Editing Schlieffen Plan (section)

====John Keegan====

In 1998, [[John Keegan]] wrote that Schlieffen had desired to repeat the frontier victories of the Franco-Prussian War in the interior of France but that fortress-building since that war had made France harder to attack; a diversion through Belgium remained feasible but this "lengthened and narrowed the front of advance". A corps took up {{cvt|29|km|order=flip}} of road and {{cvt|32|km|order=flip}} was the limit of a day's march; the end of a column would still be near the beginning of the march, when the head of the column arrived at the destination. More roads meant smaller columns but parallel roads were only about {{cvt|1|–|2|km|order=flip}} apart and with thirty corps advancing on a {{cvt|300|km|order=flip}} front, each corps would have about {{cvt|10|km|order=flip}} width, which might contain seven roads. This number of roads was not enough for the ends of marching columns to reach the heads by the end of the day; this physical limit meant that it would be pointless to add troops to the right wing.{{sfn|Keegan|1998|pp=36–37}}

Schlieffen was realistic and the plan reflected mathematical and geographical reality; expecting the French to refrain from advancing from the frontier and the German armies to fight great battles in the [[hinterland]] was found to be [[wishful thinking]]. Schlieffen pored over maps of Flanders and northern France, to find a route by which the right wing of the German armies could move swiftly enough to arrive within six weeks, after which the Russians would have overrun the small force guarding the eastern approaches of Berlin.{{sfn|Keegan|1998|pp=36–37}} Schlieffen wrote that commanders must hurry on their men, allowing nothing to stop the advance and not detach forces to guard by-passed fortresses or the lines of communication, yet they were to guard railways, occupy cities and prepare for contingencies, like British involvement or French counter-attacks. If the French retreated into the "great fortress" into which France had been made, back to the Oise, Aisne, Marne or Seine, the war could be endless.{{sfn|Keegan|1998|pp=38–39}}

Schlieffen also advocated an army (to advance with or behind the right wing), bigger by {{nowrap|25 per cent,}} using untrained and over-age reservists. The extra corps would move by rail to the right wing but this was limited by railway capacity and rail transport would only go as far the German frontiers with France and Belgium, after which the troops would have to advance on foot. The extra corps ''appeared'' at Paris, having moved further and faster than the existing corps, along roads already full of troops. Keegan wrote that this resembled a plan falling apart, having run into a logical dead end. Railways would bring the armies to the right flank, the Franco-Belgian road network would be sufficient for them to reach Paris in the sixth week but in too few numbers to defeat decisively the French. Another {{nowrap|200,000 men}} would be necessary for which there was no room; Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory was fundamentally flawed.{{sfn|Keegan|1998|pp=38–39}}