated Western voters continues to grow, in many democracies non-degree holders still form a large share of the electorate. According to the OECD, in 2016, the average share of voters between the ages of 25 and 64 without tertiary education in the European Union was 66% of the population. In Italy, it exceeded 80%. In many major democracies, such as France, although the representation of women and ethnic minorities in the corridors of power has increased, the same cannot be said for the working-class and non-degree holders.<ref name="Eatwell-2018c" />

In the United Kingdom, political scientists James Tilley and Geoffrey Evans conducted a longitudinal analysis of the electoral behavior of the same cohort between 1964 and 2010 and found that the average likelihood of a person voting for the right-leaning Conservative Party increased by 0.38% each year. Previous research suggests that aging and key life events—such as seeking employment, marriage, rearing children, and retirement—all make a person more skeptical of change and more conservative.<ref name="Eatwell-2018b" /><ref name="Tilley-2014">{{Cite journal|last1=Tilley|first1=James|last2=Evans|first2=Geoffrey|date=2014|title=Ageing and generational effects on vote choice: Combining cross-sectional and panel data to estimate APC effects|journal=Electoral Studies|volume=33|issue=1|pages=19–27|doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.007|s2cid=154982446|url=https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:49922ae3-fe8e-4c2d-8e3d-a725542208c0|access-date=August 11, 2022|archive-date=February 3, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230203081338/https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:49922ae3-fe8e-4c2d-8e3d-a725542208c0|url-status=live}}</ref>

In the United States, the baby boomers have been described as "the largest and most powerful generation in US history."<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Munger |first=Kevin |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/mung20086 |title=Generation Gap: Why the Baby Boomers Still Dominate American Politics and Culture |date=2022 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-20086-8 |doi=10.7312/mung20086|jstor=10.7312/mung20086 }}</ref> Even though the Baby Boomers were responsible for the cultural revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s, their political views shifted quickly and decisively during the 1980s. This was not because they wanted to reverse the changes they have brought about, but rather because they wanted to preserve the status quo. In fact, the level of support for conservatism among Boomers was higher than older generations when they were at the same age.<ref name="Twenge-2023b" /> Compared to younger generations coming of age in the early twenty-first century, boomers are more conservative as well.<ref name=":1" /> In addition, especially since the 1970s, working-class voters, who had previously formed the backbone of support for the [[New Deal]] introduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, have been turning away from the left-leaning Democratic Party in favor of the right-leaning Republican Party.<ref name="Eatwell-2018" /> As the Democratic Party attempted to make itself friendlier towards the university-educated and women during the 1990s, more blue-collar workers and non-degree holders left.<ref name="Eatwell-2018" />

[[File:US_political_leanings_by_age_(Gallup_2018).png|center|597x597px]]
In 2018, Gallup conducted a survey of almost 14,000 Americans from all 50 states and the District of Columbia aged 18 and over on their political sympathies. They found that overall, younger adults tended to lean liberal while older adults tilted conservative. More specifically, groups with strong conservative leanings included the elderly, residents of the Midwest and the South, and people with some or no college education. Groups with strong liberal leanings were adults with advanced degrees, whereas those with moderate liberal leanings included younger adults (18 to 29 and 30 to 49), women, and residents of the East. Gallup found little variations by income groups compared to the national average. Among people between the ages of 50 and 64—older Generation X and younger Baby Boomers—Gallup found that 23% identified as liberals, 32% as moderates, and 41% as conservatives. Among those aged 65 and over—older Baby Boomers—they found that 22% considered themselves liberals, 30% moderates, and 43% conservatives. (See above.)<ref>{{Cite news|last=Saad|first=Lydia|date=January 8, 2019|title=U.S. Still Leans Conservative, but Liberals Keep Recent Gains|work=Gallup Poll|department=Politics|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/245813/leans-conservative-liberals-keep-recent-gains.aspx|access-date=December 25, 2019|archive-date=December 24, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191224032436/https://news.gallup.com/poll/245813/leans-conservative-liberals-keep-recent-gains.aspx|url-status=live}}</ref>

In both Europe and the United States, older voters are the primary support base for the rise of nationalist and populist movements, though there are pockets of support among young people as well.<ref name="Eatwell-2018" /> During the 2010s, a consistent trend in many Western countries is that older people are more likely to vote than their younger countrymen, and they tend to vote for more right-leaning (or conservative) candidates.<ref name="BBC News-2018">{{Cite news|date=January 29, 2018|title=The myth of the 2017 'youthquake' election|work=BBC News|department=UK|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-42747342|access-date=December 15, 2019|archive-date=December 21, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191221111935/https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-42747342|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Sopel-2019">{{Cite news|last=Sopel|first=Jon|date=December 15, 2019|title=Will UK provide light bulb moment for US Democrats?|work=BBC News|department=US & Canada|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50785442|access-date=December 15, 2019|archive-date=December 15, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191215041939/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50785442|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Kight-2019">{{Cite news|last=Kight|first=Stef W.|date=December 14, 2019|title=Young people are outnumbered and outvoted by older generations|work=Axios|url=https://www.axios.com/2020-election-youth-vote-gen-z-895c7c4b-3ee2-4068-8b83-96178249d3f0.html|access-date=December 24, 2019|archive-date=December 24, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191224214437/https://www.axios.com/2020-election-youth-vote-gen-z-895c7c4b-3ee2-4068-8b83-96178249d3f0.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Due to the continued aging of these countries and the long life expectancy of their voters, right-leaning parties will continue to have a strong base of support.<ref name="Eatwell-2018b" /><ref name="Tilley-2014" />

When the 'Golden Age' of economic boom finally came to a grinding halt in the 1970s, various reforms were introduced. High-skilled workers earned even more than before whereas low-skilled workers saw their fortunes melt away and consequently became dependent on welfare. This created a schism between the two groups, with the upper-end of the working class now supporting the political Right upon realizing that it was they, viewing themselves as hard-working taxpayers, who were the ones financing welfare, something they would rather do without except in cases of emergency. The fact that some governments incautiously made such welfare programs quite generous during the boom years exacerbated resentment for 'the underclass'. Public housing complexes came to be viewed as nothing more than residences for those who were socially problematic and chronically dependent on welfare.<ref name="Hobsbawn-1996" />