Editing Abraham Lincoln (section)

====Foreign policy====
{{Further|Diplomacy of the American Civil War|History of U.S. foreign policy, 1861–1897}}
Lincoln had "limited familiarity with diplomatic practices" but had a "substantial influence on U.S. diplomacy" as the Union attempted to avoid war with Britain and France.{{sfn|Mahin|1999|pp=2&ndash;3}} At the start of the war, Russia was the lone [[great power]] to support the Union, while the other European powers had varying degrees of sympathy for the Confederacy. Lincoln's policy succeeded: all foreign nations were officially neutral throughout the Civil War, with none recognizing the Confederacy.{{sfn|Herring|2008|pp=226–229}} European leaders saw the division of the United States as having the potential to eliminate, or at least greatly weaken, a growing rival. They looked for ways to exploit the inability of the U.S. to enforce the [[Monroe Doctrine]]. Spain invaded the [[Dominican Republic]] in 1861, while France established [[second Mexican Empire|a puppet regime]] in [[Mexico]].{{sfn|Herring|2008|pp=224–229}} However, many in Europe also hoped for a quick end to the war, both for humanitarian reasons and because of the economic disruption it caused.{{sfn|Herring|2008|pp=240–241}}

Lincoln's foreign policy was deficient in 1861 in terms of appealing to European public opinion. The European aristocracy (the dominant class in every major country) was "absolutely gleeful in pronouncing the American debacle as proof that the entire experiment in popular government had failed." Union diplomats had to explain that United States was not committed to the ending of slavery, and instead they argued that secession was unconstitutional. Confederate spokesmen, on the other hand, were more successful by ignoring slavery and instead focusing on their struggle for liberty, their commitment to free trade, and the essential role of cotton in the European economy.{{sfn|Doyle|2014|pp=8, 69–70}} However, the Confederacy's hope that cotton exports would compel European interference did not come to fruition, as Britain found alternative sources of cotton and experienced economic growth in industries that did not rely on cotton.{{sfn|Herring|2008|pp=235–236}} Though the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation did not immediately end the possibility of European intervention, it rallied European public opinion to the Union by adding abolition as a Union war goal. Any chance of a European intervention in the war ended with the Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, as European leaders came to believe that the Confederate cause was doomed.{{sfn|Herring|2008|pp=242–246}}